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Abstract 
The methodologies used to explore neuroatypical minds in fiction expose both the 
strengths and weaknesses of literary studies. How we interact with literature is often a 
microcosmic reflection of how we engage with the actual world and understanding the 
neuroatypical experience is essential to diversifying this engagement. Although literary 
studies are often the champion of empathy, critics who rely on outmoded theories may 
unwittingly ally themselves with antiquated ideas about neuroatypical minds and its 
experiential intersections with gender, class, and sexuality. In this thesis, I problematise 
several such methodologies used to approach neuroatypical functioning; in particular, 
psychoanalytic literary theory, which enacts the idiomatic separation of mind and body, the 
pathologizing of neuroatypicality, and reinforces the reductive timeline of diagnosis, 
treatment, and recovery. I argue for an empirically informed and multidisciplinary approach 
towards representations of mental processing in order to emphasise the rich potential literary 
studies has for the domain of cognitive study. My methodology is thus shaped by cognitive 
literary studies and based upon an ethos of equal exchange between the cognitive sciences 
and literary studies. Throughout this thesis, I engage with a variety of disciplines—including 
affect theory, disability studies, and memory studies—that offer insight into mental 
processing and evokes both the effable and ineffable qualities of the othered mind. The three 
texts I centre my discussion on are Mrs Dalloway (1925) by Virginia Woolf, Faces in the 
Water (1961) by Janet Frame, and My Name is Lucy Barton (2016) by Elizabeth Strout. All 
three novels articulate a subversive mode of representing neuroatypical minds that I suggest 
is further invigorated by a dialogue with the cognitive sciences. Following the diverse 
approach of my three authors, I demonstrate the need for a multidisciplinary methodology 
informed by epistemic care towards its neuroatypical subjects, and one that supports the 
urgent revision occurring in the relationship between artistic and scientific disciplines.   
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Madness has always been tied up with language because it manifests a particular relationship to 
unconscious material unavailable to ordinary consciousness. The important point might have 
more to do with how we hear the language of the mad than how we sanitise the language we 
use about madness. 
—Ashley Tauchert, “The Language of Madness”  
  
The language of madness—to borrow Ashley Tauchert’s phrase—has shaped some of 
Western literature’s most captivating and intimate narratives. The notion of madness has a 
monopoly on most concepts of mental atypicality, covering anything from genetic disorders, 
such as autism and obsessive-compulsive disorder, to mental illnesses like schizophrenia and 
major depressive disorder. Therefore, the literature and language of madness encompasses a 
broad spectrum of material, including both implicit and explicit representations of mental 
divergence. The three novels I consider in this thesis are emblematic of the evolution of the 
past century of fictional representations of atypical minds. Mrs Dalloway (1925), Faces in the 
Water (1961), and My Name is Lucy Barton (2016) each explore the diverse embodiment of 
madness, intervening in stigmatised perceptions of difference common to their respective 
time periods by wielding language in a subversive and critical manner.   
All three novels exemplify innovative forms of representing the social otherness of 
individual madness. Virginia Woolf, Janet Frame, and Elizabeth Strout construct narratives 
that test the boundaries of portraying embodied forms of cognitive functioning, paying 
particular attention to the processes of remembering and the fallibility of traumatic and 
affective memory. In focusing their narratives on experiences of madness, illness, and the 
institution, all three authors explore questions surrounding epistemic harm, empathy, and 
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ethical representation, and the responsibility of care that authors, readers, and critics share 
when approaching the other.  
Memory underpins the non-linear structures of Mrs Dalloway, Faces in the Water, 
and My Name is Lucy Barton, with each seeking to disrupt the oppressive hierarchies of 
gender, class, and sexuality that are enforced both within and beyond their story worlds. 
Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1925) follows the lives of Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus 
Smith across a single day in post-First World War London, with Clarissa and Septimus’ 
experiences doubled against one another throughout the novel. Clarissa is an upper-middle 
class woman who continues to experience the lingering effects of illness across her daily 
routine, and whose memory considers the romantic conflicts of her youth. Septimus is a 
working-class war veteran who is diagnosed with shell-shock, and is frequently haunted by 
paralysing hallucinations of the dead. In Faces in the Water (1961), Janet Frame depicts the 
complex life and mind of Istina Mavet without clear boundaries between past and present. 
Istina’s memory oscillates between her experiences at Treecroft and Cliffhaven mental 
institutions, with Istina positioned as both sane observer and insane other who explores the 
societal containment of madness through isolation and punishment. Finally, Elizabeth 
Strout’s My Name is Lucy Barton (2016) surveys the troubled life of Lucy Barton, centring 
on her hospitalisation in the mid-1980s. As the narrator, Lucy remembers the unexpected 
visit from her estranged mother during her hospital stay, which in turn conjures memories of 
a traumatic childhood coloured by classism, loneliness, and deprivation.  
My interest in including Mrs Dalloway, Faces in the Water, and My Name is Lucy 
Barton, both independently and comparatively, in this thesis is a result of both their situation 
within the historical narrative of madness and their shared investment in revealing the 
multifaceted experience of otherness. The positioning of the three novels (1925, 1961, 
2016)—spread across the past century of literature in English—demonstrates the progression 
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of cognitive representation in fiction, and I am able to better situate moments of innovation 
and evolution that have occurred across this narrative within each work. Moreover, utilising 
both historical and contemporary works that depict mental atypicality enables me to explore 
how a contemporary, cognitive methodology benefits (and benefits from) a variety of fiction. 
This thesis is also committed to demonstrating how fiction can help us comprehend the 
embodied nature of the mind and mental atypicality. Woolf, Frame, and Strout embrace a 
holistic understanding of the othered mind through an exploration of the parameters of 
otherness both within the body and its entangled, social identities. Each of the novels are 
written by women and largely centre upon the female experience of atypical minds and 
illness, and thus accentuate a particular awareness of the embodied experience of both 
othered minds and identities. Gender is one of many concerns that each novel, and this thesis, 
considers. Mrs Dalloway, Faces in the Water, and My Name is Lucy Barton each situate the 
othered mind within hierarchies of class, gender, sexuality, the family, and the institution 
(each of which may be considered the other or an othering force), and thus emphasise the 
diversity of experience that mental atypicality often accentuates. Throughout this thesis, I 
contend that all three novels emphasise the embodiment of otherness and destabilise the 
hierarchies that they are located within in order to reclaim and reimagine the critical narrative 
of madness.  
The subversion of temporal, spatial, and linguistic boundaries in all three novels is an 
essential move towards care for the vulnerable and othered characters within each text. 
Memory and remembering allows for experiences of illness and otherness to exist in both 
past and present, and for the process of recovery to be reframed as fluctuating and circular, 
rather than linear and regimented. Woolf, Frame, and Strout’s works invite the reader to 
commune with the other and their unstable and displaced experiences of illness. In so doing, 
all three novels create a space for both characters and readers to accept the unknowable mind 
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of the other and question the hierarchies that use pathologizing methodologies to confine 
them.  
Literature that focuses upon the othered mind while rejecting the oppressive structures 
that often shape the atypical experience deserves a critical approach that reflects these same 
subversive qualities. What this thesis will demonstrate in reading the works of Virginia 
Woolf, Janet Frame, and Elizabeth Strout through a cognitive literary studies lens is the need 
in literary criticism for an undogmatic and non-pathologizing approach to mental otherness. 
The multidisciplinary nature of cognitive literary studies provides a multitude of perspectives 
on cognitive functioning that often clash and overlap, but share in the fundamental desire to 
contribute to a methodology of equal exchange across both literary and cognitive scientific 
domains.  
Across this thesis, I will introduce a variety of theories based upon the needs of each 
novel and its characters that fall under the wider cognitive literary studies paradigm—
including affect theory, the new unconscious, and memory studies. Rather than attempting to 
interrogate, untangle, or, crucially, diagnose the otherness of these fictional minds, I 
introduce these methodologies in order to attend to and uphold the inherent unknowability of 
each character, and instead interrogate the oppressive cultural hierarchies that seek to bind 
these characteristics. In applying these methodologies, I will demonstrate how Mrs Dalloway, 
Faces in the Water, and My Name is Lucy Barton complicate representations of mental 
otherness and are able to reimagine the cultural narrative of madness. Moreover, through the 
lens of cognitive literary studies I will illustrate how we, as critics, can better embrace 
fiction’s celebration of the ineffability of othered minds, and thus redefine and reinforce the 
place of literature in cognitive scientific discourse. While the notion of ineffability may seem 
antithetical to the underlying desire of cognitive studies to redefine the parameters of human 
cognition—and thus continue to explore, uncover, and apprehend—there is a greater place 
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for the ineffable within cognitive literary studies than in previous theories of the mind. That 
is to say, rather than filling gaps in knowledge with inaccurate assumptions and speculation 
that may eventually work to damage our understanding of cognition, that which is unknown 
might be accepted, even accentuated, in order to communicate a more holistic picture of 
mental processing.   
In the following sections, I map the history of the cultural and critical narrative of 
madness, and its language, progenitors, and contours in contemporary cognitive discourse. In 
particular, I demonstrate how language is an ever-evolving agent of both oppression and 
liberation throughout cognitive discourse. In so doing, I establish a historical backdrop so as 
to better demonstrate the vast nexus of theories and ideas that intersect with all three novels, 
and the discursive scope that links all three. First, I survey the rise of Freudian 
psychoanalysis and its saturation of Western culture as a vital element in understanding the 
language, theories, and frameworks that continue to be (mis)used in approaching fictional 
representations of cognition. By looking at what came before the cognitive literary studies 
movement, and how Freud persists in our cultural imaginings, I am able to better emphasise 
the need for a critical methodology that engages with the contemporary understanding of 
mental atypicality. 
 
From Madness to Neuroatypicality: Freud and the Rise of Cognitive Science 
Hearing the language of madness through Western fiction and art has given rise to a 
significant and complex field of study. In the West, the understanding of atypical minds and 
mental processing has been largely defined by the work of Sigmund Freud. Although 
conceived at the turn of the twentieth century, Freudian psychoanalytic theory continues to 
inform Western society’s understanding of the mind through the constructs of the 
unconscious mind, the id, ego, and superego, and repression.  
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Literature was foundational for psychoanalysis. In The Interpretation of Dreams 
(1899), the character of Oedipus from the Greek tragedy Oedipus Rex became the basis of 
Freud’s theory of the Oedipal complex—a theory which he would then test in a character 
analysis of Hamlet. In 1913, Freud turned to Shakespeare, myth, and folklore in his essay The 
Theme of the Three Caskets, as he analysed the repeated trope of a character faced with three 
choices, and the implications of those choices upon his theories of wish-fulfilment, dream 
analysis, and the role of literature in representing a shared human psyche. Furthermore, 
E.T.A. Hoffman’s short story The Sandman (1816) formed the basis of Freud’s essay “The 
Uncanny” (1919), which locates an almost ephemeral sense of otherness and strangeness in 
the seemingly ordinary, as well as tying the uncanny into his concepts of childhood 
development and castration anxiety. In all three texts, it is literature, not patient trial or 
empirical observation, that forms the basis for Freud’s study and methodology.  
I suggest that this early alignment with literary theory has contributed to 
psychoanalysis’ longevity within the Western literary canon and within the critical narrative 
of each of my texts. The entangled nature of the relationship between literature—in 
particular, literature that focuses on cognition and atypicality—and psychoanalysis makes it 
difficult to extract novels that are even further embedded in the psychoanalytic milieu 
because of their historical context. The critical narratives of Mrs Dalloway and Faces in the 
Water have both been similarly entangled, regardless of whether or not the novels are 
invested in the same concerns as Freudian theory. Furthermore, the uncritical application of 
Freudian psychoanalytic literary theory to fiction that explores the oppressive social and 
institutional experience of atypical minds creates an ethical tension between text and critic. 
While both Mrs Dalloway and Faces in the Water were written during Freud’s cultural 
dominance, both novels reject the pathologizing methodologies of Freudian psychoanalysis 
with its emphasis on diagnosis and recovery, as well as the psychological institutions these 
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methods upheld. Moreover, My Name is Lucy Barton actively parodies and critiques Freudian 
diagnostic practices and ideas pertaining to female mental atypicality. Therefore, despite the 
enmeshed relationship of Freud and fiction, I suggest that literature that reframes the 
individual and social experience of the othered mind—like the works of Woolf, Frame, and 
Strout—often opposes the harmful effects of Freudian discourse, and thus requires a 
discourse with theories that accentuate, rather than obfuscate, this resistance.  
Freudian psychoanalysis has become invested in the oppressive structures—both 
historical and contemporary—used to restrain and sanitise representations of atypical minds 
and madness. Throughout this thesis, I demonstrate the adverse effects that Freudian readings 
have upon the characters and concerns of Mrs Dalloway, Faces in the Water, and My Name is 
Lucy Barton. Each of the novels’ protagonists encounter the effects of Freud’s conceptions of 
madness and diagnostic practice, both of which are laden with the expectation to conform to 
a fixed collection of symptoms or experiences. When the characters within all three works 
inevitably find themselves unable to satisfy the assumptions of their prescribed identities, it is 
characterised by their peers as a personal failure. Woolf, Frame, and Strout’s novels are, 
therefore, invested in overthrowing the dangerous misconceptions that surround madness, 
which Freudian psychoanalysis often enforced rather than overcame.  
Although Freud and literature will always be inextricably linked in Western culture, 
we, as literary critics, are not required to prolong the theory’s artistic survival. Furthermore, it 
was this same artistic relationship that, in part, prompted the growing scientific scepticism 
towards psychoanalysis during the mid-twentieth century. This scepticism would eventually 
evolve into a split between the realms of cognitive science and psychoanalysis. In the 
following sections, I explore the primary figures and theories which bolstered this dissent, 
and the alternative methods they offer literature. Despite this fracture in disciplines, Freud’s 
presence in the literature and art of cognitive functioning remains. Therefore, it is critical to 
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understand the underlying motives behind the split between Freudian theory and the 
cognitive sciences in order to further substantiate what I argue is the need for literary studies 
to distance itself from psychoanalytic literary theory grounded in Freud. 
 
i. The Cognitive Split 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, criticism of Freudian analysis from the cognitive 
sciences grew increasingly vocal in reaction to Freud’s theory of repression. In The 
Interpretation of Dreams, Freud suggested that the unconscious operation of the mind was a 
primary process which actively repressed disturbing sexual thoughts and memories, while the 
conscious was a secondary operation, dictated by logic and unaware of the repressive 
process.1 It was the theory of repression’s wide acceptance within U.S. legal proceedings 
concerning the sudden increase in reports of Childhood Sexual Abuse (CSA) and satanic 
ritual abuse that prompted urgent dissension from the cognitive sciences (Anastasi et al. 
1994, Crews 1995, Manning and Loftus 1996, Milchman 2012, Ho et al. 2014). 
Preceding this division was a line of questioning that emerged in the 1970s, which 
disputed psychoanalytic-based conceptions of memory and the unconscious, demonstrating 
the negative implications of this conception upon eye-witness testimony.2 Across the 
following decade, repression theory became a principal focus of the critical and empirical 
 
1 In his work, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud emphasises the sexual foundation 
for the repressive process, explaining that repression of sexual desire into the unconscious state was a result of 
puritanical societal restrictions. Through the repression of basic sexual wishes during childhood, Freud 
suggested that the resulting displaced energy could emerge as physical and anxious symptoms during adulthood. 
 
2 Examples of this early debate were largely led by Elizabeth Loftus, who published a number of 
influential articles questioning how memory and the retrieval of memory had been previously quantified and 
evaluated (in particular, by those who used hypnosis, word association, psychoanalysis, and brain stimulation) 
(Loftus and Loftus 1980). In 1974, Loftus examined the imperfect nexus of human memory, and the process 
through which false-memory perception and false-testimony can be prompted through the use of leading 
questions. In a similar vein to Loftus, Garry Wells (1978) suggested the need for the betterment of the scientific 
study of memory and eye-witness testimony, while emphasising the real-world implications that the 
misconception of memory holds.  
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study of memory. Central to this critique was the need to differentiate between ordinary 
forgetting, a memory believed to have been forgotten but which was not, and false or 
implanted memory (Loftus et al. 1998). One of the most significant articles to emerge from 
this period was Elizabeth Loftus’ “The Reality of Repressed Memories” (1993), which 
surveyed case studies centred on the over-reporting of repressed childhood sexual abuse that 
began in the late 1970s.3 This line of thought became the foundation of a dispute with 
Freudian psychoanalysis and was echoed by the cognitive sciences throughout the 1990s (see 
Anastasi et al. 1994, Brown et al. 1994, and Loftus 1995). Loftus’ research exemplifies the 
detrimental impact of Freudian theory when wielded as empirical fact. Although the 
implications are lessened in literary studies, the continued Freudian-based psychoanalysis of 
fiction extends the shelf-life of his theories, along with inaccurate conceptions of the mind 
and mental disorder, repression and sexuality, and highly gendered complexes.  
The psychoanalysis of fictional texts is often accompanied by the practices of 
biographical readings (the attempt to extract biographical information about an author 
through their fiction) and diagnostic readings (the desire to diagnose fictional characters). I 
contend that, often, attempts to extract biographical understanding from fiction that is not 
explicitly based upon an author’s lived experience is a reductive practice that diminishes the 
author’s craft. This methodology can invite the diagnosis of an author through the diagnosis 
of their characters. “Armchair” speculation surrounding both character and author assumes 
particular manifestations of a condition, and again undermines the fictional quality of a text. 
 
3 While acknowledging the very real existence of childhood sexual abuse, Loftus notes how popular, 
yet uncorroborated letters and articles built a public narrative of repression that was uncritical and overly 
simplistic, and that ultimately affected the biases of jurors in trials where repression was seen as fact. Loftus 
concluded by arguing for the need for an increasingly rigorous and empirical methodology, a widespread 
understanding of the implications of false memories, and the development of a critical and cautious approach 
(Loftus 1993). 
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Furthermore, biographical and diagnostic readings are often swathed in problematic notions 
of gender, class, and sexuality that were pervasive at the time of Freud’s writing.  
 
ii. Language and the Levinasian Grasp 
Emmanuel Levinas’ notion of the “knowing grasp” is one lens I utilise to explore the 
epistemic harm that biographical and diagnostic literary criticism can enact upon both 
character and author. The problem with attempts to understand a character through diagnosis 
and, by implication, an author through a fictional text, is perhaps best explained by Levinas’ 
Ethics as First Philosophy (1989). In Ethics, Levinas examines the vexed consequences 
produced by a person’s attempts to grasp and know the other. This innate desire parallels the 
literary critic’s attempt to grasp and know characters, text, and author. Levinas suggests that 
“thinking through knowing, of seizing something and making it one’s own, of reducing to 
presence and representing the difference,” is “an activity which appropriates and grasps the 
otherness of the known” (Levinas 1989, 76). Thus, those who endeavour to diagnose 
characters or make biography of fiction attempt to know these subjects on their own terms, 
rather than allowing their unknown qualities to remain and upholding the inscrutable parts of 
their existence that make them uniquely other. I contend that the constricting process that 
forces “beings” to become “the characteristic property of thought, as it.… becomes known” 
(1989, 76) mirrors the most reductive aspects of diagnostic and biographical literary 
criticism. By forcing the subject to conform to an expected set of symptoms and 
characteristics, we reduce the diversity and inherent unknowability of the individual.  
The Levinasian grasp towards knowing is an intrinsically self-serving action. Levinas 
suggests that “things contain the promise of satisfaction—their concreteness puts them on a 
scale fit for a knowing form of thought” (Levinas 1989, 77). In other words, there is an innate 
and seductive sense of fulfilment that stems from a belief in solving, knowing, and 
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understanding a person or subject. This is, in many ways, a driving force for literary study 
itself: to uncover the “true” meaning of a text or author. Although I question the motivation 
behind the satisfaction gained from knowing the othered mind, I also empathise with this 
inherent need to know. The methods through which we attempt to grasp fictional and 
authorial minds, that is, through symptoms, diagnosis, and biography—to make the ineffable 
mind effable—can erase the importance of difference and diversity represented in fiction. As 
I have previously discussed, language often acts as an agent for these restrictive forms of 
knowledge. Words such as hysteria, madness, and repression continue to convey the 
oppressive hierarchies of gender, sexuality, and (dis)ability, and they attempt to know othered 
minds through the language of the knower. Across this thesis, I instead suggest a 
methodology that delivers the satisfaction of studying the mental processes of character while 
also upholding otherness and the uncertainty of the individual mind. Moreover, I draw on 
vocabulary from disability studies that further reflects this ideology of diversity, inclusivity, 
and unknowability. If, in contemporary literary study we are to hear the language of madness 
without sanitising it, as Tauchert suggested, it would be more fruitful to invest in those 
frameworks and methodologies, like cognitive literary studies, which engage with otherness 
on its own terms.  
Language is constantly evolving to encompass the communicative needs of the 
individual and their cultural environment. As a result, terms deemed to be accurate or 
respectful can rapidly cycle out of commonplace use or land outside of notions of social 
acceptability. Ashley Tauchert’s “The Language of Madness” (2015) asks us to consider how 
sanitising our language may do more harm than good as it “does nothing to change the 
particularity of the phenomenon it has been developed to capture” (55) and often detracts 
from the discourse of a movement or ideology. Although I agree with Tauchert’s sentiment, I 
argue that evolving some terminology may instead expand meaning, further resisting the 
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Levinasian grasp, while evoking a sense of diversity that is beneficial to the growing 
understanding of madness. Madness as an all-encompassing concept has a complex historical 
narrative and, while I support Tauchert’s reclamation of the term, for the purposes of this 
thesis I have chosen to explore and employ terminology that has developed from a cognitive 
scientific context and resists the knowing grasp articulated by Levinas.  
All three of my chosen novels include characters who live with a form of 
neuroatypicality that remains undiagnosed throughout their narratives. I contend that the use 
of the term “neuroatypical” speaks to the inherent sense of difference felt by all three and 
their possible experience of a behavioural, mental, or genetic disorder, without speculating on 
its intimate nature, and therefore upholding their inherent otherness. Neurodiversity, 
neurotypicality, neurocosmopolitanism, and neuroatypicality are terms that emerged from 
discourse within disability studies and the Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) community. The 
concept of neurodiversity was coined by Judy Singer in the late 1990s and was immediately 
popularised by journalist Harvey Blume (Blume 1997; Silberman 2017). As Silberman 
explains in his article “Beyond ‘Deficit-Based’ Thinking in Autism Research” (2017), 
“Singer and Blume intended to evoke the concept of biodiversity [in using neurodiversity], 
which suggests that natural variations in communities of non-human life forms make those 
communities more resilient” (2017, 119). In particular, the concept of neurodiversity opposes 
the pathologizing of developmental disabilities—an act which was “condemned as viewing 
autistic people only in light of their deficits and impairments, while ignoring the special gifts 
conveyed by their atypical neurologies” (2017, 120). Where neurodiversity speaks to the 
diversity of the human mind and its cognitive functioning—the adjective “neurodivergent” 
refers to the individual whose mind diverges from the dominant societal construction of what 
is deemed neurotypical.  
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Neurodivergence encompasses genetic or innate divergence and experiential 
divergence, allowing for the individual to be identified as having a divergent mind without 
the often-intimate specificity that can accompany the disclosure of a medical diagnosis. 
However, as this thesis concerns characters whose conditions and origins are unknown, 
another term is required, one that includes the experience of mental illness and non-genetic 
disorders, also. Neuroatypical, like neurodivergent, is an expansive term that includes 
behavioural, mental, and genetic disorders. As a concept, neuroatypicality—also referred to 
as atypicality—is even further removed from the pathologizing paradigm towards 
divergences, as it shares the broad strokes of madness while reflecting the neurocosmopolitan 
ideals expressed in disability studies and by Nick Walker and Ralph James Savarese.  
The neurocosmopolitan individual or society rejects the pathologizing of 
neurodivergent minds. Neurocosmopolitanism was therefore used by both Walker to 
“[approach] neurodiversity in the same spirit in which the true cosmopolitan approaches 
cultural diversity” (Walker 2013) and Savarese as “not just an openness to neurological 
difference but, rather, a denaturalization, even a dethronement, of privileged neurotypicality” 
(Savarese 2015, 394). A methodology (born from disability studies) defined by actively 
embracing and engaging with neuroatypical individuals and advocating for the importance of 
neurodiversity within humanity is essential to approaching all three of my texts. The 
protagonists of Woolf, Frame, and Strout’s novels suffer as a consequence of social 
prejudices and hierarchies that attempt to suppress their neuroatypicality, in part through 
presumptions born from terms such as madness, insanity, and hysteria. This thesis seeks to 
prevent the perpetuation of these same prejudices by employing language and a wider 
methodology that are aligned with neurocosmopolitanism. In so doing, I look to exemplify 
the importance of utilising a methodology that reflects the empathy and ethics of the fiction it 
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approaches—fiction that represents vulnerable and othered individuals and resists knowing 
on neurotypical terms.    
In Mrs Dalloway, Faces in the Water, and My Name is Lucy Barton, binarized forms 
of language harm their protagonists, whose liminal identities spurn easy categorisation. In 
being both unwilling and unable to conform to the boundaries of illness/wellness, and 
insane/sane, all three protagonists become socially ostracised, perceiving themselves as 
having failed, and are unable to retain a stable sense of self. The ability of neurodivergent 
discourse to speak to this uniqueness of experience while continuing to foster a sense of 
community is fundamental to my usage of this terminology. All three novels depict their 
characters’ struggles with feelings of social isolation and disconnect, in part owing to their 
inability to communicate the uniqueness of their cognitive experiences. Therefore, 
terminology born from a demand for inclusivity and community articulates the shared aspects 
of each character’s experience without effacing their individuality. Throughout this thesis, I 
suggest that neurocosmopolitanism, and its ethos of diversity, inclusivity, and individual 
privacy, is accentuated by the methodology of cognitive literary studies. In order to 
substantiate this claim, however, I must return to the historical narrative of madness. 
As I have demonstrated, the practice of hearing and engaging with the language of 
madness has provoked intense and ongoing debate across a wide field of interdisciplinary 
study. How we choose to engage (or disengage) with representations of neuroatypicality in 
fiction often places a reader squarely in factions of an artistic, scientific, or philosophical 
approach, and in such a way that suggests each is incongruous with the other. In this thesis, 
however, I seek to adopt an approach to mental representation that synthesises a variety of 
studies so as to diversify meaning rather than sanitise or erase. My overarching methodology 
is therefore informed by cognitive literary studies, a field of study that explores the 
possibility for equal exchange to occur between literary studies and the cognitive scientific 
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paradigm. In contextualising some of the problems encountered in both the literary and 
scientific study of mental processing, I have established many of the key tensions cognitive 
literary studies has worked to overturn and reimagine. In the proceeding section, I look to the 
theories whose approach to both literature and cognitive science falls under the methodology 
of cognitive literary studies. I contend that affect theory (specifically Brooke Miller’s [2017] 
“4E” approach), the study of the new unconscious, and memory studies offer some of the 
more diverse and rigorous paths towards engaging with the fictional minds of my three texts 
while situating literary studies within a wider empirical model, thus creating an undogmatic 
approach to atypicality that embraces the unknown mind.   
 
Redefining Cognition in Three Methodologies   
Mrs Dalloway, Faces in the Water, and My Name is Lucy Barton each reimagine the place of 
the neuroatypical experience in society, and therefore necessitate a theoretical interchange 
that is similarly innovative and inclusive. Affect theory, the new unconscious, and memory 
studies are each concerned with expanding our consideration of cognitive function and 
perception. Although the methodology of cognitive literary studies is not exclusive to fiction 
that concerns neuroatypical minds, my reason for including texts that primarily concern 
neuroatypicality is twofold. First, literature that concerns neuroatypical functioning often 
places a character’s cognitive operations at the forefront of a narrative so as to either covertly 
or overtly establish their otherness. All three of my texts are richly engaged with the mental 
processes of their characters, and provide a more extensive plain for cognitive literary studies 
to explore. Second, as I have acknowledged, the treatment of divergence both within and 
beyond literature has historically employed tactics of dehumanising, erasing, and sanitising 
through an emphasis on diagnosis and recovery, an investment in institutional practice, and 
tactics of social isolation. Engaging specifically with neuroatypical minds therefore reveals 
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the oppressive social frameworks that can surround the study of cognition, and emphasises 
the need for both scientific and artistic ethical advancement and representation.  
The conception and evolution of cognitive literary studies has been approached from 
a number of disciplines across the past seventy years. While literary studies is a capacious 
and longstanding field, the cognitive sciences found their foothold around the mid-twentieth 
century. In the 1950s, psychologists and academics, led by the work of psychologist George 
A. Miller, began to oppose the behaviourist approach to mental processing that formed the 
accepted psychological establishment. The “cognitive counter-revolution” (Miller 2003, 142) 
marked a burgeoning interest in a multidisciplinary approach to the human mind. Miller’s 
“The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for 
Processing Information” (1956) is widely regarded as one of the founding documents of the 
cognitive sciences. Miller’s article considers the numerical limitations of short-term memory 
and acknowledges the value of a variety of cognitive psychology-based approaches in 
conveying new progressions in understanding memory processes. What symbolically began 
with Miller’s article developed into the cognitive sciences, both in practice and in ethos—an 
ethos which has evolved from “a view of cognition as computation over mental 
representations” to the idea that “cognitive processes are so closely intertwined with action 
that cognition would best be understood as ‘enactive,’ as the exercise of skilful know-how in 
situated and embodied action” (Engel et al. 2013).4  
As the cognitive sciences demonstrated the value to be found in a multidisciplinary 
approach to the faculties of the mind, literary theorists developed a similar urgency of focus 
 
4 The cognitive sciences include psychology, anthropology, linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience, 
artificial intelligence, and computer science. By the 1970s the field had been formally inducted into academia, 
defined by the works of Miller (psychology), Norbert Wiener (cybernetics), Noam Chomsky (linguistics), 
Marvin Minsky and John McCarthy (artificial intelligence), and Allen Newell and Herbert Simon (computer and 
cognitive science) (Miller 2003, 142). 
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toward representations of the mind in fiction. Cognitive literary studies draws upon the ideas, 
methodologies, and research of the cognitive sciences and applies them to literature in order 
to create a field of open exchange between the arts and sciences. Alan Richardson’s “Studies 
in Literature and Cognition: A Field Map (Introduction)” provides a comprehensive guide to 
the history of cognitive literary studies, which he saw as “an overriding interest in the active 
[and largely unconscious] mental processing that makes behaviour understandable” 
(Richardson 2017, 2). The multidisciplinary examination of fictional minds contributes to the 
reconnect occurring between literature and science, and attempts to establish a more 
reciprocal relationship between the two. 
Laura Otis’ “The Value of Qualitative Research for Cognitive Literary Studies” 
(2015) highlights the value of a symbiosis between literature and the cognitive sciences in an 
empirical manner. For literature, Otis suggests that the cognitive sciences offer a diverse 
approach that upholds the richness of representations of mental processing within literary 
texts. For the sciences, Otis contends that reader response in verbal, spatial, or object 
processing for both fiction and non-fiction offers a diverse pool for scientific study. In 
essence: “to generate useful knowledge about how texts and minds interact, we need to pool 
our epistemological resources” (2015, 249). Here again, I acknowledge the initial tension 
between “generating useful knowledge” and the inherent ineffability of much of human 
cognition. Cognitive literary studies, however, seeks to understand the unknown mind 
through a multifaceted lens that does not presuppose functioning or knowledge, and actively 
accepts those undefinable qualities rather than erasing them. Furthermore, the reciprocal 
nature of cognitive literary studies suggests a space for the exchange and evolution of ideas—
one that accepts the potential for prior frameworks of knowledge to be overturned and 
reimagined.  
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The values of diversity and reciprocity are also essential qualities within Mrs 
Dalloway, Faces in the Water, and My Name is Lucy Barton, with each text complicating and 
destabilising our perceptions of what cognition can look like, and how the neuroatypical 
mind may function and interact in individual and social contexts. Cognitive literary studies 
offers a strong approach to mental representation in fiction, as it includes a variety of theories 
that offer distinct perspectives on mental functioning. Each of the three texts draw on both 
the arts and sciences in order to undertake their own exploration of human cognition, in 
particular, the sense of ineffability and possibility that surround perceptions of the 
neuroatypical mind. By introducing disciplines that engage with the everyday mysteries of 
mental functioning, I emphasise literature’s capacity to contribute to cognitive scientific 
discourse: affect theory, the new unconscious, and memory studies each approach the mind in 
the interest of reimaging and reclaiming our conception of its functions from past 
misunderstandings and shed new light upon the experimental potential of all three novels.  
 
i. Affect Theory  
Affect theory draws on psychology, neuroscience, and literature. Both Brook Miller (2017) 
and Stephen Ahern (2019) assess the potential for interplay between affect theory and literary 
studies. In “Affect Studies and Cognitive Approaches to Literature,” Miller describes affect 
theory as “[beginning] with identifying features of experience not readily visible within the 
terms of established conceptualisations,” comparing it to cognitive literary studies’ “new 
approaches to the analysis of literary texts and reading experiences” (2017, 113). For Miller, 
affect “exceeds human boundaries and has an independent ontology that challenges how we 
conceptualise cognition, sociality, and familiar binaries such as the human/inhuman and 
organic/inorganic” (115). Affect theory seeks to conceptualise the ineffable and in-between 
aspects of human cognition. The narrative of Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway is primarily formed by 
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these underlying experiences of affect and emotion, as cognitive and emotional bounds 
extend beyond individual characters and into the environment and among the characters that 
surround them. While the precise notion of affect had not been theorised during the writing of 
Mrs Dalloway, the systems of affect and affective states create a backdrop upon which we 
may better study the highly embodied experience of emotion, mental processing, and 
memory within each of Woolf’s characters. Although Miller’s chapter details a variety of 
intersections and parallels between literature and affect theory, it concludes that there will be 
no “grand unified theory”; rather, a practice of “unified borrowing” (125). Here again we 
return to the notion of reciprocity both within the theories of cognitive literary studies and 
between fiction and scientific and artistic study. The lack of a “grand unified theory” suggests 
a position for literature as an equal within this interchange of ideas. This position is 
something I champion for all three of my texts throughout this thesis as their complex and 
diverse representations of cognitive functioning benefit from participating in this “unified 
borrowing.” It is Miller’s problematising of familiar binaries that carves a clear path for 
affect theory to follow in an analysis of Woolf’s novel in particular, and for the text’s 
concerns with social division, hierarchy of experience, and binary language to be, in turn, 
emphasised through affect theory.  
Where Miller primarily explores the potential for interchange between affect theory 
and literature, Stephen Ahern (2019) suggests that literature presupposes the identification of 
affect itself. Ahern explains that in “representations of embodied agents literary texts have 
long striven to capture human experience in its multivalent forms,” but that “recent 
theorisations of affect have made us more attuned to the passing modulations of bodies 
affected by and affecting the others they engage with and the environments they inhabit” 
(2019, 1). While authors today may respond to developments in understandings of the mind 
in their writing, this is not to suggest that only recent fiction will be illuminated by an 
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engagement with fields such as affect theory, the new unconscious, or memory studies. 
Ahern reinforces the need to include a variety of historical literature, arguing that “awareness 
of nineteenth-century conceptions of affective agency not only can enhance our 
understanding of other times, but can improve current understanding by putting pressure on a 
key tenet of recent theory: that a categorical gulf separates affect from emotion” (2019, 6). 
Affect is the visceral, bodily reaction that precedes and informs an emotional state. Where the 
experience of emotion is more unique to the individual, the preceding affect is more shared 
and universal, with the process not exclusively located in either unconscious or conscious 
processes.  
The emphasis on embodiment of emotion and cognition within affect is something I 
endeavour to address across my thesis. In all three of my texts, characters struggle to 
consolidate the mental experience of neuroatypicality with its inescapable physicality. Each 
novel resists locating the atypicality of its characters in the mind or the body exclusively, and 
instead disrupts the boundaries between both systems in order to emphasise the holistic 
nature of disorder. Thus, the prominent exploration of the synthesis of mind and body 
through affect sheds further light on the unified nature of each character’s experience of 
neuroatypicality. Further, Ahern describes literature as having a “transformative potential” 
(2019, 9) that echoes affect’s ability to make sense of the in-between. It is a disruptive 
potential “characterised by a rend in the fabric of the everyday, by an intensification of 
presentness, by a sense that time stands still” (9). The intrusive immediacy of affect echoes 
the temporal interventions made throughout all three novels. In Mrs Dalloway in particular, 
the nature of Clarissa and Septimus’ remembering similarly rends the fabric of their daily 
lives, incapacitating both characters with the emotional and affective intensity of their 
memories—an intensity that elicits vastly different outcomes for each character. 
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ii. The New Unconscious 
Like affect theory, the “new unconscious” (Kihlstrom 1987; Hassin et al. 2006; Hayles 2014; 
Vermeule 2015) is an emerging concept within the cognitive sciences that seeks to 
empirically observe and understand the operations of the unconscious mind. Blakey 
Vermeule situates her definition of the new unconscious around that of Daniel Schacter’s 
“cognitive unconscious,” explaining that it would include “‘all the mental processes that are 
not experienced by a person but that give rise to a person’s thoughts, choices, emotions, and 
behaviour.’ The key here…. is these mental processes are ‘not experienced’ by us—and 
because they are not, they cannot be seen directly” (Vermeule 2015, 464). Here, Vermeule 
establishes the broad interest of new unconscious studies, as well as the complex tension 
between literary study’s investment in representation and the new unconscious’ ineffable 
nature. One of the driving forces behind the new unconscious is the desire to liberate the 
conception of the unconscious mind from the spectacle of the Freudian unconscious. The new 
unconscious is a branch of study that benefits from literature’s communicative power, 
narrativizing ability, and its socio-cultural currency. This open space for representation and 
interpretation in literature is where, I suggest, Janet Frame’s Faces in the Water could 
contribute to the new unconscious field of study. According to Hassin et al., literary circles 
are reluctant to engage with an unconscious that is “rather cold, apparently rational, and 
amotivational, compared to the heat and irrationality of psychoanalytic drives and conflicts” 
(2006, 5). However, Frame’s novel intimates the ineffable and undefined parameters of 
mental processing and memory that have become critical characteristics of the new 
unconscious. Faces in the Water exemplifies a mode of representing cognitive functioning 
that addresses and embraces the unknown and emphasises the potential fallibility of its 
processes.  
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In The New Unconscious (2006), Hassin et al. consider John F. Kihlstrom’s work on 
the cognitive unconscious in the late twentieth century as the pivotal moment for the 
scientific redefinition of the unconscious. Kihlstrom reclaimed the conscious/unconscious 
divide from Freud’s assertion that “our conscious mental lives are determined by unconscious 
ideas, impulses, and emotions, as well as defence mechanisms unconsciously arrayed against 
them” (1987, 1445). Instead, Kihlstrom established “a clear theoretical framework for 
studying the nonconscious mental structures and processes” (1987, 1451), and argued for the 
continued need to study, clarify, and define the nature of the new unconscious. Those who 
study the new unconscious are determined that it should remain distinct and separate from the 
psychoanalytic unconscious. The technical approach of the computer metaphor marked a 
decisive split from the psychoanalytic unconscious, which is “to most laypeople and those in 
the arts and humanities, the only unconscious” (2006, 4).5 Hassin et al. explain that “unlike 
the psychoanalytic unconscious, [the computer metaphor] has no innate drives that seek 
gratification without regard to constraints of reality and society” (5). Kihlstrom’s cognitive 
unconscious—especially the computer metaphor—is now largely obsolete within 
contemporary cognitive sciences. However, Kihlstrom’s underlying desire to recover the 
unconscious mind for the cognitive sciences and reimagine it thus is a concern that continues 
in the contemporary study of unconscious processing. In moving beyond both Freud and 
Kihlstrom, the contemporary new unconscious is “much more concerned with affect, 
motivation, and even control and metacognition….Goals, motives, and self-regulation are 
prominent, without the conflict and drama of the psychoanalytic unconscious,” and it 
 
5 The innovation of Kihlstrom’s new unconscious relied on a computer metaphor to communicate its 
processes. Hassin et al. reflect on the computer metaphor’s function as “the basis for increasingly complex 
conceptions of human mental processes” (Hassin et al. 2006, 5) that evoked the mind’s capacity for information 
processing, memory storage, mental coding, and input and output.  
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“includes the causes of the phenomenal experience of having intentions and free will, of 
attributing these to oneself and others” (Hassin et al 2006, 6).  
In “The New Unconscious: A Literary Guided Tour” (2015), Blakey Vermeule 
surveys the rise of the new unconscious and discusses the possibilities of a theoretical 
interchange with literature and literary criticism. Vermeule cites the problem of scientific 
progress becoming conflated with social, economic, and moral progress as part of the reason 
literature must be reintegrated into the scientific realm, adding that while “I am all in favour 
of progress in these other spheres of life—science experiments are almost certainly not the 
way to achieve it” (2015, 463). Here, Vermeule develops Hassin et al.’s celebrations of the 
new unconscious requiring a “multitude of methods….from neuroscience to cognitive and 
social lab experiments to naturalistic developmental observations (on theory of mind) to field 
experiments (on self-regulation)” (Hassin et al. 2006, 6). Vermeule examines a variety of 
literature that seemingly presupposed elements of the new unconscious so as to take 
“tentative steps towards opening up the new unconscious to literary study” (2015, 466) and 
create a “language in which to unfold its tale” (471). In line with Vermeule’s claims, I 
incorporate the study of the new unconscious into this thesis. Regardless of scientific 
innovation, if practitioners of the new unconscious wish for the study to have cultural 
purchase—and it must, if it is to topple the psychoanalytic unconscious’ cultural throne—
then literary studies and the wider humanities must become a part of this “multitude of 
methods.” Faces in the Water is one such work whose circular temporality, metatextual 
commentary, and representation of unknowable minds demonstrates how literature could 





iii. Memory Studies 
Like the new unconscious, memory studies reinterprets the processes of the mind in an 
increasingly scientific light. Memory studies has many thematic and methodological 
intersections with cognitive literary studies. Both favour a multidisciplinary approach and are 
strengthened by the interplay between scientific and artistic pursuits. In their “Introduction: 
Methodological Premises and Purposes” (2013), Michael Pickering and Emily Keightly 
describe the evolution of memory studies as “proceeding outwards from individual memory 
and concentrating on broad dimensions of social memory and the politics of public 
remembering” (2013, 2). This paradigm shift suggests a growing interest in “collective 
representations of the past, how they constitute a range of cultural resources for social and 
historical identities, and how they privilege particular readings of the past” (2). Memory 
studies is therefore a multifaceted field that is open to a variety of disciplines as it continues 
to define its investigative space. 
Feindt et al.’s (2014) article, “Entangled Memory: Toward a Third Wave in Memory 
Studies”, puts forth theoretical and methodological developments in the understanding of 
three types of memory. Temporal memory, entangled memory, and mnemonic memory are 
forms of remembering that situate the subject in individual and social frameworks, as well as 
differing forms of chronology. Although examining both cultural and individual forms of 
memory and remembering, the article stresses the need to eliminate “the pernicious stress on 
unity and homogeneity” (2014, 26). “Entangled Memory” instead suggests that cultural 
memory is constructed of individual interpretations and memories of the past. Furthermore, 
Feindt et al.’s approach discounts the idea that memory can be a tangible “thing” and that 
memories and memorials cannot be seen as interchangeable: “one starts to encounter 
epistemological difficulties if one takes the study of memory to serve as an access point to 
allegedly real events rather than as interpretations of the past” (26–27). For Feindt et al., 
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individual and cultural memory are intrinsically linked through interpretation, with each 
affecting the other. Individual memory serves a dual purpose; first, it is an “[act] of mental 
representation by which individuals locate themselves in time and distinguish themselves 
from the past” (28). Second, it is a form of interpretive cultural memory, consisting of 
“patterns of preceding interpretations of the past, which allow for a continuity of meaning, 
[and] place every individual interpretation of the past in a social context” (30). Memory and 
remembering offer an essential space for character development in all three novels. For My 
Name is Lucy Barton, in particular, the abundance of time to think and process made 
available to Lucy during her hospital stay allows her to locate and explore moments of 
divergence and trauma in her life, overcoming the restrictive linearity that had previously 
prevented her from doing so. Neuroatypical experiences of memory are essential to 
diversifying the understanding of the mind and memory, making memory studies integral to 
the methodology of this thesis. Memory studies emphasises the complexity of Strout’s 
depiction of mental otherness, reimagining the place of neuroatypicality in both social and 
empirical contexts whilst furthering literature’s contribution to cognitive scientific discourse.  
Across this thesis, I explore the capacity of literature and literary analysis to 
contribute to and create space for each of these cognitive scientific concepts and the wider 
paradigm. Literature has already been employed as the subject within a number of empirical 
studies concerning authorial intention (Guy et al. 2018), simulating minds within fictional 
worlds (Jacobs and Willems 2016), and the field of empathy studies (Fowler and Shigley 
2014, Jacobs and Willems 2016, Guy et al. 2018). In their article, “Caring About 
Dostoyevsky: The Untapped Potential of Studying Literature” (2016), Arthur Jacobs and 
Roel Willems assert that “the finesses of literature are not considered seriously enough” 
(2016, 245), suggesting that “not only would the cognitive neuroscience study of literature 
increase our understanding of a fundamental human behaviour—engaging with narrative—
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but it would also provide richer and ecologically more valid insights into already studied 
cognitive and affective processes” (245). Jacobs and Willems’ article emphasises storytelling 
as an essentially human characteristic. Therefore, the “story-liking nature of the human 
mind” (245) is a crucial site of research in which the humanities and the cognitive sciences 
will find collaboration beneficial.  
By applying affect theory, the new unconscious, and memory studies to Mrs 
Dalloway, Faces in the Water, and My Name is Lucy Barton respectively, I explore the 
insights each novel provides into how the othering experience of neuroatypicality may impact 
processes of affect, the unconscious, and memory, and how understanding this divergence 
can lead to a greater insights into human cognition. In employing theories which explore 
mental processing in relation to all three novels, I also illustrate the neurocosmopolitanism 
within the wider structure of cognitive literary studies. This diversity is an essential mode of 
resistance to the Levinasian grasp, which limits the experience of the other with forms of 
knowledge possessed only by the knower.  
 
Reimaging The Mind In Three Novels  
Mrs Dalloway (1925) by Virginia Woolf is often credited as a key text in shaping the cultural 
landscape of the mind for modernist literature. In chapter one, I situate Woolf’s novel within 
its historical context in order to reflect on the innovation of this early modernist narrative 
against its psychoanalytic milieu. I draw on affect theorists Brook Miller (2017) and Stephen 
Ahern (2019), to consider how Woolf’s text evokes the ineffable mind through active 
remembering and playing with the temporal and spatial qualities of the novel. I explore the 
social and narrative constraints that inhibit recovery from illness, looking particularly at the 
difficulties posed by the recovery timeline reinforced by the bildungsroman. Further, I reflect 
on Woolf’s innovative means of representing mental processes and illnesses to demonstrate 
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how Mrs Dalloway contributes to a growing discourse of resistance to the realist novel’s 
over-emphasis on neurotypical minds and failure to adequately represent neuroatypicality. 
That is not to suggest it is impossible for realist novels to represent neuroatypicality 
accurately. Rather, Woolf’s engagement with the destabilising elements of neuroatypicality—
the circular temporality, othered perspectives, and embodied cognition—represents the 
neuroatypical subject on their terms, embracing the indefinable qualities of their minds. Mrs 
Dalloway exemplifies a narrative that resists enacting the Levinasian grasp upon its 
vulnerable subjects, and thus demonstrates the need for realist novels to undermine the 
problematic cultural legacy of their framework if they too wish to refrain from appropriating 
the experience of the other. 
In chapter two, I continue an exploration of the social constraints that surround 
neuroatypicality in considering Janet Frame’s novel Faces in the Water (1961), and its 
staging of neuroatypical minds within and against the oppressive structure of the institution. 
The institution enacts its subjection through division and separation—division of language 
and the mind, and physical and intellectual separation. My objective is to address the novel’s 
exposure of the social suppression of neuroatypical minds by positioning Faces in the Water 
in relation to the notion of the new unconscious, which reimagines how we approach and 
engage with unconscious processing. I aim to contribute to the branch of cognitive literary 
studies that deals with representation and language, and challenges established 
methodologies, like those used to approach historical works that probe human cognition. The 
narrative of Faces in the Water is formed by a network of characters who subvert 
expectations of (dis)ability, gender, and illness and wellness, and how they function (or fail 
to) within and without the institution. This desire to overturn presuppositions of experiences 
and identities forms the basis of much of Frame’s oeuvre and can therefore be best 
accentuated through an engagement with a methodology that shares in this desire to 
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destabilise and reimagine. Like Woolf, Frame’s novel sought to represent the mind beyond 
the patriarchal framework of her contemporaries. Thus, Frame’s text benefits from the 
evolving playing field that distinguishes the cognitive approach, as it values diversity and 
inclusivity, emphasising both individuality and community.  
In chapter three, I focus on Elizabeth Strout’s 2016 novel My Name is Lucy Barton in 
order to reflect upon psychoanalytic practice in a more modern setting. Strout positions many 
of her characters along a spectrum of neuroatypicality, with the protagonist Lucy’s 
psychogenic illness placing her in a liminal space in relation to those around her. Strout’s 
novel, like those of Woolf and Frame, is structured by memory and remembering, as Lucy’s 
hospitalisation and the return of her mother evoke recollections of her impoverished 
childhood. Strout resists giving Lucy’s illness or disorder a name, denying the outmoded 
binary of illness and wellness and the “recovery plot” so often valorised by the 
bildungsroman. In My Name is Lucy Barton, the dual nature of illness and loneliness is at its 
most pronounced—particularly in Lucy’s traumatic memories. I therefore introduce memory 
studies and the concept of mnemonic signifiers to explore both the individual and cultural 
significance of Lucy’s remembering process and its relationship with the ongoing nature of 
her trauma. In so doing, I build on my analysis of the qualities of neuroatypicality and illness 
explored by Woolf and Frame as subversive, yet bound by social constructs of gender, class, 
and sexuality. I contend that the neurocosmopolitan ethos of cognitive literary studies resists 
perpetuating these same boundaries and is therefore best suited to those texts which explore 
experiences of neuroatypicality and attempt to overcome the oppressive social hegemony that 
limits their existence.  
 The abundant historical intersections between Freudian psychoanalysis, literary 
criticism, and the cognitive sciences is imperative to understanding and locating each novel 
in parallel to past and contemporary discourse. In each chapter, I explore and critique the 
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uncritical appropriation of Freudian psychoanalysis, diagnostic practice, and biographical 
readings in literary studies. Through the framework of cognitive literary studies and the 
related fields of affect theory, the new unconscious, and memory studies, I highlight the 
necessity of a critical approach that is willing to engage with a number of disciplines in order 
to fully maintain and appreciate the diversity of the human mind. 
Literature enables a reader to connect with what Tauchert identified as the “language 
of madness.” By witnessing and engaging with madness, the reader is able to consider 
complex mental processes, the perceptions of themselves and others, and to situate 
themselves within and against the hegemonic structures that suppress the diverse reality of 
neuroatypicality. Woolf, Frame, and Strout each construct narratives that are at once attentive 
to their characters’ experiences and aware that they are ultimately representations inflected 
by their cultural contexts. Each work plays with memory within the narrative to create a non-
linear timeline that disrupts the linear and oppressive frameworks of diagnosis and recovery, 
class and gender, and social hierarchies that surround neuroatypicality. The open-ended 
exploration of memory and neuroatypicality in Mrs Dalloway, Faces in the Water, and My 
Name is Lucy Barton is a radical move towards care in the fashion of neurocosmopolitanism 
for each novel’s vulnerable figures. As a narrative device, memory allows for effects of 
illness and divergence to be at once overcome and ever-present. Ultimately, progress does not 
necessarily rely on forward momentum towards the traditional understanding of “recovery.” 
All three authors explore the circularity of time, providing dialogues between past and 
present in order to create a more informed future.  
Creating awareness of mental complexity through literature can catalyse a person’s 
introduction to and engagement with the realm of the cognitive sciences—and this thesis is a 
testimony to my own experience with this catalysing effect. Thus, literature can function as a 
gateway to current and evolving frameworks of cognitive functioning as well as the 
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immersive world of one’s own mind. Those who study the mind’s conscious and unconscious 
processes emphasise the extensive and, in some respects, unknowable nature of their subjects 
and become appreciative of the importance of acknowledging that which remains unmapped 
and undetermined. As critics, we may feel the desire to fill these gaps of knowledge with 
artistic interpretation and complex, critical analysis. However, if we are to sustain and engage 
with the neuroatypical experience in literature in line with the ethics of Levinas and 
neurocosmopolitanism, we, as both readers and critics, should instead learn to embrace the 
unknown.  
The overarching argument of this thesis is that Mrs Dalloway, Faces in the Water, 
and My Name is Lucy Barton engage with the othered mind in a manner that destabilises 
representations of the cognitive experience in order to reimagine the place of atypicality 
within and beyond fiction. Moreover, the neurocosmopolitan nature of all three novels resists 
glorifying or vilifying neuroatypicality, and instead characterises it as an essential form of 
diversity within humanity that widens the parameters of our understanding. I contend that the 
cognitive literary studies approach—similarly informed by the neurocosmopolitan ethos of 
disability studies—best accentuates these qualities of embracing diversity through an 
engagement with the othered mind, whilst aiding the interrogation of the social hierarchies 
that entrap otherness. Yet, the underlying spirit of disability studies manifested through the 
ethics of Levinas reminds us that the mind of the other—and indeed, much of human 
cognition—remains unknowable. In becoming comfortable with the indefinability of the 
mind and choosing to commune instead of grasp, we may glean more from fiction of 
cognition than if we attempt to know the other—in fiction and in the actual world—on our 
own terms. Thus, the mind in fiction can appear markedly different from the mind as it is 
understood through contemporary science. In this thesis, I celebrate the vital differences 
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between literary and scientific practice, while also articulating the importance for spaces of 
collaboration and appreciation.   
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Chapter One 
Untangling and Embodying: The Revelation of Illness in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs 
Dalloway 
 
Mrs Dalloway is a novel that rejects the limitations enforced by a patriarchal understanding 
of the mind and mental illness. Virginia Woolf’s 1925 work synthesises past and present in 
order to accentuate the dramatic modernity in which her novel is set. The early twentieth-
century London of Mrs Dalloway is at once bustling and bound by restrictive social rules. 
Like London, Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Smith are trapped in a liminal space of their 
own, fluctuating between symptoms of illness and wellness that manifest both physically and 
mentally. Oppressive social structures and attitudes concerning class, tradition, and gender 
encumber Clarissa and Septimus as they each attempt to define the contours of their 
identities. Woolf’s novel is a compelling account of how illness extends through mind and 
body, and past and present, on both individual and societal scales. Mrs Dalloway explores 
moments where the experience of illness intersects with class, tradition, and gender. In this 
chapter I shall examine the social and narrative constraints that inhibit recovery from illness, 
looking particularly at the difficulties posed by the linear trajectory of diagnosis-treatment-
recovery. 
Sanja Bahun (2012) has argued that “Woolf created an original language to describe 
her illness against the dominant narrative of mental illness” (100). That is to say, her 
contemporaries’ restrictive attitudes towards illness in all divisions of society compelled 
Woolf to operate beyond oppressive dogmas, purposefully playing with language, structure, 
and temporality in order to bolster her subversive attitude. Woolf’s text unsettles all three 
elements within the narrative, identifying conventional language, structure, and temporality 
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as agents of the oppressive social hierarchies that Freudian theory perpetuates. Thus, while 
Bahun situates Woolf in relation to Freudian psychoanalysis—both historically and 
critically—the author emphasises their fundamental thematic misalignment. In her 
conclusion, Bahun states that “the most productive way to think about the relationship 
between psychoanalysis and Woolf’s texts is to treat them as isomorphic, with regard to their 
development as modes of thought, their essence as affective engagements with human 
activity, and their nature as performance-attentive discourses” (2012, 103). For Bahun, 
psychoanalysis is an ambivalent player in Woolf’s literary critical narrative—at once an 
important critical interaction with “the study of Woolf ’s ‘contexts’” (93), and an agent of the 
oppressive social attitudes that Woolf desired to overturn. Bahun’s positioning of Freud and 
Woolf as isomorphic players within the same historical narrative is a model I replicate 
throughout this chapter. In particular, I look to build upon Bahun’s acknowledgement of 
psychoanalysis’ cultural ubiquity whilst also acknowledging Woolf’s key opposition to the 
theory’s fundamental values, and subversion of its pernicious manifestations within her 
novel.   
Mrs Dalloway was written in the midst of Freud’s psychoanalytic cultural fervour, 
which has led the two to become inextricably linked. While the emergence of psychoanalysis 
led to a complete cultural reconstruction of the mind and mental illness, this new perception 
was (and remains) coloured by restrictive notions of class, gender, and sexuality that presided 
over Western society. As an author, Woolf was heavily invested in representing women and 
their experiences of sexuality and mental illness in the constraints of the upper-middle class. 
The patriarchal forms of knowledge that informed early twentieth-century conceptions of the 
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mind were therefore at odds with Woolf’s narrative concerns.6 Woolf’s text is antithetical to 
the social attitudes of her contemporaries. How these hierarchies manifest themselves within 
Mrs Dalloway, and how Woolf’s narrative meticulously subverts them, creates a tension 
which I explore throughout this chapter. For example, representations of neuroatypicality that 
rely on a language brimming with oppressive associations—such as negatively-coded 
diagnoses including “hysterical” or “insane”—and the linear path of diagnosis-treatment-
recovery homogenise the experience of illness.  
To suggest that illness can be quantified by a uniform inventory of symptoms and 
treatments denies the individual trajectory of illness and recovery. Although a medical 
diagnosis often precedes vital and effective treatment, it may also be used by others to restrict 
an individual, leading to the harmful expectation that they must conform to a particular set of 
symptoms, expressions, and treatments. Furthermore, a diagnosis often initiates an 
established timeline towards recovery that, when deviated from, labels the patient as 
malingering or failing. While Woolf and the growth of the diagnostic institution may share a 
historical backdrop, Mrs Dalloway’s resistance to the oppressive linearity of the diagnosis-
recovery timeline demonstrates the need for an approach that shares in this resistance. My 
methodology throughout this chapter therefore emphasises Woolf’s subversion of linear 
temporalities and diagnostic language, and how this in turn destabilises moralistic hierarchies 
of gender, sexuality, and class enforced both within and beyond the novel.  
In the first part of this chapter, I outline a sample of early psychoanalytic material in 
order to highlight key moments of its development in our socio-cultural narrative. By 
bringing attention to the emergence of Freud’s conceptualisation of the mind in Western 
 
6 The use of the word “patriarchal” in this chapter implies a traditional system that harmed both men 
and women, although in different ways. In Mrs Dalloway, men often suffer as much as women when they are 
unable to live up to the hyper-masculine and heteronormative standards imposed upon them.  
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culture and its often-problematic social associations, I am able to situate Woolf’s cultural 
context so as to fully elucidate the magnitude of opposition to her underlying concerns, while 
acknowledging the radical scope of her text. Although scientific and psychological 
understanding of the mind has, in the twenty-first century, largely outgrown its 
psychoanalytic foundations, psychoanalysis remains lodged in Western culture and literary 
studies. Outdated concepts such as repression theory and dream interpretation continue to 
flourish owing, in part, to the continued use of psychoanalysis in literary and artistic circles. 
While people may find authentic and productive utility in Freudian psychoanalysis, the 
uncritical application of debunked theories to literature continues to perpetuate potentially 
damaging falsehoods and is symptomatic of psychoanalysis’ cultural embeddedness. Mrs 
Dalloway is a novel whose modernist psychological narrative demonstrates a progressive and 
empathetic understanding of illness that reached beyond its psychoanalytic contemporaries, 
but whose characters nevertheless fall victim to the treatment trends of its day. The tension 
between Woolf’s novel and Freudian psychoanalysis signals Woolf’s discomfort with the 
institutional position of psychoanalysis and its operation within the patriarchies of the upper 
classes. In the latter parts of this first section, I present a close analysis of Mrs Dalloway to 
further explore this tension and the modernist narrative Woolf weaves to destabilise the 
diagnostic practice of Freudian psychoanalysis and the problematic constructions of gender, 
class, and sexuality it enforces.  
In part two, I argue that Woolf utilises language and the embodied experience of 
otherness in order to overcome and oppose the hegemony of treatment regimens and 
inadequate vocabularies associated with illness and otherness. In evoking the ineffable and 
affective qualities of the mind, Woolf opens up the possibility for a new mode of representing 
embodied illness. Moreover, Mrs Dalloway uses characters’ memories to undermine the 
temporal boundaries of the novel and to explore the synthesis between mind and body. The 
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subversion of the linear experience of time and an emphasis on spatial isolation echoes the 
unsettling experience of illness, and works to create a similar, revelatory space of illness that 
allows both character and reader to question hegemonic structures that use diagnosis and 
recovery to restrict those experiencing illness. The pivotal acts of Clarissa Dalloway’s kiss 
with her friend Sally Seaton in her youth, and Septimus Smith’s suicide after a long struggle 
with post-traumatic stress disorder destabilise social expectation and impact upon the 
perception and representation of neuroatypicality and illness. I explore how both incidents 
echo the ability of metaphorical language, stream of consciousness, and embodied 
representation to overcome, even momentarily, the oppressive hierarchies of gender, class, 
and sexuality at play. These narrative echoes further extend into theoretical fields, as they 
anticipate the attempts of contemporary theorists—both in literary and scientific domains—to 
overcome similar limitations. I introduce Marco Caracciolo’s (2019) analysis of Woolf, 
Cartesian geography, and contemporary neuroscientific and embodiment theory, Brook 
Miller’s (2017) interplay with affect theory and literature, and Stephen Ahern’s (2019) 
exploration of how affect can help us understand literature and, in turn, how literature can 
evoke affect. In so doing, I consider the importance of Mrs Dalloway as both a precursor to, 
and an active contributor in cognitive literary studies and developing fields of inquiry, such 
as affect theory.  
 In part three of this chapter, I build upon the ineffable nature of affect, and consider a 
dialogue between Woolf’s 1926 essay “On Being Ill” and Mrs Dalloway in order to explore 
how everyday language fails to capture the experience of illness. In considering how Woolf 
herself problematises representing the individual and atypical experience in realist novels, I 
am able to better illustrate how Mrs Dalloway attends to these problems by subverting 
narrative expectation, employing metaphor and stream of consciousness, and disrupting the 
temporal boundaries of the novel. “On Being Ill” serves as Woolf’s more explicit meditation 
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on the limitations of everyday language, and how it fails to capture the subtle distinctions 
between one person’s illness and another’s. Woolf suggests that literary writers have 
overlooked narratives that focus on bodily illness because of its corporeality, which is framed 
as crude and unrefined. While there are numerous narratives that depict physical illness, 
Woolf was more deeply invested in exploring the affective states elicited by the experience of 
illness, which reveal the inherent connection between mental and physical processes and 
begin to suggest the revelatory function that experiences of illness may perform.  
Through a close reading of Mrs Dalloway in part three, I apply Woolf’s argument 
from “On Being Ill”—that everyday language fails to capture the epiphanic possibilities of 
illness—and I demonstrate how Woolf uses metaphorical language, stream of consciousness, 
and modernist structures to redress this shortcoming. I will focus on the relationship between 
Clarissa Dalloway’s observations of daily life and her past illness, while examining how her 
character is doubled with that of Septimus Smith to obscure the boundaries between the 
corporeal and the cerebral. I shall, moreover, examine Woolf’s extension of this doubling to 
consider physical and mental illness and wellness, the notion of survival and recovery, and to 
explore the motiveless nature of death that is part of the revelation of illness. 
The experience of illness often brings a person closer to death, which, for Clarissa—
an upper-middle class woman—was deemed a distant possibility. However, illness and its 
proximity to death dismantles Clarissa’s false sense of security, instead giving her a renewed 
vigour for daily life. It is the realisation that death is inevitable that brings Clarissa Dalloway 
one of her first epiphanies of the novel. The epiphanic possibilities of illness are an important 
step in diversifying the depictions of illness and neuroatypicality in literature. Woolf’s novel 
acknowledges the value inherent in engaging with the othered experience and perspective in 
line with the neurocosmopolitan suggestion that neuroatypical and neurodiverse minds 
mirrors the importance of biodiversity in nature. However, Mrs Dalloway does not represent 
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illness and neurotypicality in a one-dimensional manner—as unconditionally positive. The 
experience of the othered mind explored in Woolf’s novel is complex, both revelatory and 
reaffirming, yet isolating and all-consuming, and is thus a form of representation that defies 
the rigid and hierarchal understanding of her psychoanalytic-oriented contemporaries. 
 
Giving Freud the Slip: Tracing the Historical Narrative of Mrs Dalloway    
Studies on Hysteria (1895), Freud’s collaboration with physician Josef Breuer, is viewed as 
the founding document of psychoanalysis. In that work, Freud and Breuer relay five case 
studies of women that each centre on the symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment (by both Freud 
and Breuer) of hysteria—a now discredited, female-coded disorder of general psychological 
distress. Both authors also lay the foundation for the theory of repression. Repression theory 
is the key, and perhaps most controversial, tenet of Freudian psychoanalysis. Freud and 
Breuer explain that in relation to hysteria, “[repression] was a question of things which the 
patient wished to forget, and therefore intentionally repressed from his conscious thought” 
(1956, 10). Both hysteria and repression are enmeshed in outmoded notions of gender and 
sexuality and work to pathologize women and queer individuals’ experiences of 
neuroatypicality.  
The dismissal of women’s experiences of illness and neuroatypicality based on gender 
was an issue of which Woolf herself was keenly aware. Furthermore, Freud’s diagnostic 
practice established a rigid, linear path to recovery that often inflicted more psychological 
harm through its sometimes unrealistic expectations. I suggest that Woolf resists naming a 
diagnosis for Clarissa Dalloway, as she understood the limiting effect this could have on the 
depiction of, and discussion surrounding, her character’s neuroatypical mind. Where Clarissa 
benefits from her indeterminate status, Septimus Smith’s diagnosis of shellshock places him 
on a path that proves fatal. Throughout Mrs Dalloway, Septimus is continually dismissed and 
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maltreated by loved ones and medical professionals alike as a result of societal and medical 
misconceptions surrounding his diagnosis. The fatal consequences of Septimus’ 
(mis)treatment demonstrate the potential for harm in such psychological inaccuracies, 
regardless of intention, particularly when concerning neuroatypical functioning.  
Mrs Dalloway explores the pressures created by the kinds of social expectations 
Freud imposed through Septimus’ doctors and their detrimental impact on one’s holistic 
health. Both Dr. Holmes and Sir William Bradshaw continue to reinforce their own reductive 
regimens upon Septimus, who they suggest “had nothing whatever seriously the matter with 
him but was a little out of sorts” (Woolf 1992, 23), and is therefore prescribed outdoor walks, 
music hall, and playing cricket (1992, 27). Rather than conclude that these characters simply 
need to learn to obey and observe, Woolf’s novel plays out the various consequences of 
finding oneself unable to fulfil one’s social obligations. Woolf explores Clarissa’s 
suppressed, queer sexuality, but rather than characterising it as a wild, primordial desire, as 
Freud might, she frames its presence in small, intimate, and almost ordinary ways: “but this 
question of love ([Clarissa] thought, putting her coat away), this falling in love with women. 
Take Sally Seton.…had not that, after all, been love?” (Woolf 1992, 35). Woolf does not see 
Clarissa’s sexuality as a failing in her character—as her conservative contemporaries may 
have—but as a failing in society. In exploring Clarissa’s queer sexuality, Woolf is able to 
more explicitly consider the notion of innate divergence from oppressive social norms, 
echoing the more abstract experience of neuroatypicality.  
Similarly, for Septimus, there is no easy divide between the divergent experiences 
within his unconscious and conscious mind; Septimus’ unconscious operations overwhelm 
his everyday life, but it is society that tells him to suppress his thoughts, and he dies as a 
result. Woolf’s writing indicates an awareness of the harmful restrictions that became 
apparent in Freud’s theories as they were put into psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic 
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practice. Dr Holmes and Sir William Bradshaw’s disregard for the severity of Septimus’ 
condition and their trivialising suggestions for Septimus to take outdoor walks and play 
cricket set him up for failure. Holmes and Bradshaw’s continual reinforcement that there is 
nothing wrong with Septimus convinces him that “there was no excuse; nothing whatever the 
matter, except the sin for which human nature had condemned him to death” (99). When 
Septimus’ condition does not improve with Holmes and Bradshaw’s linear treatment 
timeline, it is characterised as a failing within himself, as “health is largely a matter in our 
own control” (100). In resisting the reductive, linear narrative that follows the expectation of 
illness-diagnosis-recovery, Woolf demonstrates that illness is not a homogenous experience, 
and that it does not conform to the expectations of a single diagnosis or treatment. The 
Freudian psychoanalytic institution reinforced this reductive narrative of recovery and is thus 
antithetical to Mrs Dalloway’s concern with engaging with the neuroatypical experience in an 
ethical and empathetic manner. 
The shared cultural and historical landscape of psychoanalysis and Woolf have led the 
two to become inextricably linked, regardless of their fundamental divergences. Sanja Bahun 
has considered what she terms the “complicated vectoring” of Freud and Woolf’s historical 
and literary narratives (2012, 93) while resisting conflating the two simply because “the 
development of psychoanalysis and Woolf ’s personal and professional trajectory not only 
coextended but are also related bilaterally at various levels” (93). Bahun’s untangling of 
Woolf’s complicated relationship with Freud is a mindful repudiation of the plentiful 
psychoanalytic readings of Woolf. Bahun emphasises that “any [scene] we create of Woolf ’s 
engagement with psychoanalysis, is limited (that is, speculative), inscribed by not only our 
phantasmic projections—the fanciful if deeply satisfying activity of ‘imagining Woolf’—but 
also selection and hermeneutic bridges that are always partly provisional” (92). Bahun’s 
critique of past psychoanalytic readings of Woolf supports my own evaluation of such 
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criticism as she articulates the need to move beyond the confines of psychoanalysis while 
acknowledging the importance of past artistic and critical negotiations.  
In opposition to Bahun is Elizabeth Abel’s Virginia Woolf and the Fictions of 
Psychoanalysis (1989), which examines both the biographical and fictional interplay of 
psychoanalytic theory in Woolf’s work. Writing of Mrs Dalloway, Abel presents Woolf’s 
work in parallel with Freud’s own growing interest in gender, and its impact upon the 
Oedipal complex. Abel names Mrs Dalloway as “Woolf’s version of the daughter’s Oedipal 
narrative” (1989, 7), as Clarissa’s obsession with both the unconscious and the past holds 
“the full weight of the pre-Oedipal experience” (32). However, at odds with her insistence 
that Woolf was thoroughly invested in psychoanalytic theory is Abel’s acknowledgement of 
Woolf’s real-world critique of psychoanalysis, particularly its Freudian forms.  
Nicole Jouve (2000) takes a similar, biography-first approach when analysing 
Woolf’s work. Jouve also notes Woolf’s “strong hostility” (245) towards psychoanalysis, 
emphasising how “manifold recent readings of Woolf’s novels show her to be consciously re-
writing and countering Freudian notions about the unconscious, the Oedipus complex, and 
female sexuality” (245–46). Yet, even in opposition, Jouve frames Woolf’s authorial 
approach as inherently psychoanalytic. Abel and Jouve’s unwillingness to look beyond 
Woolf’s historical context so as to force Freudian ideas upon Woolf’s novels typifies the 
criticism that I argue we need to move beyond. I suggest that in their wielding of 
psychoanalysis, both authors attempt to unlock Woolf’s novel in a manner that echoes the 
harmful parameters of the Levinasian grasp. Rather than approach Mrs Dalloway through a 
methodology informed by the novel’s diverse approach to mental otherness and attempts to 
overturn and reimagine the socio-cultural narrative of neuroatypicality, Abel and Jouve force 
Mrs Dalloway to conform to the ideology of Freudian psychoanalysis. If we are to fully 
appreciate the cognitive innovation of Woolf’s novel, as well as reflect the move to ethical 
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representation and discourse that Mrs Dalloway enacts, the neurocosmopolitanism of 
cognitive literary studies exemplifies an approach that maintains the ineffable and uncertain 
aspects of othered minds while situating Woolf’s novel within cognitive scientific discourse. 
Like the writings of Abel and Jouve, Shirley Panken’s Virginia Woolf and the Lust of 
Creation: A Psychoanalytic Exploration links “the oral images in Mrs Dalloway” to Panken’s 
own diagnosis of Woolf as having “insistent oral conflicts in [her] developmental history” 
(1987, 135). The foundation of Panken’s text underscores the more insidious consequences of 
Freudian psychoanalytic readings of Woolf: diagnosing the author through readings of her 
fiction. The practice of “armchair psychology,” and the speculative diagnosis of an author 
through their work, disregards the fictional quality of a text, an author’s ability, and the 
inherent unknowability of the other. Furthermore, biographical and diagnostic readings are 
often undercut by problematic notions of gender and class that were pervasive during Freud’s 
time. Similarly, Suzette Henke (2010) has written about the supposed relationship between 
the autobiographical and psychoanalytic nature of Woolf’s fiction, explaining that “without 
question, Virginia Woolf drew on her own experience of mental distress and psychic 
dissociation as a model for Septimus Smith in Mrs. Dalloway” (2010, 165). Panken and 
Henke’s articles highlight the enticing, but limited nature of biographical readings that 
psychoanalytic theory invites to Woolf’s work. While I understand the desire to extract 
biographical insight into an author from their text, I would argue that this is a reductive 
practice that undermines the fictional world created by an author.  
Speculation that a character may be a covert extension of an author by virtue of 
sharing in neuroatypicality both undermines an author’s ability to create a fictional world and 
it also runs the risk of invading an author’s privacy. Bahun is, like me, concerned by this 
practice as it relates to psychoanalysis. She observes that “while (psycho)biographies and 
psychobiography-based literary criticism.…have significantly contributed to our knowledge 
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of the intimate contexts for Woolf’s art, they have also had regrettable consequences for the 
general evaluation of her artistic and political activity” (Bahun 2012, 100). Here, Bahun does 
not dismiss the potential for details of an author’s life to have informed their work. Rather, 
she rejects attempts to extract biographical detail from the characters, events, and themes of 
fiction. As Bahun explains, “animated by the vicissitudes of Woolf’s mental health, psycho-
biographical assessments of her work often neglect the realities of text as well as those social 
contexts that do not conform to the inevitably limited interpretation posed by a symptom-
driven biography” (100). Speculative biography in literary criticism is restrictive to both text 
and author. However, it is at its most damaging when used to diagnose an author with a 
particular illness through the lens of their works.  
Across this thesis, I argue that it is vital to establish boundaries between an author’s 
life and the experience of their works so as to resist reducing a complex, fictional world to a 
means to a diagnostic end. Bahun examines the various autobiographical contexts in which 
Freud and Woolf intersect, noting “another context that allies, tentatively and sometimes 
problematically, Woolf and psychoanalytic theory, is her own mental health” (Bahun 2012, 
99). Psychoanalytic literary criticism has perceived the accounts of Woolf suffering from a 
form of mental illness as an open invitation to diagnose the author through her fiction. Abel 
problematises this practice best, saying “Woolf insists that she disputes not psychoanalytic 
interpretations of the infantile experience but a colonisation of the literary field that 
transforms ‘characters’ into ‘cases’ through the application of a doctrinal ‘key’ that 
‘simplifies rather than complicates’” (Abel 1989, 17). I agree with Abel here that the 
relationship between psychoanalysis and biographical readings of Woolf is a toxic 
combination that is more reductive than revelatory. Bahun recommends that “we need not 
perceive the relationship between Woolf and psychoanalysis in terms of either precedence or 
competition,” instead suggesting that “it is far more illuminating to probe rapports and 
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intersections between the two” (2012, 103). However, as Abel suggests, there is not any 
single “doctrinal key” to Woolf’s writing, as this limits the theoretical and thematic 
possibilities of the text. For Woolf, I would suggest, the limits of psychoanalysis are 
entangled with the limitations of language, diagnostic practice, and traditional divisions 
between mind/body, which in turn work to enforce oppressive social attitudes that inflict 
harm upon these vulnerable subjects. I assert that a neurocosmopolitan approach, framed by 
cognitive literary studies, offers a means of overturning these problematic practices.  
The methodology of cognitive literary studies draws upon a variety of fields, 
including psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy, which offer diverse perspectives upon 
diagnosis, language, and Cartesian dualism, with each drawing upon both scientific and 
artistic understanding. For Mrs Dalloway I draw on affect theory more specifically in order to 
explore the interconnection of mind and body emphasised in Woolf’s novel while 
maintaining the ineffability of the othered mind. In the next section, I analyse how the 
introduction of affect theory to the critical narrative of Mrs Dalloway allows us to explore the 
embodied and extended cognitive experiences of Clarissa and Septimus beyond outmoded 
constructs of gender, class, and sexuality in the same manner as Freudian psychoanalysis. In 
so doing, I seek to demonstrate the complex innovation of Woolf’s novel while exploring 
how we, as critics, may continue to redeem the place of literature in the cognitive sciences 
and embrace the experience of othered minds.  
 
Action, Affect, and Narrative Intervention  
Marco Caracciolo argues that “modernist fiction serves as an important precedent for 
envisioning the entanglement of our mental life and physical bodies” (2019, 22). For him, 
Mrs Dalloway is an example of modernist writing that overcomes the Cartesian dualism 
espoused by “the empiricist psychologies that emerged in the second half of the 19th century” 
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(3). Caracciolo contends that the methodology of embodiment, and of subverting dualism 
through metaphor, “leads to a reassessment of the whole relation between (human) 
subjectivity and the nonhuman world of things and natural processes” (22).7 Modernists such 
as Woolf rejected Cartesian dualism through metaphorical language and stream of 
consciousness, representing instead the “deep entanglement” (22) of subjects. In this respect, 
the modernist agenda anticipates the attempts of contemporary cognitive sciences to do the 
same. Contemporary cognitive science has built upon the “fundamentally materialist, anti-
Cartesian project” of modernists by exploring the “the neural underpinnings of our cognitive 
makeup” (22). Thus, for Caracciolo, modernist fiction’s pre-empting of embodiment theory 
and interrelatedness in fiction necessitates an increase in contemporary, cognitive-based 
approaches to literature so as to fully illuminate its transformative potential.8  
Like Caracciolo, the subversion of dichotomies—particularly mind/body and 
past/present—through circular temporalities, embodied and affective states, and embracing of 
otherness in order to illuminate the complex innerworkings of neuroatypicality is where I 
locate the space for cognitive scientific discourse within Mrs Dalloway. However, where 
Caracciolo used embodiment theory to articulate the bridge between Woolf’s novel and the 
scientific realm, I turn to affect theory and its emphasis on the embodied, emotive, and 
ineffable underpinnings of cognitive functioning in order to further engage with the 
destabilising atypicality of Clarissa and Septimus. In so doing, I demonstrate how Woolf 
subverts the diagnostic institution and its socio-cultural manifestations throughout her novel.  
 
7 Caracciolo suggests that Woolf and her modernist contemporaries’ disruptive use of metaphorical 
language also holds promise in a variety of fields beyond the cognitive, including ecological, climatological, and 
geographical sciences. 
8 Caracciolo explains it is “because [metaphorical language] helps us reassess our position vis-à-vis the 
material and natural realities that surround us” (2019, 23). By “[effectively] yoking together the human and the 
non-human” (23), modernist fiction reframes the human perspective on, and location within, the natural world. 
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Affect theorist Stephen Ahern describes literature as having a “transformative 
potential” (2019, 9) that echoes affect’s ability to make sense of the in-between. The intrusive 
immediacy of affect echoes the temporal interventions that rupture the everyday in Mrs 
Dalloway, such as the kiss shared by Clarissa and Sally, or Septimus’ suicide. In the 
following section, I further my analysis of the in-between of affect in Mrs Dalloway, looking 
to the “sensual resonances, the aesthetic engagements, the affective investments” (Ahern 
2019, 3) that make up the discursive space between affect theory, cognitive literary studies, 
and literature. In particular, I employ the “4E” approach to affect theory and cognitive 
literary studies advanced by Brooke Miller of “extended, embedded, embodied, [and] 
enactive” affect and cognition (2017, 114). Miller acknowledges the tension that can arise 
when “coordinating affect and emotion as components of cognition and experience” (114) 
but suggests that the “4E” framework provides the most fruitful discourse between literature, 
affect, and cognitive literary studies. In Mrs Dalloway, I explore the concepts of affect and 
emotion, complex temporality, and relationality between subjects and bodies—concepts 
which Miller suggests are best explored through an emphasis on the “4E” experience of 
cognition. In so doing, I demonstrate how Miller’s composition of affect and affective states 
in literature creates a dynamic backdrop upon which we may better study the extended and 
embodied experience of emotion and cognition within each of Woolf’s characters. 
Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Smith are often unable to communicate their 
experiences of deeper affective and emotive states that are situated within their otherness 
owing to the hierarchies of gender, class, sexuality, and recovery. The dichotomies of 
mind/body, illness/wellness, and past/present are all agents of these social hierarchies that 
restrict one’s understanding of their own cognitive experience. Throughout Mrs Dalloway, 
Woolf uses embodied emotion, metaphorical language, and memory and foreshadowing in 
line with the modernist approach to describe instances of epiphany gained and lost that defy 
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everyday understanding and hegemonic beliefs. In so doing, Woolf undermines the binarized 
systems of language and pathologizing methods that these hierarchies operate through. I 
argue that the complex aesthetic and temporal backdrop of the “4E” affective experience, 
with a specific focus on the embodied and extended forms of affect and cognition, can 
communicate the subversive elements of Clarissa and Septimus’ experiences. 
Clarissa’s queer kiss with Sally is a powerful experience shared between two women 
that momentarily transcends the bounds of their patriarchal society. In a moment of 
reflection, Clarissa describes the kiss as “the most exquisite moment of her whole life” 
(Woolf 1992, 38). Clarissa reflects that there “was the purity, the integrity, of her feeling for 
Sally.…a quality which could only exist between women, between women just grown up” 
(37). Clarissa’s relationship with Sally works to disrupt her everyday life with affective 
moments of profound revelation. Miller echoes this same sentiment in her chapter, explaining 
how “analyses of affect decentre, destabilize, or otherwise trouble the already troubled 
subject” (Miller 2017, 117). Woolf uses the metaphor of a gift: “a diamond, something 
infinitely precious, wrapped up, which, as they walked.…she uncovered, or the radiance 
burnt through” (Woolf 1992, 39), to explore the simultaneously private and powerful 
experience of the kiss—an act that is at once contained within, like the wrapping of a present, 
yet still able to burn through its temporal confines. Woolf utilises metaphor throughout 
Clarissa’s narrative to encapsulate the simultaneity of experience, which in turn evokes 
Miller’s embodied (personal) and extended (uncontained) affective experience. Moreover, 
just as much of the affective experience is largely ineffable, Clarissa is able to intimate the 
sense of revelatory change felt within the kiss yet is unable to act upon it. Clarissa 
understands that it was Sally “who made her feel, for the first time, how sheltered life at 
Bourton was” (1992, 36), as, when she kissed her, her “whole world might have turned 
upside down!” (38). However, Clarissa never truly acts upon this revelation, and instead 
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continues to feel its cognitive disruptions throughout her life in moments of isolation and 
contemplation created by the landscape of illness.  
Like one’s experience of illness, the disruptive qualities of Clarissa and Sally’s kiss 
are an inherently personal and intimate revelation that holds particular meaning only for 
Clarissa. Woolf emphasises the dual nature of both experiences: at once unique to the 
individual yet symbolic of a wider, communal experience. Miller voices a similar tension of 
representation in her chapter, explaining how “the complexity of the subjective experience 
reflects the inadequacies of traditional models of cognition.…of linear, hierarchical flows 
from lower- to higher-order thought” (2017, 123). For Clarissa, the idiosyncrasies of her 
illness and her kiss run parallel. Her individualised experience of illness is further upheld in 
Woolf’s text by her lack of diagnosis. It is implied that Clarissa fell ill with the flu during the 
1918 pandemic and that the mental and physical effects felt are a direct consequence of this 
illness. However, Mrs Dalloway never makes this diagnosis or its aftereffects explicit, 
resisting the impulse to limit Clarissa to an assumed timeline of symptoms and recovery. 
Likewise, Woolf never makes explicit Clarissa’s sexuality, and obfuscates her feelings 
towards Sally or her husband, allowing them to exist for both people in the past and present. 
Clarissa’s memory of the kiss—bringing together past and present—is undetermined and 
open-ended in meaning. Woolf is therefore able to represent and align affective experiences 
of Clarissa’s life and illness in a way that allows for both collective meaning to be gained 
while resisting homogenising these moments as representative of all illness or all queer 
experiences.  
The ability to simultaneously share meaning and uphold individuality is essential 
when approaching Septimus’ death by suicide. While Septimus’ death represents the grave 
consequence of social and medical mistreatment, it is his unique motivation, and should not 
be reductively projected upon other, similar events. Septimus’ suicide is recounted as an 
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action that finally allows Lucrezia to commune with Septimus as “she saw; she understood” 
(although ironically, Dr Holmes “could not conceive” the profundity of the act) (Woolf 1992, 
164). The act of Septimus’ suicide is felt and reinterpreted by many characters within the 
novel, echoing Miller’s assertion that “affect exceeds human boundaries and has an 
independent ontology that challenges how we conceptualise cognition, sociality, and familiar 
binaries” (2017, 115). Clarissa in particular has an intensely embodied, affective reaction to 
the news of Septimus’ death, saying “always her body went through it first…her dress 
flamed, her body burnt” (1992, 201). The metaphor of burning parallels how the “radiance 
burnt through” Clarissa during her kiss with Sally, doubling the two acts as similarly 
disruptive and decentring in their affective experience.  
Septimus does not perceive suicide as a calamitous event, thinking that “it was their 
idea of tragedy, not his” (163). Yet, at the same time, he is reluctant and uncertain at the 
moment when he is closest to death, saying “he would wait until the very last moment. He 
did not want to die. Life was good. The sun hot” (164). Septimus’ oscillation between his 
desperate need and thoughtful hesitation as he sits upon the liminal space of the windowsill, 
poised between inside and out, embodies the divisions that manifest in his conflicting 
memories throughout the novel. The erosion of time and space for Septimus only brings him 
closer to death in a way that is eluded by Clarissa—his memories are violent and hold the 
forms of deceased comrades and friends that continually foreshadow his own death and 
suggest the circular temporalities that affect theory also emphasises. Moreover, Septimus’ 
suffering is diffused throughout his surroundings and into wider society. While Clarissa’s 
cognitive experience does extend into the exterior world, it is mostly contained within. Upon 
observing an elm tree in the park, Septimus notes how “leaves were alive, trees were alive. 
And the leaves being connected by millions of fibres with his own body” (24). Woolf uses 
the metaphor of the tree as connected to the fibres of Septimus’ being to demonstrate how 
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Septimus’ individual personhood has dissolved into his surroundings, his emotive and 
affective experience has extended into the natural world, and his character is overwhelmed by 
the apparent meaning behind each part of the world within which he exists. Miller best 
conceives of this experience as she explains how “affect flows between organic and inorganic 
bodies to produce a radical sense of presence” (2017, 118). The embodied and extended 
nature of Septimus’ affective and cognitive experience conveys the inherent sense of 
atypicality that Septimus understands but is unable to communicate. Here, Woolf utilises 
metaphors that embody experience, and stream of consciousness that extends cognition, in 
order to demonstrate the disruptive encounters that often underpin identities of 
neuroatypicality. 
 Septimus’ suicide is demonstrative of the destructive potential of illness in an 
individual who lacks the privilege of time and education to reflect upon and understand their 
condition. Furthermore, it is an act that in part results from the toxic expectations surrounding 
working-class masculinity thrust upon men returning from war. Dr Holmes and Sir William 
Bradshaw diagnose Septimus with shellshock, thinking a diagnosis will create a linear path to 
recovery. The quintessentially British notions of masculinity and pulling oneself up by the 
bootstraps accompany the specialists’ expectation that Septimus will follow an accepted 
trajectory towards recovery. Yet, the opposite becomes true when the expectation of 
conformity to an inventory of symptoms and cures, an unwavering investment in recovery, 
and the reductive nature of diagnostic language become yet another prison that traps 
Septimus. He believes that “he was in their power! Holmes and Bradshaw were on him!” 
(1992, 161), later presupposing the patronising dismissal he would encounter when they were 
to arrive to take him away, declaring “Holmes would say, ‘In a funk, eh?’ Holmes would get 
him” (163). Within this passage there is a sense that Septimus can anticipate the doctor’s 
moves—suggesting the unstable temporalities evoked through affect—but cannot out-
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manoeuvre them, as he does through his suicide, further intimating the inexpressible nature of 
his experience. Ahern articulates the dual nature of this ineffable meaning, explaining how 
“forces of encounter overwhelm a character’s sense of self-possession as the transmission of 
affective intensities threatens to wipe out psychic integrity—and yet at the same time 
enkindles a sense of potential, of promise, of something profound in play beyond the narrow 
confines of the self” (2019, 8). Unable to express the true extent of his condition with 
language, Septimus’ suicide is an act of total despair. There is no triumphant meaning in 
Septimus’ death in line with bildungsroman structure. Although, in a sense, Septimus 
overcomes Holmes and Bradshaw, the act is an absolute reminder of the tragic potential that 
restrictive social expectations and ideals can provoke.  
Beyond the experience of affect itself, affect theory also asks us to consider complex 
temporal experiences of cognition. Similarly, Mrs Dalloway explores how illness and 
neuroatypicality emphasise a circular temporality for cognition through characters’ memories 
or foreshadowing of great affective and emotive moments. These subversive moments of 
cognition, emotion, and action continue to echo across the novel through acts of 
remembering. Clarissa often finds herself remembering and reliving her queer kiss with Sally 
Seaton— “the intoxication of the moment” (1992, 191)—and the impact this action has had 
upon her life since. Conversely, Septimus is seemingly able to intimate his death by suicide 
which concludes his narrative, as death presses upon his daily life— “the whole world was 
clamouring: Kill yourself, kill yourself, for our sakes” (101)—and further incapacitates him. 
Woolf’s novel uses characters’ memories to destabilise the linear temporal boundaries which 
uphold the binaries of illness/wellness and past/present, and traditionally constrains the 
affective experience of illness and neuroatypicality. The circularity of memory and 
foreshadowing creates a cycle of embodied and extended experience for both Clarissa and 
Septimus, who continue to re-embody incidents that make explicit their inherent otherness. 
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The destabilising nature of the kiss and the suicide thus repeatedly overpower—however 
momentarily—notions of class, gender, sexuality, and experience, and their oppression of the 
othered individual. Moreover, the representation of the kiss and the suicide evoke a sense of 
the ineffable mind: that which we experience but cannot verbalise. I suggest that the ability to 
communicate the underlying ineffability of the “4E” experience of affect and emotion is what 
makes the contribution of Mrs Dalloway so valuable to our understanding of affect theory 
and to the growing paradigm of cognitive literary studies. 
Clarissa’s experiences of memory as it disrupts the temporal and spatial boundaries of 
her world are moments of relatively privileged youth and middle-aged introspection. 
Although her character is remembering, the immediacy of the kiss makes its temporal 
placement uncertain—for Clarissa, it is relived as both present and past. Her incessant 
remembering makes manifest the liminal qualities of her identity. Miller’s “4E” approach 
allows us to consider how the kiss evokes the subversive liminality of Clarissa’s identity, and 
communicates the synchronicity of past/present, mind/body, and illness/wellness. The kiss is 
a moment of unification that brings the past into the present, allowing Clarissa to slowly 
move towards an acceptance of the continual presence of illness as something that cannot be 
quantified into binaries of illness/wellness or past/present. In this way, “Mrs Dalloway” as a 
character and a text resists the linear structure of diagnosis-treatment-recovery.  
Clarissa’s privileged ability to explore her memory as a means of understanding her 
identity and expressing her sense of self are antithetical to Septimus. The duality of privilege 
explicit in Woolf’s novel also reflects the problematic intersections with class and privilege 
present in Freudian psychoanalysis. Rory du Plessis explains “psychotherapy was practiced 
within a framework of social class that embraced patients from the middle class and higher 
[while] the poor and disadvantaged were largely excluded from the practice” (du Plessis 
2012). Du Plessis describes the clientele of early psychoanalysis as “middle-class and up who 
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were educated, intelligent, successful, and powerful” as opposed to those members of the 
working classes who were “considered to have deficits in their psychic life (lacking desires, 
thoughts, and intellectual capacities) and thus [were] un-analysable” (2012). The classist 
attitude implicit in Freud’s practice led to the psychological neglect of the working classes at 
a time where such care was urgently required. Septimus’ dismissal by his doctors is 
indicative of the discriminatory dismissal felt across the working class, who were largely 
unable to access effective medical care (due to finances, labour, and prejudice), particularly 
when compared to Clarissa’s own ability to recover at leisure.   
 For Septimus, his past collapses catastrophically into his present, and he lacks the 
privilege of time to explore its meaning. The disintegration of self is reflected in Septimus’ 
extended and embodied state, as the boundaries between himself and the world are 
collapsing—like the “radical sense of presence” he experiences in the park. Furthermore, his 
social class only leads “experts” to dismiss him as uneducated, socially inconsequential, and 
incapable of feeling. However, Miller’s emphasis on the flow of affect between bodies, 
temporalities, and aesthetics demonstrates that Septimus is, in fact, experiencing a radical 
presence of feeling. Woolf’s novel uses the tragedy of Septimus’ harrowing experience to 
undercut Clarissa’s privilege by situating Septimus’ struggle within her day of leisure and 
entertaining. In so doing, Woolf explores the disruptive and clarifying qualities of illness 
without romanticising the condition of being ill. Woolf’s depiction of two divergent 
experiences of illness demonstrates an avenue for representation that can at once draw 
parallels between them, while maintaining the uniqueness of individual experience. Thus, 
through metaphor, doubling, and memory/foreshadowing, Mrs Dalloway creates a counter-
narrative of the othered experience that considers class, gender, and sexuality, while evoking 
the embodied and affective nature of neuroatypicality. 
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The symbiosis between Woolf and affect theory is an exemplification of the broader 
aim of this thesis to explore avenues of research that fall under the wider cognitive literary 
studies paradigm. In so doing, I demonstrate how Mrs Dalloway complicates cultural 
imaginings of otherness, and, in turn, how cognitive literary studies can uphold these 
unknowable and uncertain elements of cognition within fiction. Affect theory, like Woolf 
herself, attempts to represent the ineffable embodiment of experiences that overwhelm 
human, material, and societal boundaries. In part three, I demonstrate Woolf’s impulse to 
bring together seemingly disparate ideas and experiences that cross all manner of 
boundaries—doubling Clarissa and Septimus, while further extending my analysis of the 
embodiment of illness and neuroatypicality, and coalescing past and present upon the vast 
social matrix of London. I conclude with a discussion that considers how metaphorical 
language, stream of consciousness, embodied emotion, and the wider operations of modernist 
literature are able to represent and explore the nexus of the mind, memory, and cognitive 
theory, unbound by everyday language and structure.  
 
Woolf at the Door: The Liminality and Synchronicity of Illness   
In the essay “On Being Ill” (2002), Woolf suggests the need for “a new language…. 
primitive, subtle, sensual, obscene” (34); one that captures both the revelation and sedation of 
illness, and that is suitable for both literature and everyday use. “On Being Ill” demonstrates 
Woolf’s concern that physical illness is not always adequately represented in literary writing, 
suggesting that, as a result, language has suffered a deficit and is incapable of accurately 
depicting the experience of illness. Woolf notes that “literature does its best to maintain that 
its concern is with the mind; that the body is a sheet of plain glass through which the soul 
looks straight and clear” (2002, 32). However, “the very opposite is true. All day, all night 
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the body intervenes” (32). Here, Woolf evokes the synthesis of mind and body that 
experiences of illness reveal, despite a society that was unwilling to explore the corporeality 
of mental illness and the cognitive impact of physical illness. It is crucial, therefore, that our 
cultural understanding moves to encapsulate illness in all its manifestations if it is to 
appreciate narratives like Mrs Dalloway.  
“On Being Ill” posits that to suffer profound illness is to come to terms with the 
oneness of mind and body in a way that is difficult to understand for those who have not 
experienced it. The symptoms of mental and physical illnesses are not restricted either to the 
mind or the body. Thus, the experience of illness muddies attempts to separate and privilege 
one over the other, as symptoms often call to attention the intrinsic interconnectedness of the 
two. Understanding the completeness of mind and body challenges a sense of selfhood as 
established under privileged ideas of the mind’s functioning. As a result, Woolf suggests, the 
depiction of illness as a synthesis of both mind and body was shunned by her literary 
predecessors. Moreover, Mrs Dalloway goes beyond a basic unification of mind and body, 
looking towards the individual and cultural meaning gleaned by drawing the two together, 
and exploring the impact affect, memory, and the othered experience has on both. Yet, 
according to Woolf, when literature does attempt to capture the experience of illness, it often 
reveals a “poverty of the language” (2002, 34), for the rarity of its depiction has left a deficit 
in representation that fails to speak to the wholeness of the mind-body experience.  
In the opening of Mrs Dalloway (1992), Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Smith are 
both described in relation to their respective encounters with illness. Clarissa is said to have 
“grown very white since her illness” (Woolf 1992, 4)—a gendered observation as it 
carelessly focuses on her physical appearance, speaking to the cursory and unsympathetic 
understanding of women’s illness in a culture consumed by the fallout of war. Moreover, 
Septimus, although suffering acutely from what is diagnosed as shellshock, triggered by 
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fighting in the Great War, is similarly dismissed as merely being “a little out of sorts” (1992, 
23).9 As a working-class man, Septimus is expected to embody a form of masculinity that is 
at odds with his deeply emotional experience that renders him incapable of physical or social 
labour. Illness is a socially isolating and invalidating experience for both characters who are 
unable to communicate the various and pervasive effects of their different afflictions to 
others.  
Both Clarissa and Septimus are burdened by the “poverty of the language” as they 
struggle to grasp their reshaped understanding of the world. The effects of Clarissa and 
Septimus’ illnesses overrun each character’s body, permeate their thoughts, and extend into 
their surroundings. Although mind-body dualism had long been critiqued by the time Woolf 
wrote Mrs Dalloway and “On Being Ill,” the underlying concepts remained embedded in 
Western culture, as bodies and minds tended to be discussed in isolation from one another. 
Thus, Clarissa and Septimus, both situated between past and present encounters with physical 
and mental illness, struggle to articulate their experience of the everyday as tainted by these 
illnesses. Similarly, in relation to the tension between Woolf’s modernity and the traditions of 
her Victorian predecessors, Steve Ellis (2007) notes, “Mrs Dalloway aims precisely at 
combining the worlds of past experience and present receptivity to ‘deepen’ its sense of the 
present ‘when backed by the past,’ to the advantage of both” (Ellis 2007, 52). This depth of 
present as shaped by the past is a temporal echo of the importance of unification between 
mind/body and illness/wellness. In unifying these concepts through metaphorical language, 
Woolf brings her characters closer to understanding themselves: defined by fluctuating 
 
9 Shellshock is an outdated term for post-traumatic stress disorder. Although defunct, I shall refer to the 
condition as shellshock as this is the diagnosis given to Septimus, which shapes his narrative throughout Mrs 
Dalloway.  
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illness, memory, and experience as they diverge from the traditional, hegemonic notions of 
illness and social propriety.  
As Clarissa Dalloway explores London on a single, mid-June day, her mind is 
punctuated by memories of her early life and time at Bourton Hall. From the novel’s outset, 
Clarissa’s memories are repeatedly triggered by a variety of sensory encounters and 
observations during a walk through the streets that thrusts her mind into the past. The 
liminality of Clarissa’s thoughts—caught between past and present—echoes the transitional 
phase her life has entered. Steve Ellis expresses how “the sense of existing simultaneously in 
the present and the past is announced on the very first page.” Furthermore, he continues to 
argue that “removing/opening doors gives both spatial and temporal access, a Woolfian 
metaphor of communing with the past we find elsewhere” (Ellis 2007, 52–53). Clarissa’s 
visible pallor further suggests this liminality, as her appearance remains caught between 
illness and wellness. Her pallor is at once desirable in an upper-middle class world of 
sheltered leisure, yet indicative of a lingering illness.  
On her walk, Clarissa considers that “she felt very young; at the same time 
unspeakably aged” (Woolf 1992, 8). As a woman in her fifties, Clarissa struggles to 
consolidate her memory of the frivolity she felt in her youth with the weight of expectation 
placed upon her as an upper-middle-class woman entering middle age. Her individual identity 
has been subsumed by the traditional roles of wife and mother, as Clarissa notes that she is 
“Mrs Dalloway; not even Clarissa anymore; this being Mrs Richard Dalloway” (1992, 11). 
The duties of wife and mother further divide her, as she feels quietly inadequate within each 
role, and a spectre of her former self.  
These uncertain preoccupations manifest themselves through Clarissa’s liminal 
wavering between states of illness and wellness. In a period situated between Clarissa’s past 
at Bourton and her present in London, she has suffered from a debilitating case of influenza. 
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Although Clarissa has, in the traditional sense, “recovered” from the virus, she continues to 
experience physical and mental effects in its aftermath. One manifestation of lingering illness 
that reshapes her perception of life is her preoccupation with death. The sense of closeness to 
death that illness brings induces a feeling of vulnerability in Clarissa: that in spite of her 
recovery, illness will strike again, and that death will follow. As Clarissa reaches Piccadilly 
on her walk, “she had the feeling that it was very, very dangerous to live even one day” 
(1992, 9). While she continues to observe, Clarissa wonders, “did it matter that she must 
inevitably cease completely; all this must go on without her; did she resent it; or did it not 
become consoling to believe that death ended absolutely” (9). Clarissa’s thoughtful, yet 
morbid, preoccupation demonstrates an understanding that death is all encompassing and 
inevitable, regardless of the illusion of protection her social standing conveys.   
Objectively, the likelihood of experiencing, and surviving, an illness like the flu is 
dependent on factors including class, ethnicity, and gender. The rampant nature of pandemic 
illness means that its destructive effects are felt even in the most privileged echelons of 
society. As someone who experienced a sheltered upbringing, Clarissa’s debilitating 
experience of illness is one that forces her to confront the reality of death as motiveless and 
equalising—an understanding often shielded by privilege. This understanding manifests in 
Clarissa’s appreciation for the small delights of her daily life, undercutting the hegemonic 
social structures in place. In so doing, Woolf questions whether there is a place for the 
traditional social hierarchy in a world increasingly shaped by an experience of illness that is 
both shared and unique. Clarissa’s class fails to protect her from the physical and mental 
turmoil associated with illness. Although Clarissa retains her material advantages—a factor 
that becomes more pronounced when she is compared to Septimus—she becomes 
preoccupied with death as something all-encompassing and ever-present. Clarissa’s brush 
with death also shatters the sense of safety she has associated with the domestic sphere. 
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Moreover, unlike the fervent religiosity of her contemporaries, Clarissa does not look to an 
afterlife, Christian or otherwise, suggesting a total acceptance of the inevitability and finality 
of death.  
During the 1918 flu pandemic, civilian life became as deadly as war. Thus, while 
illness was debilitating for Clarissa in her traditional public life, leaving her unable to fulfil 
the expectations associated with an upper-middle-class wife, it was also quietly revelatory for 
her mental life. Reflecting on the relatively trivial matter of not being invited to lunch, 
Clarissa considers “the dwindling of life; how year by year her share was sliced; how little 
the margin that remained was capable any longer of stretching, of absorbing, as in the 
youthful years” (Woolf 1992, 32–3). The moments in which Clarissa considers her mortality 
occur when her day is at its least eventful—during the periods of rest between shopping, 
socialising, or hosting her party. The almost inconsequential nature of these thoughts reflects 
her awareness that, even in its most universal form, there is no meaning in death.  
Clarissa’s ability to comprehend the arbitrary nature of death is what allows her to 
reach a place of clarity and understanding. This lucidity is in direct contrast to Septimus, 
who, I contend, suffers in part because of his inability to come to terms with the 
meaninglessness of life when brought into proximity with death. As a veteran of the Great 
War, Septimus is impaired by intense hallucinations brought on by shellshock. He is haunted 
by the death of his friend and fellow soldier, Evans, and he is left incapacitated by his fear of 
the dead. Throughout the novel, spectres of the dead shift closer to Septimus who, unable to 
separate himself from his surroundings, feels ever closer to death. Out on a walk with his 
wife, Lucrezia, Septimus imagines Evans walking towards him: “‘for God’s sake don’t 
come!’ Septimus cried out. For he could not look upon the dead” (1992, 76). Septimus’ 
experiences with death are vastly different to those of Clarissa. While he may have been 
physically closer to death throughout his time at war, Septimus was unable to access the type 
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of epiphany Clarissa undergoes because the sensory overload of his wartime experiences left 
little time for intensive meditation.  
For Septimus, war gave death a false purpose. Men were encouraged and emboldened 
to enlist without fear, as dying for one’s country was portrayed as a noble and necessary 
fulfilment of masculine duty. The glorification of death by the warmongering governments of 
the early twentieth century downplayed its reality as an equalising and inevitable part of life. 
Septimus, is, on some level, aware of this truth, but he is unable to consolidate this 
understanding with the patriotic interpretation of war, leaving him with feelings of 
disillusionment. To come to terms with life and death as purposeless would be to consciously 
admit that Evans’ death held no meaning. Instead,  
when Evans was killed, just before the Armistice, in Italy, Septimus, far from 
showing any emotion or recognising that here was the end of a friendship, 
congratulated himself upon feeling very little and very reasonably. The War had 
taught him. It was sublime. He had gone through the whole show, friendship, 
European War, death, had won promotion, still under thirty and was bound to 
survive.  (1992, 94–95) 
This passage highlights the fundamental disconnect between working-class Septimus and 
sheltered, upper-middle class Clarissa by illustrating the calamity and peril that characterised 
Septimus’ experience in war, as well as his exposure to loss. Septimus was forced to come to 
terms with the inevitability of death in a manner that resisted attempts to derive deeper 
meaning from his experience. Yet Clarissa, in her largely upper-middle class, domestic 
lifestyle, was still able to come to terms with this same realisation under drastically different 
circumstances, which in turn enabled her to find personal significance and peace in her 
meditations. Illness cannot be epiphanic if the conditions for reaching a state of illumination 
do not exist. As a working-class man and a war veteran, Septimus does not have the 
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education or leisure that allows Clarissa to meditate on her experience, a state that reflects the 
divergent experiences of Clarissa’s kiss and Septimus’ suicide. Further, to be preoccupied 
with emotions, thoughts, and memories, however traumatic, is at odds with hard-working, 
masculine ideals that bind both his class and gender. Therefore, Septimus does not have the 
means to express his experience of war and illness, and their interconnectedness, in everyday 
language. Clarissa’s privileged position allows her to delight in the everyday rather than 
continually seek meaning in the world. Moreover, in being sent to war, Septimus was 
expected to either die in order to fulfil a greater, masculine purpose or return home under the 
mantle of hero. Instead, he finds a slippage in the rhetoric of bravery, masculinity, and 
success against the reality of his traumatic experiences and is stripped of any expected 
meaning in his post-war life.  
Woolf characterises the (mis)treatment of both Clarissa and Septimus by the other 
characters throughout the novel—particularly those in the medical profession—as a 
fundamental misunderstanding of their conditions. This (mis)treatment of Clarissa and 
Septimus contributes to their shared suffering and emphasises the issue of the forgotten 
survivor.10 In both fiction and in life, the resolution of an event, be it a war or a pandemic, 
commonly signals the end of the fictional or historical narrative. As observers of these 
stories, our interest and empathy are often piqued at the height of action within a story—the 
act of survival—and they then taper off at the conclusion of that same action. What becomes 
of the survivor is then relegated to concluding remarks. Thus, both author and reader are 
potentially culpable for failing to care for and engage with the narrative of the survivor. The 
hegemonic society in which Woolf wrote was struggling to understand the experiences of 
 
10 For the purposes of this chapter, the word “survivor” will encompass those people who have 
survived events such as war, natural and human-made disasters, and pandemic illness—specifically, those who 
continue to have their daily lives affected (in both visible and invisible ways) by these events long after they 
have been relegated to history.  
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survivors like Septimus and Clarissa. In acknowledging men like Septimus, society would be 
forced to confront the mistreatment of neuroatypical individuals as well as the 
meaninglessness of war and its aftermath.  
The lack of aftermath narratives leads to a lack of understanding and empathy for the 
lives led by veterans of mental and physical disorders. The plot of the bildungsroman over-
emphasises the need to draw meaning (and closure) from trauma so that characters may learn, 
grow, and, in essence, recover. For Woolf, this progression towards a triumphant recovery 
and conclusion was at odds with the effects of trauma that surrounded her in the early 
twentieth century—in war veterans and pandemic survivors. Aftermath narratives deny the 
convenient idea that survival is the point of closure for an individual, and this negligence can 
deny the lingering and fluctuating nature of illness. For many survivors, the event (if there is 
one) that triggers illness is the beginning of a lifelong narrative characterised by invisible 
struggles. Instead of being met with empathy, however, those who return from war and 
cannot return to daily life may be perceived as failures, and those who recover from the flu 
but are unable to regain full physical or mental mobility can be seen as weak. It is the binary 
notion of illness and wellness—where one who is no longer completely overwhelmed by 
illness is, for all intents and purposes, “recovered”—that fails to attend to the ongoing effects 
of illness.  
It is for these reasons that Mrs Dalloway’s narrative is so radical despite its apparently 
everyday events. Woolf is exhaustively engaged in the aftermath of cataclysmic historical 
events—of the people left behind in both fiction and reality. Mrs Dalloway places the chronic 
potential of illness and atypicality at the forefront of her novel, demonstrating the subtle ways 
in which everyday life can erode the wellbeing of those whose suffering is largely unseen by 
others. For Clarissa and Septimus, the pervasive presence of death is one such symptom of 
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their continued suffering. Death is something both characters escaped in the past, yet it 
continues to inflect their interactions with the world. 
Clarissa is delighted by many aspects of her seemingly mundane life. The opening 
passages are an ode to many of her small joys; from her determination to “buy the flowers 
herself” (Woolf 1992, 3), to her delight at hearing Big Ben “there! Out it boomed. First a 
warning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable” (1992, 4), Clarissa flits across her observations 
with great pleasure. Her intense focus upon everyday routines is a direct response to her prior 
incapacitation through illness. The deadly nature of a pandemic confronted Clarissa with the 
stark possibility of death, and the subsequent loss of the joys of her “before” life. Death 
bookends Clarissa’s narrative, with her opening stroll through London leading her to consider 
whether it was “was consoling to believe that death ended absolutely” (9), while news of 
Septimus’ suicide disrupts Clarissa’s party and thoughts, as she ponders: “death was an 
attempt to communicate, people feeling the impossibility of reaching the centre, which, 
mystically evaded them” (202). Thus, Clarissa’s almost overwhelming delight in her ability 
to complete small, everyday tasks—her London walk, and her party—takes on a new, 
sympathetic affect rather than being relegated to the shallow musings of an upper-middle-
class woman.  
Despite her mental delight, Clarissa is physically fatigued by the daily responsibilities 
she is expected to fulfil in the roles of wife and mother. Although her status allows her to 
depend on household staff, Clarissa’s routine has also developed to include periods of rest 
and isolation to aid her recovery. These allowances for physical recuperation not only 
encroach on Clarissa’s schedule but also on her mental wellness. Rather than seeing her 
physical weakness as symptomatic of the chronic nature of the illness she has survived, 
Clarissa perceives it to be a personal failure. The negative impact of this perception upon her 
own mental wellbeing is reflected in her physical isolation within the Dalloway household. 
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Clarissa’s rest room is separate from her bedroom and is the only place where she may dwell 
on her feelings of shame.  
 During this period of rest and reflection, Clarissa frames her sense of failure using 
language that dissects her form under a critical gaze. Clarissa relates her isolation as “like a 
nun withdrawing, or a child exploring a tower” (1992, 33), and later describes herself as 
“feeling.... suddenly shrivelled, aged, breastless, the grinding, blowing, flowering of the day, 
out of doors, out of the window, out of her body, and brain which now failed” (33). This 
language links Clarissa’s invisible suffering as a survivor of illness to themes of aging and 
womanhood, as well as to the wider trauma of those whose pain has been silenced by a 
(mal)practice that reduced their experiences to superficial and inaccurate diagnoses. After 
resting, Clarissa laments that “she could not dispel the virginity preserved through childbirth, 
which clung to her like a sheet” (34). These passages suggest that Clarissa is keenly aware of 
the non-sexual nature of her relationship with her husband after the birth of her daughter and 
in the wake of her illness. This is indicative of Clarissa’s loss of beauty and desire, a mental 
burden that she takes on alone, rather than sharing with her husband or attributing to her 
illness. She reflects upon her relationship with her husband, saying “lovely in girlhood, there 
came a moment.…when, through some contraction of this cold spirit, she had failed him” 
(34). There is no language with which Clarissa can fully articulate the ongoing and 
fluctuating nature of her illness, and the discourse that surrounds it only diminishes her 
struggle through its entanglement with oppressive social attitudes towards illness, gender, and 
sexuality. Thus, Clarissa burdens herself alone with feelings of failure, shame, and weakness. 
As with Clarissa, the label “survivor” has seen Septimus neglected both medically and 
socially. Septimus is considered to be part of the privileged group of survivors, even while 
overtly suffering through shellshock. Further, Septimus’ inability to express gratitude for his 
life has led others to perceive his condition to be a selfish and ungrateful one. These attitudes 
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are expressed in the dismissive (mis)treatment by Dr. Holmes and, later, that of Sir William 
Bradshaw. On their medically sanctioned walk, Lucrezia reflects on Dr. Holmes’ suggestion 
that Septimus simply needs to “take an interest in things outside himself” (1992, 23). 
However, I would argue that the opposite is true. As I explored in part two, Septimus’ 
suffering extends into the natural environment, and any stable sense of self becomes entirely 
diffused. In opposition to Holmes and Bradshaw’s emphasis on the outside world as an agent 
of recovery is Septimus’ understanding of his condition as brought about by some essential 
quality, as he suggests that “human nature, in short, was on him” (101), and later expressing 
that “he had committed an appalling crime and had been condemned to death by human 
nature” (105). Whereas Clarissa experiences small instances of a diffused selfhood, Septimus 
is overwhelmed by the violent trauma his past brings to the fore. Thus, where Clarissa is 
privileged in benefitting from her communion with the past, Septimus’ suffering only 
deepens.  
Woolf again demonstrates that there is no single, overarching experience of illness, 
and that nor does every survivor follow the same trajectory. Rather, where there is 
commonality and community there is also an inherent heterogeneity. At one point, Septimus 
proclaims that “he knew the meaning of the world” (73) and goes on to suggest that “[his 
condition] must be the fault of the world then” (96). His unwavering belief that the entire 
world wishes him to die is an integral part of his condition. Thus, in insisting that “there was 
nothing whatever the matter with him” (101) and prescribing walks outdoors, Dr Holmes 
demonstrates his misunderstanding of Septimus’ experience of the world and his illness— 
thrusting him deeper into the world he believes to be against him. Where Clarissa is 
energised and excited by her metropolitan environment, Septimus experiences a form of 
sensory overload that conjures visions of war and death, further reinforcing the fundamental 
misunderstanding of Holmes and Bradshaw’s recovery plan.  
 70 
Sir William Bradshaw’s diagnosis of Septimus indicates only a cursory understanding 
of his suffering. Bradshaw attempts to engage with his patient’s illness on a deeper level, but 
he too defaults to a uniform, linear diagnosis and treatment. Bradshaw settles on—almost 
carelessly—diagnosing Septimus with “not having a sense of proportion” (106). Whereas Dr 
Holmes prescribed fresh air, Bradshaw prescribes rest in his country estate. Both diagnoses 
and solutions are characterised by neglect and privilege, which is in turn characterised by the 
underlying societal abandonment of the survivor and survival narratives. Neither of these 
medical men has the appropriate language to approach Septimus’ suffering, and neither 
understands how his past experience has impacted his mental wellbeing. Lucrezia 
misunderstands this when she bemoans that “everyone has friends who were killed in the 
War. Everyone gives up something when they marry.… But Septimus lets himself think 
about horrible things” (1992, 72). Lucrezia sees Septimus’ remembering as self-indulgent, 
even neglectful of her, and fails to grasp its involuntary nature. Neither Clarissa nor Septimus 
is able to fully articulate the synchronicity of their worlds in everyday language, as they exist 
in states of illness/wellness, past/present, mind/body simultaneously. Thus, both suffer from 
living in a culture that valorises narratives of survival, while downplaying the neglect and 
trauma that can follow. 
At a time when women burdened by illness were dismissed as hysterical, and men 
were expected to conform to the limitations of traditional masculinity, Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway 
exposed the individual trauma that these hegemonic structures enforced. The restrictive and 
reductive dogma of Freudian psychoanalysis, binary language, and diagnostic constructs are 
agents that work to reinforce the social hierarchies of gender, class, and sexuality. Each agent 
manifests within the diagnostic and divisive language of psychoanalysis that has defined our 
approach to neuroatypical subjects. While Woolf’s formidable application of metaphorical 
language, memory, and stream of consciousness may at times feel frivolous and inaccessible, 
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it offers a subversive alternative to the rigid language of diagnosis and recovery. Through the 
complex representation of otherness in Clarissa and Septimus, Woolf is able to evoke the 
embodied and affective nature of their conditions and how they interact in both private and 
public worlds. Therefore, the approach of Mrs Dalloway is a profound opposition to the 
dominant ideas of illness espoused by her patriarchal predecessors and contemporaries. 
Woolf’s novel is thus subversively metatextual in its awareness of the constructs of everyday 
language, seeking new ways to accurately and attentively represent othered experiences of 
illness within the limitations of its historical narrative.  
Throughout this chapter, I have identified the problematic and oppressive social 
structures that Woolf directly challenged in her radical depiction of illness. Freudian theory 
and language, the idiomatic separation of mind and body, and the restrictive and linear 
framework of illness and experience are entangled with restrictive societal attitudes towards 
class, gender, sexuality, and tradition. Woolf exposes these hegemonic constructs in order to 
represent two divergent experiences of illness and atypicality, and how the hierarchies of 
gender, class, and sexuality further limit and restrict Clarissa and Septimus. Woolf rejects a 
traditional, linear narrative structure to undermine problematic ideals of illness, recovery, and 
closure. She articulates a mode of representation that is reinvigorated by dialogue with a 
contemporary cognitive lens and through an interchange with affect theory. Mrs Dalloway 
benefits from contemporary ideas because of its undogmatic approach to neuroatypicality, 
and the novel’s emphasis on the embodiment of illness, the fallibility of memory, and the 
celebration of the ineffable mind. This discourse not only works to support the urgent 
revision that is occurring in the relationship between artistic and scientific fields, but, on an 
individual basis, it demonstrates the radical methodology of Woolf’s writing, and its ability to 
intimate contemporary cognitive ideas around affect. In her use of modernist devices such as 
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metaphorical language, experimental form, and non-linear structures, Woolf created a literary 








“The Giant Unreality”: The Ethical Unconscious in Janet Frame’s Faces in the 
Water 
 
In Faces in the Water, Janet Frame devises a similar creative refuge for the neuroatypical 
other—one that continues to undercut the oppressive social hierarchies of gender, class, and 
(dis)ability. Frame moves beyond Woolf in locating her characters within the bounds of the 
institution and therefore more explicitly ruminates on the complicated social positioning of 
neuroatypicality, while upholding the inherent unknowability and ineffability of the othered 
mind. In the opening chapter of the 1961 novel, Frame introduces the reader to the evocative 
yet overwhelming mind of Istina Mavet through Istina’s consideration of the fraught 
relationship between safety and fantasy. Istina perceives safety to be a limiting concept, 
designed to “remove the foreign ideas the glass beads of fantasy the bent hairpins of unreason 
embedded in our minds” (Frame 2018, 3). The asylum walls that surround Istina continually 
reinforce the notion of “safety first,” yet Istina states that she “traded [her] safety for the glass 
beads of fantasy” (2018, 5) and was therefore “not yet civilised” (5) in the eyes of society. 
Istina’s initial meditations as narrator of Faces in the Water establish several images and 
themes that go on to define her world and echo throughout the novel. The tension between 
Istina’s inner world—which consists of her unique self-fashioning, social interaction, and the 
world at large—and its socially constructed counterpart is the most important concern 
established in Frame’s opening chapter. This tension not only introduces the reader to Istina’s 
modus operandi, but also introduces the limitations placed upon people like Istina who are 
forced to exist in a world defined by division and duality.  
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In this chapter, I build upon the idea of illness and neuroatypicality as revelatory 
states for characters in fiction which expose the oppressive restrictions of the world in which 
they exist. Frame’s novel laments the harmful consequences of having a fundamentally 
different perspective from the mainstream. While Clarissa Dalloway is able to sense the 
separation between herself and society as a result of her illness, her class status affords her 
continued care and social standing. Istina Mavet, however, has been institutionalised and 
abandoned by her family and society, with her perspective upon the world dismissed as 
insanity. Although Mrs Dalloway also explores the harmful facets of illness through 
Septimus, Frame’s novel is more relentless in its exploration of the (mis)treatment and abuse 
that those with mental illnesses and disorders faced in the mid twentieth century. Faces in the 
Water is a significant acknowledgement of the historical mistreatment of people with illness 
and neuroatypical minds. Further, Frame’s narrative recognises how the mistreated individual 
may resist hierarchies of gender, class, and (dis)ability in their inner lives more so than in the 
public world. While Frame’s text demonstrates a mostly outmoded system of 
institutionalisation, the remnants of this oppressive social mindset linger in societal 
impressions of shame and fear when approaching illness and neuroatypicality. 
In the first part of this chapter, I will contextualise the historical narrative of Faces in 
the Water. I primarily focus on what I suggest is Frame working both with and against 
Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory: with the psychoanalytic conception of the 
mind that was available, and against its historical practice. In order to reinforce my critique of 
institutional practice, I also incorporate the theories of Michel Foucault’s Madness and 
Civilisation (1989) to examine the symbol of the institution and how its enforcers use 
symbolic and binary language to imprison its subjects. Freudian psychoanalytic ideas and 
practice are representative of the outmoded social attitude that surrounded Frame, from its 
diagnostic approach to the concepts of hysteria, penis envy, and feminine sexuality. The 
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psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious mind was pervasive at the time of Frame’s 
writing and thus inflected her cultural and creative milieu. However, as Freudian 
psychoanalytic practice was complicit in upholding the very institutions Frame’s text 
subverts, I suggest the need to treat psychoanalytic theory with the same critical gaze as 
Frame and Foucault.  
In part two I will demonstrate how Frame’s ability to evoke the unknown and 
unfamiliar nature of the mind, as well as her critical modes of representation, exemplifies an 
approach to the mind in fiction that opens up the possibility of the fictional text as a tool for 
contemporary cognitive sciences. I bring together Faces in the Water and the “new 
unconscious” (Kihlstrom 1987; Hassin et al. 2006; Hayles 2014; Vermeule 2015)—an 
interdisciplinary attempt to reclaim the unconscious mind from its psychoanalytic counterpart 
—and redraw it with contemporary scientific and psychological understanding. By 
synthesising the text and the theory, I shall demonstrate both how cognitive-scientific theory 
can reinvigorate our understanding of older texts, and how literature can benefit cognitive-
scientific theory in its creative and representational abilities.  
In the final part of this chapter, I suggest that introducing a contemporary school of 
thought emerging from disability studies and cognitive literary studies to Faces in the Water 
offers a fresh perspective on Frame’s text. This new methodology is defined by an open-
ended approach to neuroatypical minds, returning agency to individuals with a disability, and 
breaking down the linearity of diagnosis and recovery and the divisive mentality of the past. 
Using the language of neurocosmopolitanism, neurodiversity, and neurotypicality in the 
critical discourse of Faces in the Water offers an increasingly ethical and undogmatic means 
of approaching characters and fiction such as Frame’s.  
Faces in the Water resists outmoded notions of the neuroatypical other and their 
historical (mist)treatment by creating a metafictional and multi-theoretical stage on which to 
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enact and explore the diverse potential of the mind. Socially constructed notions of mental 
illness and disorder as shameful, weak, or frightening continue to exist in Western culture. 
These deprecating ideas often enact epistemic harm in a fashion comparable to the 
Levinasian grasp upon the vulnerable subject, by denying valuable systems of support and 
enforcing social isolation. Therefore, in this chapter, I argue that Faces in the Water pushes 
back against the physical and symbolic institution as it manifests within outdated language, 
binary concepts, and hegemonic social constructs. 
The novel’s complex engagement with theories, philosophies, and understandings 
also proffer a challenge to single-theory methodology. To quote Jennifer Lawn’s “Playing 
With Freud: Radical Narcissism and Intertextuality in Frame’s Intensive Care and Daughter 
Buffalo”: “Frame’s texts heuristically school their readers in their own interpretation, often by 
counter-examples of misrecognition or moments of isolated or partial insight. ‘Theory’ 
becomes a dangerous sign in such perilous circumstances” (Lawn 2009, 26). According to 
Lawn, the complexity of Frame’s texts demands a diverse and multi-theoretical approach; an 
approach that creates a relationship between theory and fiction rather than an imposition.  
 In this chapter, I maintain that the methodology of cognitive literary studies holds a 
compelling line of approach for fiction like Frame’s. Cognitive literary studies comprises a 
diverse nexus of theories based on cognitive scientific, technological, and literary studies, and 
considers literature a valuable player in both artistic and scientific realms. Similarly, Faces in 
the Water engages with philosophical and psychological practices, exploring both their 
conflicts and congruities, and what these theories can elucidate about the othering experience 
of neuroatypicality. Rather than enacting a Levinasian grasp to fit Frame’s text to a single 
theory, I first determine the thematic concerns of Faces in the Water, and then consider lines 
of inquiry within the realm of cognitive literary studies that can best attend to the novel’s 
concerns. My objective is to attend to the novel’s exposure of the punitive practice of the 
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institution by positioning Frame’s text in relation to Foucault, the new unconscious, and 
disability studies—each of which re-examines the social place, function, and contribution of 
atypical minds. Faces in the Water’s commitment to challenging both physical and social 
institutions informs my desire to introduce theories that similarly question the hegemonic 
concepts and structures historically employed to approach atypical minds. In this position, I 
bring together and contribute to cognitive literary studies and Frame scholarship, using both 
to demonstrate the individual and social benefits of overhauling the historic approach to 
neuroatypical minds in fiction.  
 
Muddying the Waters: Breaking Down Binaries and Boundaries  
Faces in the Water is an exploration of the acute otherness of Istina Mavet. Istina is 
institutionalised throughout her life in both Treecroft and Cliffhaven asylums, owing to an 
undiagnosed condition which prompts an abhorrent treatment plan characterised by 
punishment and neglect. The narrative is experienced through the unstable spatial and 
temporal boundaries of Istina’s mind, which are played against the supposedly neurotypical 
minds of the institutional figures within the two asylums. Faces in the Water is based upon 
Istina’s unreliable recollection, with no certain sense of past, present, or future established. 
The erratic and often suspect nature of Istina’s memory is mirrored throughout the novel by 
Frame’s use of language. The author frequently leads the reader into traps set by their own 
socially coded assumptions, questioning constructions of narrative truth, while consistently 
undermining any sense of certainty or reality within and without the text.  
The critical reception of Faces in the Water is diverse and has attracted approaches 
that range from “feminist autobiography” (Fisiak 2011, 183) to an “exploration of Holocaust 
themes” (Evans 2011, 513). Critics frequently recognise the theories of Jacques Lacan and 
Michel Foucault as two philosophical figures who share the novel’s primary concerns 
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(Blowers 1996; Schwartz 1996; Gambaudo 2012). Although I agree that Frame’s text is 
engaged with Lacan and Foucault’s interest in the other and their place (or lack thereof) 
within society, I contend that Faces in the Water explores these theories’ conflicts and 
oversights as well as their constructive applications. It is in keeping with the notion of 
Frame’s playful method of engagement that I find the use of Lacan and Foucault’s theories 
simultaneously at odds and in cahoots with one another.11 
This clash of theorists is visible in Susan Schwartz’s “Witnessing for the Madwoman 
in Janet Frame’s Faces in the Water” (1996). Schwartz, however, attempts to employ Lacan 
and Foucault in combination rather than allowing their contradictions to demonstrate the 
paradoxes surrounding notions of otherness. “Witnessing for the Madwoman” uses both 
theorists to show the limitations of representing madness through symbolic and metaphorical 
language. According to Schwartz, Istina witnesses, engages with, and recounts her own as 
well as others’ experiences of the cyclical nature of madness in a manner that defies these 
limitations. The article suggests that Frame sought to remove the linguistically enforced 
“otherness” of the mad woman through a mediation with the Lacanian notion of extimacy 
and Freud’s uncanny. For Schwartz, extimacy represents “the disturbing presence of the real 
in the symbolic.…the terrible jouissance in which the alterity of the Other is grounded” 
(1996, 35), and the breakdown between the traditional psychological boundaries of interior 
and exterior self. The extimate object “produces the effect of the uncanny, that disturbs and 
becomes the source of discomfort and fear” (1996, 41). In relation to Faces in the Water, 
Schwartz suggests that Frame sees the uncanny truth—fragmented and disconcerting—
produced by moments of extimacy as part of the radical otherness of madness. 
 
11 Jennifer Lawn (2009) was first to write about Frame as “playful” or “playing with” theories and philosophies. 
It is a phrase I will adopt throughout this chapter as it captures Frame’s purposefully ambivalent position when 
engaging with and manipulating a wide range of ideas.   
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In the same article, Schwartz observes Frame and Foucault’s shared problematisation 
of the “colonisation of the minds of the mentally ill” (1996, 40) that occurred within 
institutions like the asylum. She contends that in Faces in the Water, Frame utilises both 
Lacan’s extimacy and Foucault’s notion of madness as punished by and imprisoned in a 
“moral world” in order to deconstruct the historical narrative of madness and the means 
through which it is represented. Yet Lacan, by virtue of sustaining the psychoanalytic 
practice which is historically linked to the narrative of the asylum (Willick 2001; Reichenau 
2002; and Scull 2015), is complicit in maintaining the restrictive place and practice of this 
institution in society. As Foucault explains: “it would be fairer to say that psychoanalysis 
doubled the absolute observation of the watcher with the endless monologue of the person 
watched—thus preserving the old asylum structure of non-reciprocal observation” (1989, 
238). Therefore, Schwartz’s suggestion of harmony between the three authors is untenable.  
 The critical tension within Schwartz’s argument, I suggest, arises from an attempt to 
extract a unified theoretical conclusion from Frame’s novel. The tension is inevitable as 
Frame herself actively resists textual unification and harmony by purposefully engaging with 
conflicting theories and perspectives. The perception of Lacan and Foucault as both opposites 
and allies may be valid in the context of Faces in the Water. This is the textual playground 
that Frame establishes for the literary critic to explore—one of contradictions and unknowns. 
It is a playground that allows Frame to consider a variety of perspectives and possibilities 
within the narrative; for example, the duality of Lacan’s extimacy and intimacy situated 
within the novel’s Foucauldian condemnation of the punitive asylum, even while their ethical 
concerns diverge.  
Considering Jennifer Lawn’s (2009) notion that Frame “plays” with concepts and 
theories, I suggest that Faces in the Water manipulates the opposing philosophies of Foucault 
and Lacan to enrich the discourse surrounding the asylum. Allowing for both opposition and 
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synthesis within Frame’s text reflects my own commitment to a multidisciplinary approach to 
fiction. Lawn’s article contends that a critic who approaches a text with a theory first gains 
only “partial insight”, suggesting that “the critic who imposes theory on the text…. risks 
replicating the role of the ‘bad doctor’ who misdiagnoses the textual signs” (2009, 28). In my 
analysis of Mrs Dalloway, I examined the potential for harm that a diagnosis—even an 
accurate one—may present to a vulnerable individual through the creation of social 
expectation and limitation. Lawn indicates that the misguided critic creates the same potential 
for harm as the doctors in Mrs Dalloway or Faces in the Water.  
Most fictional texts have no single or unified theoretical key. While Schwartz’s use of 
Lacan and Foucault generates insightful connections regarding extimacy, reflection, and the 
asylum, the article’s attempt to unify the two theorists undermines the incongruities and 
simultaneities within Frame’s text. The compartmentalising nature of a diagnosis within and 
outside of fiction is incongruous with the adaptable and transcendent qualities of both Istina’s 
mind and Frame’s writing. As with the neuroatypical mind, upholding the enigmatic and 
multifaceted nature of fiction is essential to understanding the operations as a whole. The 
multidisciplinary approach of cognitive literary studies allows the critic to consider the text 
from a variety of perspectives, while maintaining the contradictions and paradoxes that are 
essential to its framework. While Schwartz’s attempt to unify Foucault and Lacan is 
untenable for my own cognitive literary studies-based approach, “Witnessing for the 
Madwoman” does establish Frame’s use of binaries within the text and the theories. Schwartz 
suggests that Istina exists in a state between Lacanian intimacy and extimacy—in “mad” 
introspection and “sane” observation. 
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Frame establishes a central binary in the novel between sanity and insanity.12 This 
binary and its harmful preconceptions permeate every aspect of Istina’s world as she feels 
trapped between the two arbitrary states, unable to consolidate an identity between the two. 
Faces in the Water continually destabilises the division between sane/insane. In so doing, the 
novel emphasises the inaccurate and reductive nature of these categories, and demonstrates 
the damage caused by placing something as complex and multi-faceted as the human mind 
into one of only two states. Frame’s novel identifies and critiques those social practices and 
institutions that perpetuate and enforce binary division, specifically hospitals and asylums. 
Ultimately, Frame, like Foucault, looks to condemn the asylum as the quintessential symbol 
of the arbitrary and damaging social division that is bought about by binaries. 
Frame often focuses on the creative potential that stems from a marginalised person’s 
ability to look beyond social expectations and hierarchies. However, this ability creates a 
troubled life for Istina, and she is often punished for her perceived insubordination. Frame 
refrains from valorising the experience of the other as inherently superior or more fulfilling 
than those who conform to social convention. Carol MacLennan’s article “Conformity and 
Deviance in the Fiction of Janet Frame” (1988) explores the binary of conformist/deviant as 
it is replicated across Frame’s oeuvre. I suggest that in Faces in the Water, the opposition of 
conformist/deviant can be superseded with that of sane/insane. MacLennan notes that Frame 
explores this binary in a critically neutral manner—one that resists championing or 
condemning either condition. Frame’s conformist characters are never rewarded, “either 
personally or socially” (MacLennan 1988, 193) for their obedience, just as Frame’s deviant 
characters are typically punished by and separated from society. By calling attention to this 
 
12 In this section, I will be using the terminology used in the novel and its theoretical intertexts, 
specifically sane, insane, and mad. By employing the language of Frame’s contemporaries, I look to better 
demonstrate the cruel social structures that surround mental illness and difference.  
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parallel sense of neglect and emptiness felt by conformists and deviants alike, Frame 
validates both groups’ experiences, giving significance and empathy to those who feel 
obliged to follow convention while legitimising the perspectives of those who diverge from 
prescribed normality. Frame vilifies “our established system of beliefs, attitudes, and values” 
(MacLennan 1988, 197), which is presented as advantageous to all while, in reality, 
benefitting only a select few.   
In Faces in the Water, the unsatisfactory outcome of the conformist/deviant, 
sane/insane binary manifests itself in the characters of Sister Bridge and Istina Mavet. Istina 
is the ultimate deviant: she lacks classifiable symptoms, rendering her un-diagnosable and 
therefore unknowable to the institutional staff. Frame suggests that it is Istina’s 
unknowability that is the cause of her hospitalisation. As Istina explains, “I was put in 
hospital because a great gap opened in the ice floe between myself and the other people 
whom I watched, with their world, drifting away through a violet-coloured sea” (Frame 2018, 
4). Importantly, the label of deviant/insane is not one Istina gives herself, rather, she is 
“labelled” (MacLennan 1988, 191) by those who self-consciously identify themselves as 
“normal” (1988, 191), or sane. Foucault reiterates a similar notion, explaining that “the 
science of mental disease, as it would develop in the asylum, would always be only of the 
order of observation and classification. It would not be a dialogue” (1989, 238). This element 
highlights the inherent imbalance of power within the hierarchy of their relationship. With 
the sane determining who is insane, they may also control the majority’s perception of the 
insane as overwhelmingly negative. The establishment and subversion of binaries is an 
integral component to Frame’s exploratory practice, as demonstrated in this positioning of 
Lacan and Foucault’s theories.  
Frame destabilises binaries throughout Faces in the Water in order to better explore 
the relationships characters have with each other within the framework of social and 
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institutional hierarchies. The relationship between Sister Bridge and Istina, for example, 
exists within the binaries of sane/insane, outside/inside, and control/controlled, and 
emphasises the limiting nature of these socially constructed labels. As a supposedly sane 
observer within the asylum, Sister Bridge uses taxonomy as a tool of control and self-
consolation. By labelling Istina deviant/insane, Sister Bridge holds authority over both 
Istina’s construction of self and others’ perception of her character—all the while resolutely 
defining herself as normal/sane in opposition to Istina’s difference. Yet, the name “Bridge” 
suggests that Frame’s character acts as a symbolic bridge between the institution and the 
outside world, between sane and insane. Sister Bridge’s connection to both worlds creates an 
instability within herself that provokes a desire to assert greater control over Istina. This 
control, born from the classification of the other, brings Sister Bridge a sense of safety and 
comfort, which only grows as she continues to contain Istina’s madness and restrict the 
fluidity of her identity. As Istina observes: “[Sister Bridge] sprayed all fantasy with contempt 
in order to hide from it and escape its danger and try thus to control the sinister movement of 
it” (Frame 2018, 133). However, an identity that is based solely upon the distinction of the 
self from the other, from difference, deviance, and insanity is inherently unstable. This 
instability is brought to the fore as Sister Bridge’s understanding of herself relies upon the 
categorical suppression of the other, Istina, who goes on to thwart any sense of stability for 
the would-be controller. While our identities are often in a productive state of flux, the 
instability created by an identity based upon the power dynamics of the institution enacts 
harm upon the suppressed.  
Sister Bridge’s sense of self becomes an instrument of what Foucault’s Madness and 
Civilisation identifies as “moral uniformity and social denunciation” (1989, 246). The 
uncertainty felt by the agent of control provokes increasingly oppressive attempts to control 
both the other and the societal perception of the other. The methods used to quantify and 
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control the insane attempt to frame insanity as inherently dangerous or immoral while sanity 
is portrayed as morally good. Foucault explains how in the asylum “the religious and moral 
milieu was imposed from without, in such a way that madness was controlled, not cured” 
(1989, 232). Both Frame and Foucault perceive the moralisation of sanity and the corruption 
of insanity to be a result of society rendering the two states mutually exclusive. By 
suggesting that madness is an immoral state of mind, akin to a religious sin or crime, the so-
called morally good population may then feel justified in imprisoning the mad within an 
institution designed to contain their immorality. Within the novel, Sister Bridge is the 
ultimate symbol of presupposed morality and goodness, yet also the loss of agency and 
identity. This lack of selfhood and stability continues to deteriorate owing to Sister Bridge’s 
inability to control and contain Istina, which sees further attempts by the nurse to use her 
position of moral power to condemn Istina and her fellow patients. 
In a passing moment of humanity shared between Istina and Sister Bridge, the two eat 
ice cream while Sister Bridge shows Istina her house, which “makes [Istina] feel lonely” 
(2018, 153). The time shared between the two women outside the asylum further reinforces 
Sister Bridge’s symbolic position as the bridge between both inside and outside worlds, and 
sane and insane. By revealing the truth of her isolation to Istina, Sister Bridge briefly 
overcomes the distance enforced by social categories and the two contemplate their mutual 
loneliness. The fleeting identification sparked between the women unnerves Sister Bridge, 
who immediately re-asserts her control upon their return to the asylum, as both women are 
reminded of their places in the institutional hierarchy: “[Sister Bridge] spoke fiercely and my 
heart sank.… she did not speak to me again as if she were a human being; not for a long time; 
and she was ashamed of having bought me an ice cream and having pointed out the place she 
lived” (154). By identifying with Istina’s humanity, Sister Bridge is faced with the reality that 
her perception of herself as normal, moral, and secure is nothing without the binary 
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opposition that she has constructed around Istina and the other inmates. However, rather than 
embrace this recognition, Sister Bridge falters, and reverts to the familiarity of the binaries 
and boundaries enforced within the asylum.  
Here, the reader is able to observe each of Frame’s characters with empathy, as both 
Sister Bridge and Istina have their freedom and identity once more suppressed on their return 
to the asylum. As MacLennan explains, “while Frame’s conformists may escape the negative 
sanctions inflicted upon their more imaginative acquaintances, they do not experience 
happiness, satisfaction or fulfilment, or feel in any way rewarded for their ‘good’ behaviour” 
(1988, 191). Frame resists dehumanising Sister Bridge in order to idealise Istina. The novel 
subtly uncovers the dissatisfaction and pain that an adherence to social hierarchies has 
brought Sister Bridge; however, it is a prison of her own making. Like Istina, Sister Bridge 
craves something beyond the institution, but the value she places on social validation renders 
Bridge unable or unwilling to break free for fear of existing without social recognition or 
moral affirmation.  
For Istina, however, the decision to exist with or without societal acceptance is not 
hers to make. Throughout the narrative, she experiences the pernicious outcome of the labels 
that have been forced upon her. Istina encounters a sign that “[makes] the old distinction 
between patients and people,” reading “no patient is allowed” (2018, 212). This sign echoes a 
sentiment expressed earlier in the novel, when Istina observes how only “Dr Howell.…tried 
to spread the interesting news that mental patients were people and therefore might like 
occasionally to engage in the activities of people” (22). In these passages, Frame highlights 
the dehumanisation that inevitably arises from these binaries, as they are seen as embodying 
notions of morality/immorality. If sanity and conformity are seen as interchangeable with 
notions of goodness and normality, then insanity and deviance are, by virtue of being in 
opposition, bad and threatening. Thus, those who perceive themselves as good and normal 
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may justify the dehumanisation of those they judge to be threatening through an adherence to 
a moral code structured to breed homogeneity. The separation of those “immoral” and 
“insane” individuals into the asylum only further reinforces the perception of the insane as 
sub-human, as they may no longer meaningfully contribute to society and are therefore 
denied the opportunity to express and validate their humanity.  
Foucault demonstrates that the effacement of individuality in the asylum is tied to a 
person’s work ethic. Moreover, Foucault suggests that this work ethic is in turn attached to 
socially constructed morality: “in the asylum, work is deprived of any productive value; it is 
imposed only as moral rule; a limitation of liberty.… with the single aim of disalienating the 
mind lost in the excess of a liberty which physical constraint limits only its appearance” 
(1989, 236). Here, Foucault suggests that the physical, spatial separation of difference from 
society was deemed insufficient. Instead, the patient is made to perform labour in order to 
restrict the liberty of time which feeds the freedom of the mind, further sustaining the 
perception that the minds of mad individuals are immoral, idle, or unoccupied under the gaze 
of the upper classes. Frame, like Foucault, establishes the distinction between temporal and 
spatial restrictions within the asylum in order to extend her exploration of the tension 
between sanity/insanity. For example, in Faces in the Water the asylum transposes social 
isolation for the physical separation of the other from society, while removing the patient’s 
mental freedom through forced labour, thus physically enforcing the separation of sane and 
insane. Istina is often punished by having visitor access revoked, isolation from other 
patients, and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). Eventually, Istina realises that she is “no 
longer looking from the outside on the people of Four-Five-and-One.…I was now an 
established citizen with little hope of returning across the frontier; I was in the crazy world, 
separated now by more than locked doors or barred windows from the people who call 
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themselves sane” (2018, 89–90). Physical and mental isolation has removed Istina from the 
“sane” people and rendered her incapable of identifying with those outside of the asylum. 
Istina divides her world into inner/outer spaces—inside and outside the asylum—
making clear the means through which the asylum is used as a physical barrier to separate 
sane/insane. Throughout the novel, Istina covets tokens of the outside world, speaking 
enviously of patients who get to “wear the kind of clothes worn in the outside world” (88), as 
she sees herself entering further into the “land of the lost people” (89). Like Foucault, Frame 
here suggests that the physical separation of madness is strengthened by the occupation of the 
person’s mental space and time. In the case of Istina, this leads to a kind of temporal 
disorientation, as she explains how, in her mind, “there is no past present or future. Using 
tenses to divide time is like making chalk marks on water. I do not know if my experiences at 
Cliffhaven happened years ago, are happening now, or lie in wait for me in what is called the 
future” (29–30). Istina’s identity has been colonised by the asylum and its moralising agents. 
However, Frame’s novel questions whether these moralising categories reward any individual 
on either side of the binary, as Sister Bridge and Istina find a fleeting commonality in their 
feelings of isolation, purposelessness, and fear. Faces in the Water emphasises the highly 
individualised nature of the mind and the complex personhood that is concealed by social 
categories. In so doing, Frame’s text reveals the performative nature of the social self. The 
ice cream episode demonstrates a redemptive quality within Sister Bridge and suggests that 
richness and diversity may be found through an exploration of one’s inner life. Once the 
processes of identification, communication, and basic empathy begin, the separation between 
inner and performative public self may begin to erode.  
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Reflecting on the Faces in the Water: The Past, Present, and Future Unconscious   
The Western understanding of the unconscious mind has been dominated by Freudian 
psychoanalysis. As Kihlstrom et al. note in “The Psychological Unconscious: Found, Lost, 
and Regained” (1992), the study of the unconscious mind existed before Breuer and Freud 
published Studies on Hysteria in 1895. However, it was the Freudian conception of the 
unconscious that had the most significant cultural impact, and continues to hold the greatest 
social currency. Kihlstrom et al. describe the Freudian unconscious as “hot and wet,” 
explaining that “it seethed with lust and anger; it was hallucinatory, primitive, and irrational” 
(1992, 789). Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality introduced the sexual 
underpinnings of the unconscious and repressive processes. The internal mechanism of the 
psyche represses our most primal urges, and the repression of sexual desire into the 
unconscious state was exacerbated by puritanical societal restrictions that coloured sexuality 
with shame.   
Understanding the Freudian unconscious and its saturation of Western culture is an 
essential step in understanding the unconscious mind in Faces of the Water. The Freudian 
framework of unconscious functioning was dominant during the writing of Frame’s novel. 
However, the early psychoanalytic unconscious faced moral criticism from its inception, in 
particular for its highly sexual nature. What made Freud’s notions controversial to an initially 
conservative audience is also what made them seductive to the artistic community. In 
mapping the shape of the Freudian unconscious, I look to better illustrate those textual spaces 
in which Frame infers an awareness beyond Freud, and would thus benefit from an interplay 
with theories that celebrate a contemporary, empirical formulation of unconscious 
functioning. Towards the end of the twentieth century, criticism from the fields of 
neuroscience and psychology grew increasingly vocal in reaction to repression’s continued 
social acceptance. What would become known as the memory wars (Ho et al. 2014) during 
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the 1980s and 1990s eventuated in a decisive split between the supporters and detractors of 
repression theory (largely inhabited by psychoanalysts, and scientists and psychologists, 
respectively). Although the criticism of Freudian psychoanalysis from the cognitive scientific 
community has only grown with time, Freudian thought has remained a mainstay of literary 
criticism.13 
 In the past few decades, cognitive literary studies has developed a nexus of 
interchange between scientific and literary disciplines that has bought the two fields closer 
than ever. However, literary theory’s continued use of Freudian psychoanalysis has created a 
tension in literature’s relationship with this new scientific orientation. I am not looking to 
dispose of psychoanalytic literary criticism outright, as this would be at odds with my 
emphasis on the importance of a multidisciplinary approach, particularly with authors like 
Frame. But I do condemn an uncritical appropriation of Freudian psychoanalysis within 
literary theory, specifically one that lacks appropriate cognitive context, as it continues to 
perpetuate debunked ideas such as repression and the Freudian unconscious. Instead, I look to 
highlight the necessity of a critical approach that is willing to engage with a number of 
disciplines in order to fully maintain and appreciate representations of neuroatypical minds in 
fiction. For example, Laura Otis’ “The Value of Qualitative Research for Cognitive Literary 
Studies” (2015) draws attention to the merit of an open discourse between literature and 
neuroscience. For literature, Otis suggests the cognitive sciences can offer a multifaceted 
 
13 One of the most formative critiques is Elizabeth Loftus’ “The Reality of Repressed Memories” 
(1993), which surveyed case studies centred on the sudden over-reporting of repressed childhood sexual abuse 
(CSA) that began in the late 1970s. This line of thought became the foundation of the dispute with classical 
psychoanalysis and was echoed by psychologists and neuroscientists throughout the 1990s (see Anastasi et al. 
1994; Brown et al. 1994; and Loftus 1995). Frederick Crews’ provocative text, Freud: The Making of an 
Illusion (1995/2018), further strengthened the divide between the two camps and prompted a more vocal 
response from psychoanalysts. Andrew Reisner (1996) attempted to occupy the middle ground with his article 
“Repressed Memories: True and False,” which admitted that “recovered memories can also contain distortions 
or be entirely false” (1996, 575) 
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approach to mind-centred representation in fiction—including psychology, neuroscience, and 
anthropology—that upholds the uniqueness of the neuroatypical mind, in particular. For the 
sciences, Otis highlights the value of literature as evidence or a means of evaluation in 
neuroscientific and psychological studies.  
In this section, I shall invert the discussion of what the cognitive sciences can provide 
for literature, in order to explore the potential that literature and literary analysis holds for 
these same neuroscientific and psychological practices. As I have discussed previously, 
literature has been the subject of a number of empirical studies, including study of authorial 
intention (Guy et al. 2018), simulating minds within fictional worlds (Jacobs and Willems 
2016), and empathy studies (Fowler and Shigley 2014; Guy et al. 2018; and Jacobs and 
Willems 2016). However, I also suggested that literature’s inclusion in the empirical realm 
was not simply limited to the subject of study. Literature has the ability to actively contribute 
to the exploration and representation of contemporary cognitive study. In the introduction to 
this thesis, I established the study of the new unconscious: a complete overhaul of the 
scientific and social understanding of the unconscious mind into one “much more concerned 
with affect, motivation, and even control and metacognition.…Goals, motives, and self-
regulation are prominent, without the conflict and drama of the psychoanalytic unconscious” 
(Hassin et al. 2006, 6). Those who study the new unconscious are determined for it to remain 
distinct and separate from the psychoanalytic unconscious. As a result, the artistic community 
is reluctant to engage with an unconscious that is “rather cold, apparently rational, and 
amotivational, compared to the heat and irrationality of psychoanalytic drives and conflicts” 
(Hassin et al. 2006, 5). 
My interest in introducing Janet Frame, and Faces in the Water in particular, into this 
conversation is a result of the nebulous and indeterminate nature of the new unconscious. 
This indeterminacy parallels the enigmatic elements of Frame’s text. Faces in the Water 
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challenges established modes of representing and engaging with neuroatypicality in Western 
literature. Blakey Vermeule asserts that “the new unconscious is, by its very nature, 
nonrepresentational” (2015, 465). The complex paradox of representation and the unknown is 
therefore challenged by both Frame and Vermeule.  
Frame’s intervention in established modes of depicting the neuroatypical mind shares 
in the desire of those studying the new unconscious to emphasise the unknowability and 
fallibility of unconscious cognition, rather than disengage with it. While it is unlikely that 
literature will ever be able to depict unconscious processing—as Vermeule states, the “new 
unconscious has by definition no ready-made phenomenology, no language in which to 
unfold its tales” (2015, 471)—literature is able to destabilise past (mis)understandings of 
cognitive processing and acknowledge the essential beyond of the unconscious mind. In one 
passage, Istina considers that “when it is time for us to leave the words themselves and 
parachute to their meaning in the dark earth and the seas below us, the parachute fails to 
open, we are stranded or drift wide of our target or, peering over into the darkness and 
stricken with fright, we refuse to leave the comfort of words” (Frame 2018, 179). This 
passage unsettles our experience, evoking the ineffable—like the unconscious—and 
questions the position of language in sheltering the individual from the enigmatic beyond.  
As I have discussed throughout this chapter, Frame is adept at highlighting the 
constructed notion of selfhood and the cultivated nature of reality, purposefully undermining 
the stability and integrity of her fictional worlds to do so. This methodology continues into 
her complex and dynamic depictions of Istina Mavet’s thoughts, which are characterised by 
the novel’s distinct awareness of the inherent unknowability of its workings. By resisting the 
psychoanalytic unconscious and foregrounding the narrativizing qualities of conscious 
processing, Frame exemplifies the kind of novelist able to represent the ethos of the new 
unconscious. Both Frame and the new unconscious are invested in exploring the inadequacy 
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of language to approach our complex mental experiences. While the new unconscious is un-
representable by nature, Frame’s privileging of the enigmatic and the unknown in her fiction 
anticipates the kind of fiction that could be directly invested in the ethos of the new 
unconscious in actively exploring the paradox of evoking the invisible mind and considering 
how this might impact our conscious experience. Vermeule states that, “consciousness tells 
stories, giving shape and order to our experience” (469). In this sense, Frame acts as the 
conscious for the new unconscious, interpreting and connecting its growing forms and ideas, 
yet resisting simplification and sensemaking through the subversion of forms that construct 
reality.  
The historical narrative of the unconscious and its representation in fiction is tied to 
the history of the representation of neuroatypicality. Faces in the Water reflects upon the 
complex historical perception of the neuroatypical mind—in particular its fraught 
relationship with gender—demonstrating the impact of fictional representations upon the 
social construction of the neuroatypical mind:  
There is an aspect of madness which is seldom mentioned in fiction because it 
would damage the romantic popular idea of the insane as a person whose speech 
appeals as immediately poetic; but it is seldom the easy Opheliana recited like the 
pages of a seed catalogue or the outpourings of Crazy Janes who provide, in fiction, 
an outlet for poetic abandon. Few of the people who roamed the dayroom would 
have qualified as acceptable heroines, in popular taste; few were charmingly 
uninhibited eccentrics.… Their behaviour affronted, caused uneasiness; they wept 
and moaned; they quarrelled and complained. They were a nuisance and were 
treated as such. (2018, 96)                                                                                                          
This passage acknowledges the loaded legacy of the culturally constructed mind, and Faces 
in the Water’s own, uncertain position within this history. The quote also considers the 
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implications of fiction’s romanticised depiction of neuroatypicality in women. Istina’s words 
imply that as a result of the disconnect between the fictional portrayal of madness and its 
actual, lived counterpart, the treatment and understanding of neuroatypicality has become 
ineffectual at best, and harmful at worst. Frame’s engagement with problematic 
representations throughout the history of fiction creates an ideal setting for a critical 
exploration of the possibilities of the new unconscious while acknowledging both the 
historical and developing understanding of the unconscious mind.  
While the Freudian unconscious is seductively dramatic, “the public voice of the new 
unconscious sounds markedly different—more triumphalist, more scientistic, far more 
antiseptic—than the popular Freudianism.…whose noirish fictions were lurid and 
overblown” (Vermeule 2015, 464). Hassin et al. describe how the new unconscious is formed 
by “goals, motives, and self-regulation” and includes “the causes of the phenomenal 
experience of having intentions and free will, of attributing these to oneself and others” 
(2006, 6). The empirical study of the new unconscious has been defined by investments in 
“subliminal perception, priming, and decision-making,” and “heuristics and biases” from the 
fields of social psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and behavioural economics 
(Vermeule 2015, 463–64). As a result of this investment in intention, free will, and a “list of 
psychological processes [that] is so extensive,” Hassin et al. contend that the primary 
questions of the new unconscious study concern “what, if anything, cannot be done without 
awareness? What is consciousness for?” (2006, 6). I suggest that Frame’s fiction is steeped in 
these same questions of awareness, free will, and intention, and thus exists as an example of 
what the public voice of the new unconscious could sound like. Although it is paradoxical for 
the new unconscious to have a voice—given its non-representational nature—it is clear from 
the cultural journey of Freudian theory that artistic engagement is an essential element of 
public engagement and understanding. By virtue of its relative novelty, the new unconscious 
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offers a compelling space for shared artistic and scientific discourse. The space is also open 
for past fiction to illustrate modes of representing the inherent unknowability of the mind 
emphasised by the ethos of the new unconscious. Faces in the Water explores the paradox of 
engaging with the unknown through moments of instability and unsettlement. In her room at 
Treecroft Istina questions, “what if Ward Seven were but a subaqueous condition of the mind 
which gave the fearful shapes drowned there a rhythmic distortion of peace; and what if, 
upon getting up from my bed, the perspective were suddenly altered…?” (Frame 2018, 58). 
Here, the novel strikes a delicate balance between two poles, remaining careful to depict the 
almost mundane isolation of the neuroatypical mind in Ward Seven against the intricate 
textures of thought and perception that forms Istina’s mental experience. As the novel 
explains, “when you are sick you find in yourself a new field of perception where you make a 
harvest of interpretations which then provides you with your daily bread, your only food” 
(2018, 23). The narratorial quality of the conscious is once more highlighted as Istina’s mind 
is isolated from the outside world and from essential human connection, mimicking the 
“artificial” laboratory conditions “that slow time down and watch us think” (Vermeule 2015, 
477). For Istina, time erodes within the asylum, and her “new field of perception” is a 
necessary adaptation to the breakdown of social constructs that occurs within.  
In section one, I discussed how Frame broke down temporal boundaries in order to 
further her exploration of arbitrary social binaries. In the context of the new unconscious, I 
suggest that this temporal ambiguity could also be perceived as Frame complicating the 
mind’s relationship with time—an issue recognised when locating conscious and unconscious 
processes. Baumeister et al. (2011) examine the complex temporality of consciousness 
against the potentially time-less unconscious. Consciousness, they suggest, oscillates between 
past and recent present, whereas unconscious processes remain largely unbound by time 
because of their automatic nature. Both the novel and Baumeister et al.’s article treat time as 
 95 
a narrativizing quality of consciousness, with the continuum of the recent present being the 
most complex and fluctuating element. To show how Istina’s conscious mind is unable to 
follow a linear timeline, suggesting a breakdown in her ability to narrate her own story, we 
can recall her statement that “there is no past present or future” (Frame 2018, 29) within the 
asylum. The non-linear processing of Istina’s mind is further reflected in the novel’s 
temporality, as it switches indiscriminately between her past experiences at Cliffhaven and 
Treecroft while hinting at a separate, narrative present.  
In an analysis of Milton’s Paradise Lost, Vermeule suggests the importance of non-
linear temporalities in representing the new unconscious in literature. Vermeule’s chapter 
considers Milton’s attempts to capture the unquantifiable and unperceivable figure of Satan, 
explaining that in one method, “Milton mixes his tenses—the past together with the durative” 
(2015, 473). Mixing tenses is not enough, however, as Vermeule explains, Milton has an 
“almost manic need to pile on simile after simile. Satan is unknown, that which cannot be 
apprehended by the puny capacities of human beings. In his presence, meaning and 
categories break down” (474). The uncertain temporality of Faces in the Water depicts the 
complex relationship between consciousness, sensemaking, and the human construct of the 
present. The failure of this relationship within Istina is indicative of her inability to fully 
conceptualise her own mind. This breakdown in sensory connection is reinforced by 
Vermeule’s second observation, of Milton’s intensive use of similes as an attempt to observe 
the unobservable. I previously examined Frame’s use of language to undermine her fictional 
worlds, which served as an important metatextual reminder to the reader to resist drawing 
biographical information from fiction, while reinforcing the unknowability of an author. 
Recontextualised in relation to time in the novel, and in relation to Vermeule’s own 
comments on Milton’s use of language, I suggest that Frame’s text continually emphasises 
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the unobservable and unknowable nature of the unconscious mind—a notion that the new 
unconscious foregrounds.  
The human mind is characterised by the unknown—a landscape which Frame is not 
afraid to approach in her writing. Vermeule states that “English writers strike me as 
genuinely posing questions about how much free will we have, how much of our behaviour is 
determined by our circumstances, and whether character is fixed or malleable” (2015, 478). 
These are motivations which Vermeule suggests directly align literature with the adaptive 
nature of the new unconscious that guides behaviour just beyond conscious recognition. In 
keeping with this line of thought, Frame is one such writer whose central questions around 
the autonomy of the mind, metafictional critiques of representation, and powerful and 
subversive use of language deserve to be brought to bear on the theoretical terrain of the new 
unconscious. Faces in the Water predates the discourse of the new unconscious. However, 
Frame’s novel is reinvigorated by an interchange with contemporary theories, as they 
accentuate Faces in the Water’s complex and experimental engagement with cognitive 
functioning, and its enduring ability to evoke the nuances and challenges of the neuroatypical 
experience. Furthermore, Faces in the Water provides a methodology of artistic 
representation for contemporary concepts like the new unconscious: one that engages with 
cognitive theories whilst embracing the unknown.  
Willems and Jacobs suggest that the increasingly beneficial relationship between 
literature and neuroscience “[provides] richer and ecologically more valid insights into 
already studied cognitive and affective processes, their development and inter-individual 
differences” (2016, 145). Istina describes attempting to understand her own mind as if she 
were “cast over the cliff [hanging] there by two fingers that are danced and trampled on by 
the Giant Unreality” (Frame 2018, 7). Like Istina, we may find evolving our understanding of 
the mind beyond Freudian concepts and approaching the study of the new unconscious to be 
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a daunting task. The rapid evolution of the scientific understanding of the mind—this Giant 
Unreality—can be even harder to comprehend. To once more return to Vermeule, only now 
have the cognitive sciences truly begun to “map the contours of this hidden continent—which 
is really just the brain itself,” reiterating that “the project is enormous. None of us may live 
long enough to see it completed” (2015, 468). This is the tension that underscores the study 
of the new unconscious and my analysis of Frame: the desire to “map,” quantify, and 
understand, against the inherent unknowability of the subject, set against the sheer scope of 
the project.  
The rapid growth and change seen within the cognitive sciences throughout the 
twentieth century, from Freud to the new unconscious, is only one example of the vast and 
changeable nature of the realm of cognitive science. Although written during the 
development of the cognitive sciences, Faces in the Water gives a voice to the ethos of the 
new unconscious. The shared tension between knowing and un-knowing suggests a 
methodology for representation based upon a meta-textual acknowledgement of the 
limitations of our understanding of mental processing.  
 
Re-framing the Mind of Istina Mavet 
Thus far, I have demonstrated how Faces in the Water explores socially constructed binaries 
in order to expose the psychological violence caused by the division of the mind. Frame’s 
text exposes and undermines these binaries in order to attend to those harmed on both sides 
of the opposition. The novel’s determined consideration of people with atypical minds is a 
consideration I look to reflect in my own approach. Therefore, in this section, I exemplify an 
engagement with representation of neuroatypical minds that shares in Frame’s ethical 
impulse, resisting the desire to know and grasp the experience of the other in a manner that 
perpetuates epistemic harm. Faces in the Water treats language as both a burden and an 
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escape for its characters. Istina’s unknown diagnosis resists the imprisonment of language, 
yet also renders her unable to fully communicate her atypical experience. Istina both 
struggles with and celebrates the unknown nature of her condition throughout the novel. 
Istina’s tone suggests that she often delights in her deviance, but her rebellion is punished by 
isolation and electroconvulsive therapy. Frame’s novel complicates our relationship with 
language and convention. Istina both celebrates and detests the idea of being unknown, 
exemplifying how language, when given power, can be both problem and solution. For Istina, 
the word deviant is not inherently negative, but it is implied otherwise within the bounds of 
the institution.  
I explore the tensions within language that are emphasised in Frame’s novel more 
specifically by contrasting the value of a medical diagnosis with the potential harm of 
“armchair” diagnoses. While Faces in the Water often treats language as the central source of 
violence towards its characters, the text also acknowledges the inescapable dependency upon 
language for communication. Marc Delrez (2007) highlights Frame’s subversive use of 
language: “Frame voices a passionate plea for the mentally ill, whose dignity must be 
acknowledged if one wishes to avoid perpetrating the humiliations illustrated in the novel” 
(2007, 27). It is with this appeal in mind that I embrace the ethos of disability studies and 
discourse branching from the neurodiverse community.  
Contemporary disability studies, like cognitive literary studies, is a multidisciplinary 
field that deconstructs the socio-cultural oppression placed upon a person with a disability, 
and how this may intersect with experiences like gender, race, and sexuality. In Dan 
Goodley’s article “Dis/entangling Critical Disability Studies” (2013), Goodley asserts that 
contemporary disability studies are invested in “developing nuanced theoretical responses” to 
factors “that led to the structural, economic and cultural exclusion of people with sensory, 
physical and cognitive impairments” (2013, 631). Further, while disability studies was 
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“conceived as a modernist project to challenge capitalist conditions of alienation,” 
contemporary discourse acknowledges that “we are living in a time of complex identity 
politics, of huge debates around the ethics of care, political and theoretical appeals to the 
significance of the body” (632). Contemporary disability studies actively acknowledges and 
include the complex and fluctuating nature of disability. Furthermore, Goodley suggests that 
the methodology of disability studies would benefit from a critical inclusion of activism, 
empiricism, and theory in order to diversify how we engage with and understand disabled 
selfhood. Goodley’s suggestion mirrors my own desire to illustrate how literary studies may 
better consider neuroatypicality in fiction by embracing scientific and artistic theories alike 
and thus resist grasping and erasing the difference of the other.     
The social othering of the disabled self is a primary concern within disability studies. 
Social hierarchy “presumes ablebodiedness, inaugurates the norm and purifies the ableist 
ideal” (Goodley 2013, 640), and those who do not conform are othered and characterised as 
deficient. Goodley’s article situates the disabled self “uneasily” on the spectrum of social 
hierarchy yet observes how the abled self is also judged “against equally pernicious standards 
of worth associated with the fully functioning self in contemporary society” (640). One key 
method the article identifies to overcome this entanglement of oppression is to spurn 
“traditional fixed identity categories” (641). The ethos of rejecting fixed identities underpins 
many of my primary concerns throughout this thesis. A manifestation of this rejection can be 
found in my employment of neurocosmopolitan discourse. In my introduction, I examined 
the emergence of concepts such as neurodiverse, neuroatypical, neurotypical, and 
neurocosmopolitan from disability studies and the ASD community. In the following section, 
I analyse what the introduction of this kind of accessible, contemporary terminology can 
offer past and present literature and literary study. Continuing to evolve the language we, as 
critics, use to approach past texts is one means of reflecting their same ethical concerns in our 
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contemporary criticism. For more contemporary works like Elizabeth Strout’s My Name is 
Lucy Barton, accessible terminology not only aligns with their underlying concerns, but also 
situates these texts within the most current cognitive discourse, and further validates their 
ability to contribute to the cognitive sciences.   
I contend that introducing this contemporary terminology into literary criticism 
provides an ethical approach, in line with the ethos of disability studies, to the neuroatypical 
mind in fiction. I am by no means the first to bring this specific set of terms into play with 
literature. Savarese’s “Towards a Postcolonial Neurology” (2010), and “Neurocosmopolitan 
Melville” (2013) explore the dynamic relationship between neurodivergent and neurotypical 
characters within fiction, the alienation of the othered individual, and the importance of 
representing human diversity in complex forms. Jordynn Jack’s 2014 book Autism and 
Gender: From Refrigerator Mothers to Computer Geeks is a comprehensive exploration of 
the intersections between gender and the neurodivergent mind, and their representation 
within film, literature, and television. Sonya Freeman Loftis’ Imagining Autism: Fiction and 
Stereotypes on the Spectrum (2015) encounters a variety of neurodivergent characters within 
literature and examines how their differing representations impact upon the societal rejection 
or acceptance of neurodiversity. Each of these critics makes use of the terminology in order 
to speak to the broad understanding and value of neurodiversity, as well as to the intimate 
experience of the neurodivergent individual, without confining their subjects to the 
preconceptions of a diagnosis.  
In the first section of this chapter, I applied and explored the language that Frame 
herself uses throughout Faces in the Water—words such as “insane” and “mad”—so as to 
best emphasise the moralistic, oppressive social conventions to which the novel responds and 
which it disrupts. As Istina reflects: “the idea still prevailed that mental illness was a form of 
childish naughtiness which might be cured in a Victorian environment with the persuasion of 
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stern speech and edifying literature” (Frame 2018, 210). Although socially we are beyond 
this time, the remnants of these attitudes linger, particularly in the language we use to 
approach neurodivergent and neuroatypical minds: terms like “insane” and “crazy” bear 
negative stereotypes. Therefore, in the following section, I use a methodology informed by 
the ethics and critical engagement of disability studies and demonstrate that it is an essential 
element of overturning the negative social constructs surrounding neuroatypicality. I contend 
that the use of neurocosmopolitan terminology also introduces essential ethics such as 
diversity, empathy, and agency that characterise the social movements they are born from.  
Istina Mavet is left without a diagnosis for the duration of Faces in the Water and 
grapples with her inability to convey the complexity of her experience to others through a 
language burdened by misconception. Although she is confined to the asylum, Istina sees 
herself as occupying a liminal position between the stereotypical asylum patient and those 
who live in the outside world. As Istina explains, “the family talked jokingly of my having 
been in the ‘nuthouse,’ and I gave them what they seemed to want—amusing descriptions of 
patients whose symptoms corresponded to the popular idea of the insane; and I described 
myself as if by misfortune I had been put among people who, unlike myself, were truly ill” 
(2018, 111). While this self-portrait is created largely for her family’s sake, it reveals Istina’s 
own feelings of social displacement as she expresses how “this image that I presented of 
myself was as a sane person caught unwillingly in the revolving doors of insanity” (111), 
suggesting that Istina is unable to place herself within the binary imposed upon her.   
Throughout the novel, Istina despairs at her lack of selfhood, explaining “I did not 
know my own identity. I was burgled of my body and hung in the sky like a woman of straw” 
(Frame 2018, 55). Istina’s perception of herself as a straw woman without an identity is in 
part owing to the failure of language to fully express her lived experience, which is further 
implied through the administration’s inability to accurately diagnose her. Yet, during a 
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moment of introspection, Istina states: “I was ashamed of my wholeness compared with 
Brenda’s fragmented mind scattered by secret explosion to the four corners of itself” (170), 
indicating that those within the asylum who had received a diagnosis still occupied fractured 
and unstable identities, just like her. In these passages, Frame highlights the complex duality 
brought about by a diagnosis (or lack thereof). A medical diagnosis may at once authenticate 
a person’s experience of their neuroatypical mind, while also limiting and fragmenting that 
same individual into categories based upon the symptoms, treatments, and the person’s 
perceived limitations. By remaining undiagnosed, Istina is never weighed down by societal 
preconceptions of her experience or abilities. Yet, she is also unable to communicate her 
lived experience in a language that can be fully understood by those around her.  
Although an accurate medical diagnosis is one form of self-identification that could 
aid Istina’s search for selfhood, Frame suggests that the problem is greater than Istina’s 
individual struggle. Throughout Faces in the Water, Frame continually highlights the failure 
of all language to sustain Istina’s sense of self or facilitate any meaningful connection with 
other people, explaining how “conversation is the wall we build between ourselves and other 
people, too often with tired words like used and broken bottles which, catching the sunlight 
as they lie embedded in the wall, are mistaken for jewels” (208). Here, Istina suggests that 
words are merely a token gesture, mistaken for sincere and important expression, which in 
actuality increases the distance between people. Istina feels both whole and empty because 
she is simultaneously freed and imprisoned by language.  
Throughout the novel, language fails to articulate the needs of the most vulnerable. 
Early on in her stay at Cliffhaven, Istina describes herself as having developed a new field of 
perception. Istina’s new perception transcends language, which suggests the need for a new, 
more immediate form of communication and understanding: “I knew the mad language 
which created with words, without using reason, has a new shape of reason; as the blind 
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fashion from touch an effective shape of the sight denied them” (2018, 91). Istina recognises 
the heightened sensory experience of the blind, believing the touch-based form of perception 
and understanding as indicative of a “new shape of reason” (91). As the passage continues, 
Istina suggests that her understanding of the mad language has enabled her to perceive a 
different truth—unobtainable to neurotypical individuals— “that things are not what they 
seem” (91). Here, Frame demonstrates and validates the experiential possibilities opened up 
by new and evolving forms of communication, both in and beyond language.  
As an authority on the language she seeks to problematise, Frame occupies an 
ambivalent authorial position. In order to mitigate the harm inflicted by the language the 
novel employs, Faces in the Water undermines its own account of Istina’s experience. At the 
novel’s conclusion, a nurse speaks to Istina, saying “when you leave hospital you must forget 
all you have ever seen, put it out of your mind completely as if it never happened, and go and 
live a normal life in the outside world,” to which Istina responds, “and by what I have written 
in this document you will see, won’t you, that I have obeyed her?” (Frame 2018, 223). The 
destabilising nature of the conclusion reminds the reader of the fictionality of Frame’s text, 
while highlighting the socially constructed nature of language and its potential to fictionalise 
the experiences of actual people. The conclusion suggests that the intimate and inherently 
singular experience of one’s own mind—neurodivergent or neurotypical—can never 
accurately be articulated through language alone, and thus should never be seen as 
representing any individual truth beyond the reader’s own perception.  
 This understanding of the mind’s singularity feeds back into Frame’s reluctance to 
diagnose Istina, as well as her emphasis upon the duty of care required in our use of 
language. As I discussed earlier, there is a duality to a medical diagnosis that may be 
experienced by the diagnosed person—of feeling both validated and fragmented through the 
process of identification and classification. In contemporary medical practice, a non-
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pathologizing diagnosis holds intrinsic value in its ability to recognise neurodiversity, while 
demonstrating how this diversity may affect a person both mentally and physically thus 
leading to effective and care-based treatment.   
I understand the impetus of literary critics who wish to diagnose both characters and 
authors through their fiction. The desire to unlock the mind of the other and create a 
definitive means to understanding their world is certainly enticing. As Levinas explained, it is 
the “promise of satisfaction” (1989, 77) that drives the action of the knowing grasp. This 
allure can be even greater when encountering an author such as Frame, whose characters’ 
minds are revealed in a way that can leave the reader with an insatiable need to grasp at 
understanding. In her chapter “Through a Glass Darkly: Reading the Enigmatic in Frame,” 
Jan Cronin (2009) problematises this need to fully decipher the unknown in Frame’s fiction. 
While Cronin acknowledges that certain theoretical lenses and critiques may unlock parts of a 
Frame text, these theories are “not master keys and their application will never result in total 
access or a complete picture” (2009, 4), emphasising again that “tracing the theoretical terrain 
does not lead to a definite answer to or resolution of the text” (10). Cronin instead believes 
that the reader and the critic alike should be engaged in the “process” of a Frame text, rather 
than the extraction of a unified product. I suggest that Cronin’s approach echoes the similar 
mode of care required to approach the neuroatypical mind both in Frame’s work and in wider 
fiction—one that overcomes the desire to enact the Levinasian grasp and instead engages 
with the neuroatypical other on their own terms and upholds their unknowable characteristics.   
Contemporary terms such as neurodivergent and neurotypical acknowledge a 
spectrum of difference in cognitive functioning across a variety of disorders, while upholding 
the private and enigmatic elements of the other’s mind. Like Frame’s fiction, the 
neuroatypical mind is not a puzzle to be deciphered or unlocked, nor should an authorial 
diagnosis be intimated through fiction. Readers and literary critics alike are accustomed to 
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having unfettered access to fictional minds. Frame reminds the reader, however, that this 
apparently unimpeded view is an untruth—that fiction is, in fact, a carefully constructed 
glimpse into a moment of sentience. In the foreword to Faces in the Water, Frame writes 
“although this book is written in documentary form it is a work of fiction. None of the 
characters, including Istina Mavet, portrays a living person” (2018). The inclusion of such a 
statement speaks to the prolific nature of external attempts to definitively know an author and 
their characters. However, Frame’s novel is purposefully bookended by reminders of the 
fictitious nature of her story world. Faces in the Water reminds us that an author only reveals 
those elements of a character’s mind they want seen, denying the illusion of a pure habitation 






“This is How I Saw It”: Remembering Trauma in My Name is Lucy Barton 
 
In Elizabeth Strout’s 2016 novel My Name is Lucy Barton, the eponymous protagonist 
repeatedly voices a sense of uncertainty and instability in her own memory. Like Woolf and 
Frame before, Strout’s text emphasises the ambiguities and uncertainties of the mind in order 
to explore experiences of trauma, neuroatypicality, and isolation while resisting the perilous 
and pathologizing frameworks that imprisoned Clarissa, Septimus, and Istina. Hesitation and 
uncertainty ensnare the titular Lucy, whose memories of three different times coalesce to 
form the narrative. In the narrative present, writer Lucy Barton reflects on her time in hospital 
in New York, in the 1980s. Lucy’s first-person narrative primarily focuses upon the five-day 
period where she is visited by her estranged mother during her nine week stay in hospital 
(owing to an unknown infection). Her mother’s presence conjures up painful memories of 
Lucy’s impoverished childhood in rural Illinois. Lucy’s mind wanders across these three 
planes of time with clarity—her upbringing, her hospital stay in the 1980s, and the narrative 
present (an unspecified time in the new millennium). Yet, Lucy is acutely aware of the 
inherent fallibility of the act of remembering—in particular, remembering trauma. The text is 
regularly punctuated by Lucy’s many “maybes,” “this is what I thinks,” and inklings of 
childhood experiences that reinforce the unreliable nature of memory. 
For Lucy, memory both forces her to re-embody the trauma of her youth and serves as 
a reprieve from the effects of illness and loss felt in hospital, and in the narrative present. One 
such aspect of her youth that memory conjures into the present is loneliness. Themes of 
isolation and loneliness are woven throughout the novel where they echo across Lucy’s life. 
Lucy is isolated from her peers as a child due to her poverty, isolated from her family due to 
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her academic pursuits, and isolated later from her academic and artistic peers through gender 
and class. As she notes early in the novel, “I was lonely. Lonely was the first flavour I had 
tasted in my life” (Strout 2016, 41). For Lucy, isolated once more in the hospital, the effects 
of loneliness and illness become entangled. This is not to suggest that loneliness is Lucy’s 
unknown illness. However, for Lucy, the two can at times feel interchangeable. 
Lucy’s experience of illness and loneliness are similarly affected by their intersections 
with hierarchies of gender, class, and traditional familial structures. All three conditions 
create a storm within Lucy’s mind, as her inability to break free from these socially enforced 
factors make her illness and isolation feel inescapable. In My Name is Lucy Barton, 
loneliness is both literal and metaphorical. The novel’s portrayal of illness and loneliness 
spirals outward from the central plot of Lucy’s hospital stay. As a result of this circular 
temporality, there is no clear beginning or end to either illness or loneliness, and Lucy is 
trapped within the cyclical workings of her own mind across all three points in her life. 
Through both the memory and experience of Lucy’s isolation, the reader explores and 
empathises with her uncertainties. In this chapter, I consider the methods through which Lucy 
remembers the trauma of her childhood and the socially and self-inflicted divisions in her 
adult life. I also examine Strout’s meditations on illness as a holistic experience of mind and 
body so as to explore the embodiment and immediacy of Lucy’s previous traumas. I will 
draw comparisons to both Mrs Dalloway and Faces in the Water throughout in order to unify 
my claims that the subversion of linearity and displacement of stability through memory 
creates a complex form of representing neuroatypicality in fiction. Furthermore, I will draw 
on the notion of neurocosmopolitanism and memory studies in order to demonstrate the 
complexities of the characters’ minds and the reverberations of trauma felt throughout their 
lives.  
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In part one of this chapter, I consider how Freudian psychoanalysis continues to 
permeate contemporary fiction, both through metatextual parody and critical interpretation. 
In the work of Virginia Woolf and Janet Frame, Freudian psychoanalysis was a more 
pernicious factor in their social and critical milieus and therefore requires a more historical 
critical approach. Strout parodies outmoded psychoanalytic practices and themes throughout 
My Name is Lucy Barton. As the most recent of the three texts, there is, as yet, little 
scholarship relating to Strout’s novel, and it is therefore yet to be affected by the issues of 
biographical readings and psychoanalytic presuppositions. Furthermore, Strout’s cultural 
positioning allows her to create moments of self-conscious interplay with Freudian 
psychoanalytic practice. These moments can be found in the novel’s criticism of biographical 
readings of fiction, psychoanalysis, and “armchair psychology”. Where Woolf and Frame’s 
texts have been plundered in the real world for biographical clues, Strout instead explores the 
experience of biographical readings within the novel itself. Throughout the text, Strout 
positions seemingly significant Freudian symbols—the complicated mother-daughter 
relationship, “repressed” memories, and authorial figures—provoking us into investigating 
their deeper meanings before undercutting this process through satire and experience. 
Therefore, my consideration of psychoanalysis in the opening of this chapter will be largely 
an engagement with the metatextual elements of Strout’s novel. In so doing, I look to 
demonstrate literature’s ability to identify and engage with contemporary cognitive-
theoretical discourse (including the memory wars debate) and position itself critically within 
this discourse.   
In part two, I draw upon memory studies to consider the study of memory and 
remembering in literature and demonstrate the ways in which My Name is Lucy Barton 
evokes the evolving understanding of our cognitive processing. In Feindt et al.’s (2014) 
article “‘Entangled Memory: Toward a Third Wave in Memory Studies,” the authors consider 
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the intertwined nature of cultural and individual memory, and the existence of mnemonic 
signifiers—a cultural symbol whose meaning changes through entangled, personal or societal 
memories—as a manifestation of this tricky temporal relationship. In Strout’s novel, I 
analyse moments in which cultural and personal memory merge to form these mnemonic 
signifiers, and suggest ways in which this merging further demonstrates the shared, cultural 
aspects of Lucy’s narrative.  
Finally, I expand upon my close analysis of Strout’s novel in relation to memory 
studies in order to explore the cyclical—and potentially generational—nature of Lucy’s 
trauma. Lucy Barton, like Clarissa Dalloway, and Istina Mavet before her, suffers from an 
undiagnosed illness that merges the experiences of the physical and mental. Furthermore, 
Lucy’s experience of illness is changed and challenged by her class and gender. More 
prevalent for Lucy, however, is her traumatic experience of family relationships, and the 
ways in which family—like class and gender—have become bound to her trauma and illness. 
Also in this section I suggest the presence of neuroatypicality and illness throughout Lucy’s 
life is manifested in her inherent loneliness. In many ways, loneliness and illness become 
interchangeable within the narrative, as both conditions are exacerbated by Lucy’s experience 
of class, gender, and family structure. Through a close reading of Strout’s novel, I examine 
how these tensions manifest throughout Lucy’s life: first in the fraught relationship between 
Lucy and her mother, then in her experiences of academic elitism, which triggers a moment 
of envy in Lucy for those afflicted by HIV/AIDS, and finally in the characteristic uncertainty 
of Lucy’s memory and her artistic endeavours. 
Literature itself is a form of memory and remembering—albeit of a fictional world 
and of someone else’s memory—that can therefore work as an educational and experimental 
artefact for practices like memory studies. As I have demonstrated in my previous chapters, 
illness often creates a revelatory space for the characters of fiction. For Lucy these 
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revelations are quietly personal ones, concerning her familial relationships, social status, and 
her sense of self. The progression of Lucy’s understanding of herself is not inherently 
positive; rather, it is necessarily reflective.   
 
Consciously Critical: The Narrative Benefit of Hindsight 
My Name is Lucy Barton is a novel written with the benefit of historical hindsight. As the 
most contemporary of my three texts, Strout’s text serves as a kind of critical epilogue to 
many of the issues that I have raised in the preceding chapters. It is hindsight that was 
unavailable to both Woolf and Frame, setting Strout’s novel apart both thematically and 
tonally. Strout is able to reflect upon, and thus be more confidently critical of, the socio-
cultural progression of Freudian psychoanalysis, diagnostic institutions, and other 
methodologies of the mind and neuroatypicality. Although Freudian ideas were firmly in 
vogue during Lucy’s early adulthood, her uneasy encounters with psychoanalysts in the past 
are filtered through the disillusioned memories of Lucy in the narrative present. These 
retroactive experiences are coloured with a scornful and often parodic tone.  
Strout’s novel is able to engage with psychoanalysis with the scepticism of 
contemporary scientific understanding, which is thusly reflected in its critical positioning. 
Where Woolf and Frame either presuppose the unseating of Freudian psychoanalysis and the 
rise of the cognitive sciences, or are engaging with them implicitly as novel, cultural 
possibilities, My Name is Lucy Barton explicitly considers the issues of reductive 
psychoanalytic practice, biographical readings of fiction, and the complex linearity of 
recovery. Therefore, issues around gender, class, and family roles—as they intersect with 
neuroatypical minds and illness—linger in the historical past of the novel’s setting, rather 
than in the authorial milieu itself. In my previous chapters, I explored the Freudian critical 
response to Woolf and Frame, and how this response reflected many of the problems of 
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engaging with neuroatypicality through both literature and criticism. There is a smaller pool 
of critical background to drawn upon for My Name is Lucy Barton owing, in part, to its recent 
publication date. However, as I have noted, its newness situates the novel in a reflective 
position which leads to the explicit problematising of the issues of biographical and 
diagnostic readings within the narrative. In terms of its engagement with psychoanalysis, 
Strout’s novel is therefore the most metatextual of the three.  
My Name is Lucy Barton undercuts potential psychoanalytic readings with satirical 
commentary from Lucy whilst continuing to signal how these readings could enact harm 
upon the vulnerable subjects of Strout’s novel. Strout positions two psychoanalytic figures 
within the novel amongst a variety of psychological and medical figures appearing 
throughout in order to clearly target her criticism towards the pathologizing elements of their 
practice. Lucy’s most notable disdain is directed towards “the psychoanalyst woman from 
California” (Strout 2016, 105), who, unprompted, publicly diagnoses author Sarah Payne, 
and Lucy notes that “[Sarah] hated this woman for saying that. She hated her” (2016, 105). 
While other diagnostic figures are characterised more sympathetically, the Californian 
psychoanalyst is treated with unabashed dislike, and with a satire of diagnostic practices. 
Furthermore, Strout inserts a separate authorial figure—Sarah Payne—within the narrative so 
as to consider the critically-loaded problem of biographical readings of fictional texts. Sarah 
Payne is introduced into the fictional world as an author, mentor, and a means through which 
Lucy is able to reflect upon her own authorial journey. In so doing, Strout’s novel creates a 
metatextual space within which the reader may consider the complex positioning of author in 
relation to their fiction, and critic in relation to author. 
My Name is Lucy Barton explicitly enacts the practice of biographical analysis of 
fiction and comments on the pernicious effects it can have upon an author’s legacy. 
Throughout the novel, Lucy reflects on her admiration for Sarah Payne, which leads to Lucy 
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to attend one of her writing workshops. It is through the developing mentor-mentee 
relationship shared by Sarah and Lucy that Strout stages the problems of biographical 
readings. At a writing panel, Sarah explains that she received hate mail after a character in 
her work expressed distaste for their president. When asked if she would ever respond to such 
mail, Sarah replies “it’s not my job to make readers know what’s a narrative voice and not 
the private view of the author” (Strout 2016, 97). Sarah’s frustration with incessant requests 
to demarcate the boundaries between fiction and reality is clear, and she expresses her wish 
for readers to impose those limits for themselves. Further, Sarah stresses that even in the case 
of a shared opinion between author and character, it may not necessarily or accurately 
represent the greater scope or nuance of an author’s social or moral reasoning. Sarah’s words 
neatly summarise the arguments I have made in regard to incessant biographical readings of 
literature. With Woolf and Frame especially, these attempts to extract biographical insight 
express a desire to solve an author and create a critical/authorial relationship whose one-sided 
nature often proves detrimental to a person’s reputation, as Sarah Payne experienced. 
Lucy is taken by Sarah’s conclusive statement, and the uncertain tone of much of 
Lucy’s self-reflection destabilises attempts to uncover biographical truths about Strout from 
the novel. After attending the panel Lucy explains that it was on that same night that she 
began to record her life’s story; “she began to try” (Strout 2016, 99). It remains ambiguous if 
the work that Lucy writes is fiction or nonfiction. Regardless, I suggest that Payne’s 
meditation on the nature of fiction—as separate from an author’s beliefs—is what prompts 
Lucy’s desire to write, and allows Strout to undermine biographical readings of My Name is 
Lucy Barton from within the novel itself. 
Lucy is constantly aware of the unreliable nature of her memory as it constitutes her 
story. Throughout the novel, she uses phrases such as “at least I remember it that way” (2016, 
21), “this is how I saw it” (38), and “I still am not sure it’s a true memory” (119), which serve 
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as reminders of the fallible nature of remembering and the sense-making narratives that 
memory often constructs. The indeterminacy of Lucy’s narration works to create a tone of 
self-awareness and uncertainty. This uncertain quality allows Strout to explore the subjects of 
psychosomatic illness, neuroatypicality, and otherness while reinforcing the fictional quality 
of her novel. Strout creates a metatextual space within which to explore the complex 
relationships between author, fiction, and reader. This discursive tone within Strout’s novel is 
shared with Faces in the Water. As I described in the previous chapter, the final sentence of 
Frame’s work collapses illusions of the novel’s reality, and stifles the ability to extract 
biographical content from within the realm of Istina Mavet. While Strout does not completely 
undermine her own story-world, My Name is Lucy Barton grapples with the complex 
relationships between author, fiction, and reader through Lucy and Sarah’s shared struggle.  
The uncertain boundary between reality and fiction creates problems that reoccur 
several times in Lucy’s life. After reading one of Payne’s novels, Lucy considers their similar 
upbringings in rural poverty and how Payne writes of characters who experienced the same in 
her fiction.14 Yet Lucy realises that “even in [Sarah’s] books, she was not telling exactly the 
truth, she was always staying away from something” (46). I suggest that what Lucy 
understands to be Sarah’s avoidance is a similar acknowledgement that even when an author 
and their fictional characters share in experience, these parallels do not equate to biographical 
truths. Furthermore, the sense of “staying away from something” may also suggest an 
unwillingness to confront a personal truth or trauma within Payne’s fiction. The desire to 
obfuscate or avoid personal reality in fiction validates both the desire to separate the authorial 
and fictional world, and Lucy and Sarah’s shared internal struggle to confront past trauma. 
Moreover, an author should be able to draw on their own experiences free from the concern 
 
14 This kind of parallel in characters suggests but does not fully realise a form of doubling like that of 
Clarissa and Septimus in Mrs Dalloway. 
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that readers will interpret it as biography verbatim if the author has not expressly interwoven 
such elements. I do not deny that autobiographical elements in fiction exist, or that an author 
may be liberated by the ability to explore their own identity within fiction. However, I 
contend that the tunnel vision often created by biography-driven criticism neglects the 
complexity of fictional minds and neuroatypicality. 
My Name is Lucy Barton could have been a triumphant Freudian bildungsroman, 
centred on the reconciliation between Lucy and her mother in a moment of ultimate, Oedipal 
recovery. The rebuilding of the relationship between Lucy and her mother takes place within 
the hospital—an institution of recovery—and is punctured by moments of solidarity found in 
stories regarding other residents of Lucy’s home town, Amgash, Illinois. Strout suggests 
moments where Lucy improves in the presence of her mother. On the first night of her 
mother’s stay, Lucy notes that “usually I woke up at midnight and dozed fitfully.…but that 
night I slept without waking, and in the morning my mother was sitting where she had been 
the night before” (Strout 2016, 7). Yet, both women resist confronting their relationship, and 
Lucy’s condition does not improve after her mother’s visit. The small intimacies and 
concessions between Lucy and her mother do not cure Lucy, who spends another five weeks 
in hospital and much more time beyond this considering the complexity of their interactions. 
Many of Lucy’s traumatic memories of her childhood feature her mother both as instigator 
and passive observer. Yet her condition cannot be attributed to her mother, nor healed in its 
entirety by her. Thus, the unspoken understanding shared by the two women at the time of 
their parting does not represent a triumphant moment of intergenerational healing, but rather 
it becomes another uncertain memory in Lucy’s mind. 
Lucy is not the only character who has a troubled relationship with her mother. 
Midway through the novel, Lucy encounters Molla, an acquaintance who began to see a 
psychiatrist after the birth of her child. Molla mentions flippantly how her “psychiatrist told 
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her she was feeling grief because of everything she had not received from her own mother et 
cetera” (2016, 62). Strout’s inclusion of Molla’s therapeutic experience in such a facetious 
manner suggests a rejection of the shallow treatment of something Lucy herself continues to 
struggle with. Molla refers to her assessment as gossip, as if such a disorder were in vogue, 
preventing Lucy from finding relief in the solidarity of shared mental and familial 
circumstances. Strout’s text is not discounting the genuine trauma inflicted by a troubled 
relationship between mother and daughter. Rather, the novel casts doubt over such a 
psychological evaluation’s ability to begin the journey of recovery for a person’s mental and 
physical turmoil. The assessment given by Molla’s psychiatrist is not the only moment of 
psychoanalytic parody within the novel. 
My Name is Lucy Barton’s primary psychoanalytic figures—the woman sharing 
Lucy’s writing workshop and Jeremy, Lucy’s neighbour—are treated ambivalently in Lucy’s 
memory. Lucy’s disdain for the unnamed woman is in direct contrast to the admiration and 
love she feels towards Jeremy. The polarity in these two relationships allows Strout to 
explore the differing socio-cultural positions such figures continue to hold as the academic 
and social belief in psychoanalysis wanes. In the writing workshop of Sarah Payne—Lucy’s 
literary hero—the unknown woman casts an unsolicited diagnosis upon Sarah after she 
flinches in surprise. Lucy describes how “the psychoanalyst woman from California, who 
usually said very little, said that day to Sarah Payne, in a voice that was—to my ears—almost 
snide, ‘How long have you suffered from post-traumatic stress?’” (Strout 2016, 105). Lucy 
reflects upon the hatred that was evident in Sarah after the incident, remarking “anyone who 
uses their training to put someone down in that way—well, that person is just a big old piece 
of crap” (2016, 108). In Lucy’s mind, the unknown woman is ridiculous and uncouth, and a 
figure worthy of ridicule. This interaction indirectly addresses the possibility that readers of 
Strout’s novel may attempt to cast a diagnostic net over the two women. By characterising 
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the psychoanalyst who diagnoses publicly and without consent as a “big old piece of crap”, 
Sarah and Lucy reject the historical notion of neuroatypical minds as public, psycho-
playgrounds, and reinforce the importance of an ethical and empathetic approach. 
Jeremy, Lucy’s neighbour, is spared the tone of parody and mistrust that colours 
many of the institutional figures throughout the novel. Jeremy is a private and respectful 
character—a psychoanalyst—who entangles the psychoanalytic world and artistic elitism. 
Lucy only sees Jeremy’s apartment once and immediately identifies that “there was art on the 
walls that made me understand then how far apart he and I were” (2016, 39), which she labels 
as “symptoms of a sophisticated world” (39). Upon learning that Lucy is a writer, Jeremy 
remarks, “you’re an artist. I work with artists, I know. I guess I’ve always known that about 
you” (40). Jeremy’s prophetic statement is treated lightly—to claim to have known 
something after the fact suggests that Jeremy perceives himself as superior to others. 
Nevertheless, Lucy continues to refer to Jeremy with deep affection, as he symbolises the 
world of sophistication to which she longed to belong.  
Jeremy represents the traditional, healing, and patriarchal image of Freudian 
psychoanalysis. Like Freud, Jeremy was educated in Europe before coming to New York, is 
invested in “sophisticated” (39) art and literature, and often prompts Lucy to discuss deeply 
personal thoughts. Yet, despite the quiet comfort that Jeremy exudes, he triggers a sense of 
loneliness within Lucy. Jeremy is symbolic of the upper-class elite—he comes “from the 
aristocracy” (38)—that forces Lucy to confront her position within the working class that 
isolated her from her peers in her youth. The novel suggests that Lucy’s ambivalence towards 
the psychoanalytic figures in her life is a result of memory’s ability to obfuscate past truths. 
Whilst actively remembering, Lucy is at all times uncertain of what notions are true, and 
what has been subject to change through the passage of time. The conflicting feelings of 
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admiration and loneliness that Lucy associates with Jeremy thus reflect the complex 
experience of memory and remembering that are enmeshed within the narrative.  
 Contemporary understanding of mental processing manifests in Strout’s narrative as 
a sense of certainty within memory’s uncertainty. That is to say, present scientific 
conceptions of the mind, memory, and consciousness often emphasise their unknown and 
unreliable functions. For example, Daniel Schacter builds upon the work of psychologists 
such as Elizabeth Loftus (whose research on eyewitness testimony I surveyed in the 
introduction) to emphasise both the function and fallibility of memory; in particular, 
emphasising those “processes that play a functional role in memory and cognition but 
produce distortions, errors, or illusions as a consequence of doing so” (Schacter 2012, 604). 
Hassin et al. likened the study of the mind to the phrase “seen through a glass darkly” (2006, 
14), and Blakey Vermeule called the mind “the hidden continent” (2015, 468). In upholding 
the inherent unknowability of the mind, contemporary cognitive theories like affect theory, 
the new unconscious, and memory studies stand in direct contrast to the psychoanalytic 
fervour that attempted to know and grasp their highly sexualised, primal unconscious. Thus, 
although much of the action of My Name is Lucy Barton occurs during the 1980s, the 
workings of Lucy’s mind are depicted in a quintessentially contemporary form, as studied by 
the likes of Loftus and Schacter. Lucy’s phrasing throughout the narrative is indicative of this 
present reimagining as she repeatedly affirms “still [I] am not sure it’s a true memory, except 
I do know it, I think. I mean: It is true. Ask anyone who knew us” (2016, 119). This is not to 
say that memory can never be accurate, nor that it is the onus of fiction to represent memory 
as inherently fallible. However, works like My Name is Lucy Barton, that use the uncertainty 
of memory as a device that effects and shapes their characters, and reflect its real-world 
counterparts, may serve as a beneficial implement for scientific interplay. 
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Mnemonic Memory and Cultural Legacy 
At the conclusion of My Name is Lucy Barton, Lucy describes a twilight scene from her past 
in Amgash, Illinois. Lucy stands on the liminal landscape of her childhood and observes “a 
view of the horizon, the whole entire circle of it, if you turned, the sun setting behind you, the 
sky in front becoming pink and soft, then slightly blue again” (2016, 191). Similarly, in the 
article “Memory Worlds: Reframing Time and the Past” (2020), Ferrándiz et al. describe the 
invocation of “the metaphor of twilight as memory’s privileged time. It is that moment of the 
day that foreshadows the night of forgetting, but that seems to slow time itself, an in-between 
state in which the last light of the day may still play out its ultimate marvels” (Ferrándiz et al. 
2020, 780). The form of memory studies outlined by Ferrándiz et al. stresses the importance 
of reimagining time and temporal boundaries so as to shift the social understanding towards 
the modern scientific frameworks of the mind and memory. As Ferrándiz et al. have 
expressed it: “where classical history promotes a dominant perspective of change over 
(linear) time, scholars of memory studies often target the imprint of the past in the present, 
portraying the coexistence of different time layers in the same moment” (2020, 778). In 
Strout’s novel, Lucy experiences time differently within the hospital. She is often found 
considering the trauma of her youth during these twilight hours where past overlays present. 
With memory forming the backbone of My Name is Lucy Barton, Strout’s novel engages with 
the cultural and individual temporalities of memory studies, and is thus strengthened by an 
analysis of its employment of memory as both structural device and character trait.  
While, initially, Strout’s novel appears to be an intimate account of memory that 
locates Lucy in several personal pasts, her life’s memory is bound to many mnemonic 
signifiers. Feindt et al. suggest that mnemonic signifiers “can refer to any socially relevant 
figuration of memory” (2014, 31). Using Versailles as an example, Feindt et al. examine its 
“symbolic character” (31), suggesting that “the meaning of Versailles unfolds only in 
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considering the context of concrete acts of memory” (31). Crucially, mnemonic signifiers are 
multi-perspectival, and provide access to “the discourse of memory, its comprehensibility and 
social scope” (31). The authors of the article explain how Versailles represents a multitude of 
cultural memories—from the French revolution to the conclusion of WWI—and therefore has 
no singular cultural meaning, but rather, a nexus of interpretive memories that locate both 
individual and cultural significance. I contend that there is a variety of mnemonic signifiers 
that appear throughout My Name is Lucy Barton, such as the events of WWII or the AIDS 
epidemic, which through the lens of Lucy’s memory, frames their personal significance 
against a wider cultural backdrop. 
While WWII and the AIDS epidemic intersect with Lucy’s story through the 
experience of her father and Jeremy, I suggest that the Chrysler building is a mnemonic 
signifier that is more deeply intertwined with Lucy’s experiences in hospital. While at first, 
the Chrysler Building appears to only be a part of the mise-en-scène of the novel, its repeated 
appearance suggests that the building holds a unique significance to Lucy’s memory of her 
time as a patient. Paul A. Ranogajec describes the Chrysler Building as one that “epitomises 
its time: an era of concentrated wealth, industrial power, and large-scale city building.… 
there may be few better artifacts of the short-lived epoch called the Roaring Twenties” 
(Ranogajec 2017). Ranogajec’s statement describes the possibilities the building holds as a 
mnemonic signifier: as a New York icon, a symbol of wealth and industry, and an artefact of 
the Twenties. Lucy herself describes the building, remembering how “the light from the 
Chrysler Building shone like the beacon it was, of the largest and best hopes for mankind and 
its aspirations and desire for beauty” (Strout 2016, 67). Lucy’s memory acknowledges the 
socio-cultural significance of the Chrysler Building, while attaching her own, personal 
interpretation of its significance to its impressive form. 
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For Lucy, the presence of the Chrysler Building in her life begins and ends with the 
presence of her mother, further suggesting the dual personal and cultural meaning held by the 
building. This maternal tie imbues the Chrysler Building with personal significance and its 
presence is a reminder of Lucy’s most intense relationship. The building is introduced in 
relation to Lucy’s first night with her mother, as she explains, “I did not see any of my family 
until the day my mother showed up at the foot of my bed in the hospital where the Chrysler 
Building shone outside the window” (2016, 33). Throughout the novel, the building is 
described always as a light that cuts through the darkness. Its presence, therefore, is an 
imposing one—it is one of the few certainties Lucy has within the uncertainty of her 
memory. The Chrysler Building is the only thing privy to the conversations shared by Lucy 
and her mother, and as such it is witness to the rapid but fleeting change in the pair’s 
relationship. 
By the next mention of the Chrysler Building, Lucy and her mother’s interactions 
have already begun to shift. The pair share and speculate on gossip from their hometown, yet 
“even though it was only the two of us in this hospital room with the Chrysler Building 
shining at the window, we still whispered as though someone could be disturbed” (34). Lucy 
begins to perceive the building as an observer of her life, and it, in turn, begins to affix itself 
to Lucy’s memory—a cultural monument to modernity that signifies the private relationship 
between mother and daughter. Lucy remembers one other time when the Chrysler building 
impresses itself upon her in hospital, midway through her mother’s visit. Once again it is 
shining through the night, this time actively impacting upon Lucy’s life, as she speculates 
“maybe it was the darkness with only the pale crack of light that came through the door, the 
constellation of the magnificent Chrysler Building right beyond us, that allowed us to speak 
in ways we never had” (36). The building has become so entangled with Lucy’s memory that 
she feels as though it guides her actions. As one may navigate through the use of 
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astronomical constellations, Lucy navigates her difficult relationship with her mother below 
the familiar constellation of the Chrysler Building. 
The final reference to the building comes later in the novel. Lucy’s mother sends her a 
postcard—a rare moment of contact between the two women outside of the bounds of the 
hospital. The postcard is significant to Lucy for multiple reasons, not least of which is that it 
pictured the Chrysler Building at night: “Where she got that card in Amgash, Illinois, I 
cannot imagine, but she sent it to me and said I will never forget either” (2016, 152). The 
scarcity of communication or words of care from Lucy’s mother, the promise to remember, 
and the accomplishment of finding this significant postcard secures the momentousness of 
the Chrysler Building in the narrative present. In receiving her mother’s postcard, Lucy’s 
illness, isolation, and the emotionally tumultuous nature of their relationship are irrevocably 
secured to the building in Lucy’s mind. Lucy reconfigures the building as a mnemonic 
signifier. The Chrysler Building’s personal and cultural significance further demonstrates 
how Lucy’s narrative is able to be both intimate, and idiosyncratically explore social themes 
surrounding class and family and their impact upon experiences of neuroatypicality.  
The tale of Lucy Barton is also a story of gender, class, recovery, and family, and of 
what a holistic experience of illness reveals about each. Where Feindt et al. suggest that 
“memory studies must go beyond writing factual histories of mnemonic signifiers in favour 
of extending their investigations to the history of interpretations” (2014, 31), it must also be 
recognised that literature can add to and identify these personal interpretations. As I asserted 
in the introduction of this thesis, the literature of neuroatypicality often places the cognitive 
functions and mental frameworks of its characters at the forefront of their narratives. My 
Name is Lucy Barton is one such work that, in exploring Lucy’s atypical experience, is 
deeply invested in its protagonist’s remembering processes, and thus offers an entangled 
individual and cultural contribution to memories studies. Furthermore, recounting stories—
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both fictional and non-fictional—of neuroatypicality creates the community that Lucy lacked, 
and while Lucy’s experience is unique to her, community can be found in differences shared. 
 
The Flavours of Loneliness in the Life of Lucy Barton 
Throughout the novel, Lucy is excluded socially by divisions both externally and internally 
enforced. She feels isolated from her family, friends, and her academic peers. Moreover, just 
as Lucy appeared settled within a family of her own making, with a career, and financial and 
social prosperity—all things that a past Lucy craved—her sudden illness disrupts her life and 
makes her an outsider once more. It is during her hospital stay that Lucy’s husband meets the 
woman with whom he will have an affair, while her children find her strange and unnerving: 
“‘Mommy, you’re so skinny!’ They were really frightened. They stayed with me on the bed 
while I dried their hair with a towel, and then they drew pictures, but with apprehension” 
(Strout 2016, 5). Further, the sudden visit from Lucy’s mother serves as a painful reminder of 
the past she sought to forget. Lucy’s experiences of loneliness, trauma, and illness force her 
to question her once-coveted lifestyle and the notions of luxury she has come to treasure. 
Strout, like Woolf and Frame, does not disclose a diagnosis for Lucy. Although this 
obscurity underlies much of the narrative, it is explicitly acknowledged at the beginning of 
the novel. As Lucy explains from her position in the narrative present: “no one could isolate 
any bacteria or figure out what had gone wrong. No one ever did. I took fluids through one 
IV, and antibiotics came through another” (Strout 2016, 4). Lucy is initially hospitalised to 
have her appendix removed, but her stay is lengthened as a result of an unidentified side-
effect. Whether this illness is physical, mental, or an amalgamation of the two also remains 
unspecified. As is the case with Clarissa Dalloway, it could be argued that Lucy’s unknown 
condition begins with the experience of a named illness—the flu and appendicitis—which in 
turn causes the development of a mental illness. However, I would suggest it is a more 
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complex and less linear combination of the two. Lucy’s physical illness gives her the time to 
explore her memories in full, and to consider the prevalence of denial, trauma, and 
oppression in her formative years. 
Illness encumbers Lucy enough that she is forced to cease her daily routine, as she 
finds herself primarily in the company of her own thoughts, feelings, and memories. It is 
possible that Lucy is physically incapacitated by trauma. However, this question remains 
unanswered—although, as Lucy comments later in the novel: “I have learned this: A person 
gets tired. The mind or the soul or whatever word we have for what is not just the body gets 
tired” (2016, 84). Lucy goes on to suggest that this is “nature helping us” (84), that tiredness 
forces a person to rest, just as illness forces her to reflect. Unlike Clarissa Dalloway, 
however, the memories that visit Lucy in tandem with the visit of her mother are largely 
painful and are at odds with the identity she has built for herself as an adult. I suggest this 
casts Lucy in a position of functioning trauma, whose impact on her memory has created a 
familial cycle exacerbated by gender and class. 
Like Frame, Strout shares in the desire to keep her characters separate from the 
potentially limiting nature of a diagnosis. The importance of an accurate medical diagnosis 
should not be undermined. However, a diagnosis given by the reader or critic of a text 
seeking to unlock or grasp a character’s mind and motivations can limit the reception and 
potential of a character. This often displaces productive, character-based discussions and 
becomes one that begins and ends with invasive speculations of illnesses that may bleed into 
biographical readings. An analysis centred on the characters within a text benefits the wider 
cognitive literary studies discourse as it produces greater insight into the mental processing of 
a character within their wider social context.   
The intense duality of Lucy’s experiences of loneliness and illness coalesce in her 
consideration of those who suffered from AIDS during the epidemic of the 1980s. In 
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moments of honest reflection, Lucy admits to feeling envious towards those suffering from 
AIDS. Lucy identifies the men she observes as having a community within their shared 
suffering, in part because their illness leads to overt physical symptoms. Being diagnosed 
with AIDS in the 1980s was almost always a death sentence, and AIDS patients were treated 
with suspicion and were isolated by both medical professionals and wider society. However, I 
suggest the sense of jealousy Lucy feels when observing these men is a more abstract  
coveting of both their community and the clear manifestation of illness that she lacks. These 
periods of introspection that surround her guilt-ridden envy are felt most deeply when Lucy is 
at her loneliest. Feelings of isolation and abandonment underscore many of Lucy’s memories, 
particularly those of her youth, and it is a sentiment echoed in her experience of illness. 
Before falling ill, Lucy sits outside with her neighbour Jeremy—who himself will later die of 
an AIDS-related illness—quietly watching two visibly ill men walk by. Lucy remarks “I 
know it’s terrible of me, but I’m almost jealous of them. Because they have each other, 
they’re tied together in a real community” (2016, 41). Jeremy does not censure Lucy for 
expressing what many would deem unthinkable. Instead, upon reflection, Lucy realises that 
Jeremy recognises and accepts her intense loneliness, that “lonely was the first flavour I had 
tasted in my life” (41). The desperation Lucy feels for a sense of belonging and community 
leads her to consider illness as one such way of overcoming the plague of loneliness. 
However, when Lucy herself experiences debilitating physical and mental illness, she only 
encounters further isolation. 
 The concern with loneliness that pervades My Name is Lucy Barton is in part a result 
of Lucy’s liminal class status. Although belonging to an impoverished, working-class family, 
Lucy’s academic prowess allows her to attend university, where she finds herself mingling 
with and reluctantly accepted by the upper-middle-class academic elite. Upon entering a 
romantic relationship with one of her professors— “the artist” —during her college years, 
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Lucy realises that although they essentially occupy the same social and creative spaces, she 
will forever be an imposter. When speaking of the artist, Lucy self-consciously comments, “I 
liked his work, though I understood that I did not understand it” (2016, 26). The inescapable 
difference in class between Lucy and many of her peers often evokes the loneliness that was 
so pronounced in her childhood. However, Lucy does not always despair at this difference, 
since she is also acutely aware of the trappings of pretentiousness and elitism. 
When the artist makes disparaging remarks about Lucy’s style or her thrift-store 
clothes, she thinks, “I was slightly embarrassed for him, that he would think of me as having 
no style, because the clothes I wore were me” (27). And when the artist celebrates owning a 
shirt from Bloomingdales, Lucy again “felt embarrassed”: “Because [the artist] seemed to 
think it mattered, and I thought he was deeper than that, smarter than that; he was an artist” 
(27). Lucy’s status as outsider affords her insights into the superficial trappings of even her 
most academic companions. Part of Lucy’s journey into the academic and artistic world is the 
realisation that its inhabitants are no more superior than those Lucy left behind in rural 
Illinois. “Symptoms of a sophisticated world” (39) are therefore disparaged by Lucy, who 
once more struggles to create a community even among her most like-minded peers. It is 
Lucy’s illness and forced isolation that compel her to re-evaluate the aspirations she formed 
in her youth, and to question if the total separation she attempted to create from her past 
during her time at university was in fact detrimental to her well-being. 
Lucy develops her earlier sense of jealousy towards those with HIV/AIDS into a more 
nuanced understanding later in the novel. While her encounter with a patient on the brink of 
death evokes her old feelings of loneliness, it is without the envious tinge of her earlier life, 
as she considers the suffering of the patient she observes through a gap in their door. Lucy 
explains that “I felt terrible that he was dying, and I knew that dying that way was a terrible 
death. I was afraid of dying, but I did not have his illness” (2016, 140). As she considers the 
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strength of the dying man’s gaze, Lucy concludes that “I was afraid of him, of death, of my 
mother leaving me” (140). Lucy is unable to escape the man’s gaze, just as she cannot escape 
the isolation that illness has once more bought her. While Lucy’s mother’s visit only makes 
her sense of separation more pronounced, her envy gives way to an understanding of the 
suffering of this patient—a suffering Lucy no longer desires to share—and a realisation that 
death and loneliness occupy the same fearful space in Lucy’s mind. 
The arrival of Lucy’s mother at her bedside in the midst of her illness prompts a flood 
of unexplored and traumatic memories within Lucy. It is clear that these recollections have 
not been repressed in the Freudian sense, as Lucy is acutely aware of their presence 
throughout her life. However, the stagnation of Lucy’s time in hospital affords her an 
abundance of time to begin exploring these memories and their meaning. Whether the 
troubling nature of Lucy’s thoughts, her characteristic difference from her family, and her 
physical frailty suggest the presence of an undiagnosed mental illness or inherent 
neuroatypicality within Lucy remains ambiguous. At least some of Lucy’s isolation is class-
based. She feels isolated during her youth because of her working-class status: yet, when she 
leaves this life behind she suffers from imposter syndrome while amongst her academic and 
social peers. Furthermore, Lucy’s memories produce cycles of both comfort and isolation that 
accompany the processing of her traumatic upbringing. Before her mother’s arrival, Lucy 
feels a characteristic thud of loneliness: “had anyone known the extent of my loneliness I 
would have been embarrassed” (2016, 6). The institution of the hospital re-enacts feelings of 
isolation that were perpetuated in the educational institutions across Lucy’s youth, suggesting 
the harmful perceptions of class and gender that underscore both. There is an immediate 
impulse within Lucy to feel shame for expressing dramatic emotions, even in her own 
thoughts, that suggests an emotionally oppressive upbringing. However, upon the arrival of 
her mother, there is an immediate change within Lucy: “Her being there.… made me feel 
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warm and liquid-filled, as though all my tension had been a solid thing and now was not. 
Usually I woke at midnight and dozed fitfully.…but that night I slept without waking” (2016, 
7). With this calmness comes a kind of urgency within Lucy to remember her childhood in 
the hopes of extending this comfort. Before this moment Lucy had only engaged with the 
idea of her estranged mother through memories. The ambivalence of Lucy’s memory 
complicates our own presumptions on the nature of trauma as completely negative. Strout 
demonstrates how memories and feelings associated with Lucy’s childhood may at once be 
isolating and comforting. For Lucy, there is a dissonance between the woman at the foot of 
her hospital bed and the mother who occupies her memory. The mother “who had never been 
in an airplane before” (8) who, despite “the terror that must have visited her when she 
stepped off the plane” (8), visits her in hospital, and confuses her. The inherent care that 
underlies Lucy’s mother’s actions is at odds with the distant and often cruel mother that she 
remembers, further reinforcing the often conflicted positioning of trauma within Lucy’s 
memory. 
As she struggles to rebuild her relationship with her mother, Lucy also struggles 
against regressing to childhood idiosyncrasies which threaten to overcome her while in her 
company. The incongruity between past and present selves felt by both women becomes 
obvious when they speak to one another. Both are simultaneously reserved and eager, as 
Lucy notes, “she talked in a way I didn’t remember, as though a pressure of feeling and 
words and observations had been stuffed down inside her for years, and her voice was 
breathy and unselfconscious” (2016, 10). Lucy is eager at the possibility of forging a new 
relationship with this reformed and softer version of her mother. But the memories of her 
traumatic childhood and the reasons behind the deterioration of their relationship prove 
inescapable. 
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Upon first introducing the reader to the circumstances in which she was raised, Lucy 
reflects that: 
I think back on the early years and I find myself thinking: It was not that bad. 
Perhaps it was not. But there are times too—unexpected—when walking down the 
sunny sidewalk, or watching the top of a tree bend in the wind....I am suddenly 
filled with the knowledge of darkness so deep that a sound might escape my mouth, 
and I will step into the nearest clothing store and talk with a stranger about the 
shape of sweaters newly arrived. This must be the way most of us manoeuvre 
through the world, half knowing, half not, visited by memories that can’t possibly 
be true. But when I see others walking with confidence, as though they are 
completely free from terror, I realize I don’t know how others are.  (2016, 14) 
Here, Lucy begins to realise the persistent nature of the trauma she experienced in her youth. 
It appears, sudden and unexpected, shattering the protection that her acquired status has 
afforded her. Illness forces Lucy to realise that a higher social class and newly cultivated 
relationships will never entirely insulate her from the issues her past-self failed to reconcile. 
Although memory is portrayed by Strout as largely unreliable, it is, ironically, what forces 
Lucy to come to terms with both the positive and traumatic truths within herself. Unlike a 
traditional recovery narrative or bildungsroman, however, these revelations are not confined 
to the five days of her mother’s visit, nor do they cure her of her illness and internal conflicts. 
Rather, the visit constitutes the centre of Lucy’s narrative circle, with personal reflections 
occurring across all three threads of time. These revelations ebb and flow throughout Lucy’s 
life as she is denied the easy closure from her mother that a traditional recovery novel brings 
about. 
One such revelation that begins in hospital but continues to grow within Lucy across 
all three timelines is her mother’s underlying humanity. During the visit, Lucy is confronted 
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with her mother as a complete person who has existed separately from the conception of 
“mother” for some years. However, Lucy’s mother is never named, suggesting that Lucy is 
unable to see her mother as a rounded person whose relationship with her daughter is only 
one element of an incredibly complex life. Lucy does grow to realise that her mother also 
experienced trauma and grief resulting from growing up in rural poverty. Lucy often portrays 
herself as an outcast in the family, in part due to her academic pursuits. However, she later 
discovers that her mother had a job at the local library until she was fired for not having a 
“proper education” (2016, 13), to which Lucy adds, “[her mother] stopped reading, and many 
years went by before she went to a different library in a different town and brought home 
books again” (13). Where, for Lucy, her working-class status made her more determined to 
succeed academically so as to distance herself from her upbringing, for Lucy’s mother it 
instead brought debilitating shame and disillusionment.  
Both Lucy and her mother become aware of what the world is through their 
experience of class, gender, and family structure, but they are divided by their actions and 
their choices. Of the library incident, Lucy explains that “I mention this because there was the 
question of how children became aware of what the world is, and how to act in it” (13). We 
can better understand Lucy through her relationship with her mother, and gain a clearer 
understanding of the cyclicality of trauma in turn. As mentioned in part one, where 
traditionally the rekindling of the mother/daughter relationship provides healing for both 
parties, for Lucy, the repeated abandonment by her mother once more extends her trauma 
beyond her stay in hospital. The method of portraying Lucy’s past mental trauma as 
embodied and immediate creates a complex temporal and physical mode of representing 
otherness that reimagines how literature is able to engage with the evolving discourse of 
trauma and memory.  
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Lucy’s determination to protect her daughters from both herself and her mother grows 
out of her own understanding of the cyclical nature of trauma. I contend that Lucy’s most 
important periods of introspection pertain to her relationship with her daughters. In 
remembering her time with her mother in hospital, Lucy considers the memories that 
confronted her and realises that many of her own formative memories are inconsequential 
moments to her mother. Towards the novel’s conclusion, Lucy laments, “I try to forget, but I 
will never forget. I worry about what it is they [her daughters] will never forget” (2016, 185). 
Later still, Lucy considers “do I understand that hurt my children feel? I think I do, though 
they might claim otherwise” (190). Lucy contemplates her own ability to understand and 
empathise with her children. In her children’s inner lives, she occupies an ambivalent 
position not dissimilar to that of her own mother, and in this moment of reflection, Lucy 
empathises with the complex pain she may have perpetuated upon her daughters. She is 
forced to confront the cyclical nature of trauma, and how it may be so deeply ingrained in a 
person that it may almost be inherited—or inflicted—between generations.  
Lucy’s liminal and complex position between her mother and her daughters, as both 
mother and daughter herself, is also one as the recipient and deliverer of trauma. Research 
has shown that individual and inherited trauma imprints upon familial structures in entangled 
and varied ways. Christa Schönfelder suggests that “legacies of trauma manifest themselves 
in the private space of the family” (2013, 275), and describes the phenomena of 
“transmemory”: a form of traumatic remembering that “arises from the subject’s longing for 
a state of connectedness with a loved one” (259). While there is a variety of responses to 
familial trauma, including “the involuntary transmission of a severely traumatic past,” 
transmemory characteristically “encompasses a broader sense of connectedness, one that may 
involve both memories and thoughts and traumatic as well as non-traumatic memories” 
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(259). In the novel, Lucy’s reflection upon her childhood trauma and the legacy of 
remembering inherited by her children represents a form of transmemory. 
While Lucy may have involuntarily transmitted the trauma of her past, she has a deep-
seated desire to connect with her children through empathy and shared trauma, even if she is 
the enactor of her children’s trauma. Schönfelder identifies this experience as a “state of 
intersubjective connectedness based on a mutual empathetic sharing of memories that reaches 
so far as to create a sense of the other’s memories being assimilated into the self” (260). 
Lucy’s memories allow her to compare and contrast her own relationship with her mother 
against that of her children, and to consider those moments in which she herself has 
unintentionally perpetuated this cycle. Where Lucy tried increasingly not to replicate the 
broadly harmful actions of her mother, she instead assimilated her own harmful actions into 
the lives of her daughters. In particular, Lucy sees her divorce from her husband as a source 
of great “rage” (185) for her daughters, as she “left their father” and “even though at the time 
I really thought I was just leaving him.…I left my girls as well” (184).  
Lucy’s underlying desire to relate to and empathise with her daughters has created a 
legacy of trauma within their family. Becka, Lucy’s daughter, aptly summarises how Lucy 
navigates her relationships, commenting: “Mom, when you write a novel you get to rewrite it, 
but when you live with someone for twenty years, that is the novel, and you can never write 
that novel with anyone again” (186). The end of Strout’s novel is a quick succession of 
intimate realisations of this nature, as Lucy’s mind flits across the interconnectedness of her 
childhood, her hospital stay, and the lives of her children, friends, and family. Lucy navigates 
her life best through narrative. This realisation of her own imperfection enables Lucy to 
engage with her mother as a largely ambivalent figure. It remains unclear as to whether or not 
Lucy mentally escapes her trauma. Just as Strout obfuscates the precise nature of Lucy’s 
neuroatypicality, so Lucy’s position in relation to her trauma, and that of others, is a liminal 
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one. The process of remembering, reinterpreting, and reexperiencing complicates Lucy’s 
attempts to physically distance herself from her childhood. Thus, Lucy, her mother, and her 
children are bound by a trauma that forms part of their family legacy. 
Lucy’s desire to distance herself from her mother and avoid re-enacting trauma in her 
own adulthood manifests in her determination to avoid telling other people’s stories. This 
refusal to appropriate other people’s narratives also reflects back upon the acknowledgement 
of authorial and biographical complexities within fiction. In accepting that she cannot fully 
understand another person’s mind, nor their motivations—that there will never fully be a 
justification for or reconciliation with trauma—Lucy accepts that she is only able to write and 
therefore understand her own story. When speaking of her now ex-husband, Lucy explains 
“this is not the story of my marriage,” because “I cannot tell that story” (148). Although 
Lucy’s is an inherently personal and idiosyncratic narrative, it is not without wider truths. 
Lucy herself realises this in her comment: “what I mean is, this is not just a woman’s story. 
It’s what happens to a lot of us” (28).  
Suzanne Keen suggests that while literature has the power to evoke great empathy 
from its readers, we, as readers, should be careful to consider the authenticity and 
permanence of our feeling, and whether such empathy continues to be felt for actual people. 
Keen posits that “when it comes to literary empathy, the dispositions of both authors and 
readers have a bearing on the way the other minds of represented persons are constructed and 
received” (Keen 2018, 133). That is to say, “aspects of authors’ and readers’ intersectional 
identities, especially gender, have been hypothesized to play a significant role in co-creating 
experiences of narrative empathy” (2018, 133). While it is evident that personal experience 
colours an individual’s perception of and reaction to a narrative, fiction also plays an 
essential role in destabilising and decentralising a person’s assumptions. In exploring the 
work of Ralph James Savarese, Keen notes the need to warn “against regarding the neuro-
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typical experience as a default version of human experience” (129) and the importance of re-
representing the experience of empathy in neuroatypical narratives. Strout’s novel celebrates 
its distinctive subject, confronting the preconceptions a reader may bring to the text, and it re-
centres our understanding through empathy for a working-class woman’s experience of 
neuroatypicality and illness. Thus, while Lucy laments her lack of community, her 
idiosyncratic fictional experiences, meditations on personal creation, and narrative 
imagination creates on a meta-textual level the very community she craves in My Name is 
Lucy Barton. 
On a wider level, Strout’s novel reflects upon what it means to be an artist and what it 
means to create. Strout’s text frames this understanding through both the gaze of a younger 
Lucy, overcome with the newness of her experience at university and then again through an 
older, wearier Lucy, who is able to reflect upon her naivety with kindness and honesty. For 
Lucy, instances of creation and artistic validation are entangled with the psychological. It is 
Jeremy, the solemn psychoanalyst who labels Lucy as an artist, yet Lucy is reluctant to 
assume such a mantle in part as a consequence of her disillusioning experience with the artist 
at university. Feelings of inferiority and isolation colour Lucy’s notions of art and creativity 
and are only further reinforced when Jeremy contends that “artists are different from other 
people” (40), to which Lucy despairs: “I had always been different; I did not want to be any 
more different” (40). For Lucy, the artist’s shameless curiosity at what he perceives as the 
oddity of her impoverished upbringing prompts her to realise that she will never marry him. 
Equally, it is at university that Lucy’s romanticised experiences with literature are dismantled 
as she encounters those who create and collect art for the purpose of superiority and 
exclusion. 
Lucy craves the sense of community from which she was excluded by her peers, her 
academic pursuits and even, to an extent, her experience of illness. She instead vows to create 
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art for the purpose of inclusion. As Lucy reflects upon her relationship with literature from a 
young age, she proclaims: “the books brought me things. This is my point. They made me 
feel less alone. This is my point. And I thought: I will write and people will not feel so alone! 
(But it was my secret).… I couldn’t take myself seriously. Except that I did. I took myself—
secretly, secretly—very seriously” (2016, 24–5). Books are not necessarily a remedy for 
illness, but for Lucy they are a cure for her chronic loneliness. Literature—whether one is an 
author or a reader—creates a community of like-minded individuals bound by their shared 
experience of a text.  
Isolation and exclusionary tactics are the tools used to enforce hegemonic structures 
of class, gender, and traditional family values against neuroatypical individuals. As a text that 
portrays experiences of illness and otherness filtered through complex patterns of memory, 
My Name is Lucy Barton demonstrates that art dealing with the unknown mind can play a 
crucial role within the community as a counter-narrative to homogenous social constructs. 
Accounts of neuroatypical minds can educate and evoke empathy, subtly working to 
undermine social hierarchies and directly challenge the systemic rejection of difference. Keen 
contends that “my reading of the developmental psychology of personality convinces me that 
fiction‐reading alone is unlikely permanently to shift a reader’s disposition at the level of the 
big five personality traits” (2018, 133). However, she notes that it is “demonstrable that 
experiences of narrative empathy can change attitudes about outgroups, reduce bias, and 
translate into real‐world sympathy for others outside of books” (2018, 133). Literature then, 
has the capacity to evoke empathetic response and the eventual erosion of individual bias, but 
should be classed as separate from “moral-guarantees” or “pathological altruism” (133). The 
narrative of My Name is Lucy Barton is a testament to the circularity of mental processing, 
and the life-long process of change. It stands to reason, then, that an empathetic response on 
the part of Strout’s reader would reflect the gradual empathetic development of its characters. 
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Strout’s novel, with its intimate setting and personal ambiguities, does not represent the linear 
triumphalism of personal growth that characterises the bildungsroman. Rather, both Lucy and 
the reader are allowed to remain uncertain, empathetic, and questioning, and continue to 




The focus of this thesis has been twofold: first, to examine the mechanisms employed by 
three authors to complicate and diversify fictional representations of neuroatypical 
functioning, and second, to interrogate an array of methodologies used to approach 
representations of this kind over the past century of literary studies. Each of my texts has 
offered insights into ethical modes of representing the othering experience of 
neuroatypicality, with all three novels yoked in their emphasis on active remembering, the 
subversion of linguistic, temporal, and spatial boundaries, and how the neuroatypical 
experience intersects with gender, sexuality, and class.     
Throughout this thesis, I have problematised the methodology of Freudian 
psychoanalytic literary theory, and its approach to neuroatypicality in both fictional worlds 
and the actual world. Freudian literary theory pathologizes neuroatypicality, enacting the 
separation of mind and body, and binarizing the concepts of illness and wellness. 
Contemporary psychoanalysis contains an abundance of theoretical offshoots and has 
evolved well beyond its Freudian roots. However, Freudian psychoanalytic theory endures as 
an active presence within contemporary literary criticism. Furthermore, Freudian 
psychoanalytic constructions of neuroatypicality, memory, and the unconscious mind are 
saturated with harmful hierarchies of gender, (dis)ability, and class, which adversely inflect 
Western cultural imaginings of cognitive functioning. 
Through the fiction of Virginia Woolf, Janet Frame, and Elizabeth Strout, I have 
explored how these same oppressive structures and attitudes burden their neuroatypical 
characters as their liminal identities grapple with and resist traditional hierarchies. Woolf, 
Frame, and Freudian psychoanalysis are all bound by their positions within the cultural apex 
of the psychoanalytic mind. Thus, my rejection of the literary critical psychoanalysis of Mrs 
Dalloway and Faces in the Water is at odds with both novels’ historical and contemporary 
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critical narratives. Critical discourse that relies on language constrained by archaic 
associations—such as hysterical or insane—pathologizing methodology, and a linear framing 
of recovery, flattens the disruptive portrayals of the neuroatypical experience in works like 
those of Woolf and Frame. Thus, continuing to apply Freudian theory to fiction that ethically 
examines the othered experience is antithetical to those characters’ struggles with the very 
social hierarchies that Freudian psychoanalysis upholds. While My Name is Lucy Barton is 
not directly linked to Freud, my analysis of the novel’s reflective position is an intervention 
within the developing critical framework of Strout’s text. The critical quality of Strout’s 
novel places My Name is Lucy Barton more squarely in opposition to Freudian methods than 
my other, earlier novels. This critical tone is further accentuated in Strout’s metatextual 
meditations on the phenomena of biographical readings and speculative diagnostic practices 
that are often Freudian bedfellows. The critical narratives of Woolf and Frame are both 
burdened by biographical criticism which, as I have demonstrated across this thesis, obscures 
more properties of a fictional text than it reveals. It is crucial to demarcate the boundaries 
between an author’s life, an author’s work, and the speculations surrounding both— 
particularly when the life and work of the author involve experiences of neuroatypicality. 
Doing so attends to the ability of an author to create and explore unique identities and 
experiences whilst maintaining the privacy of the author’s life.  
In a further act of implicit resistance to the practices of the Freudian establishment, 
Mrs Dalloway, Faces in the Water, and My Name is Lucy Barton each refrain from disclosing 
diagnoses for Clarissa, Istina, and Lucy, respectively. Each author insulates her character 
from the limiting expectations of onset, symptoms, and recovery that may unwittingly 
accompany a specific diagnosis. With no established diagnosis, all three novels resist the 
bildungsroman’s movement towards neat closure, which would suggest that success for the 
neuroatypical individual may only be obtained by recovering from or overcoming their 
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condition. Instead, Clarissa, Istina, and Lucy each face a circular journey born from acts of 
intimate remembering and provocative encounters with the neurotypical hegemony that 
positions each woman in an ambivalent space of reflection and change. 
Literature and literary studies should not be limited by historical context, or the 
ideologies of their contemporaries. Both literature and literary studies are also able to 
participate in, reflect upon, and look beyond contemporary theories and concepts. Mrs 
Dalloway and Faces in the Water are both novels that represent mental functioning beyond 
the Freudian scope of their contemporaries, and provide readers with an ethical means of 
engaging with the neuroatypical experience. My Name is Lucy Barton offers this same 
potential for readers while commenting critically upon the cultural legacy of 
(mis)understandings of neuroatypical functioning. Here, I return briefly to the Levinasian 
grasp—the attempt to know the other on one’s own terms, which enacts harm upon the 
othered individual—as a method of actualising the often-abstract notion of epistemic harm. 
The violent physicality of the grasp of the attempted knower is important to acknowledge if 
we are to come to terms with our own potential to enact epistemic harm upon othered and 
vulnerable individuals. While epistemic violence is a largely imperceptible construct, its 
contours exist within the methodologies and ontologies we use to approach the individual and 
social experience. Literary studies is often characterised as deeply invested in ethics and 
empathy. However, the unthinking application of diagnostic theories ally the critic’s ideas 
with antiquated social hierarchies and perpetuate those same hegemonic structures within 
their own work. How we, as both readers and critics, commune with literature reflects how 
we engage with the same experiences and identities in the actual world. Understanding the 
neuroatypical experience on its own terms, and resisting the desire to grasp and entirely 
know, is an essential step in diversifying this engagement. 
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Throughout this thesis, I have introduced theories and methodologies based upon the 
themes and methods of each novel. Rather than unravelling and interrogating the minds of 
neuroatypical characters, I have sought to remain attentive to their fundamental ineffability. 
In making real our potential for epistemic harm, I seek to demonstrate the intrinsic value of 
methodologies that are concerned with empirical, ethical, and empathetic approaches. 
Therefore, I have argued across this thesis in favour of the informed and multidisciplinary 
approach of cognitive literary studies. The dual focus of this thesis—on the disruptive 
qualities of my chosen texts, and their complex critical narratives—established the 
foundation through which I have demonstrated the advantages of the cognitive literary 
studies approach. Innovative literature which rejects the socio-cultural hierarchies of its 
contemporaries deserves a discursive space that reflects these same characteristics. Cognitive 
literary studies reiterates the need for a respectful and undogmatic approach to its 
neuroatypical subjects. Therefore, the methodology throughout my thesis has been formed by 
an ethos of equal exchange across literary and cognitive realms. 
This thesis has demonstrated the rich artistic and scientific potential that an 
interchange with cognitive literary studies—from affect theory to disability studies, the new 
unconscious, and memory studies—has with literature of all varieties. The interplay between 
Mrs Dalloway and affect theory demonstrated Virginia Woolf’s ability to intimate and even 
presuppose the complex processing of visceral bodily experiences in relation to heightened 
emotional events. Woolf’s fundamentally modernist use of language articulates the ineffable 
qualities of mental processing, both typical and atypical, whilst situating and exploring 
neuroatypicality in a fluctuating cultural context. The discourse of disability studies 
emphasised Faces in the Water’s ethically complex approach to the representation of 
vulnerable subjects. Moreover, my work has highlighted Janet Frame’s deep creativity in a 
critical crossover with the new unconscious. Frame’s novel depicts the narrativizing quality 
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of the conscious mind while embracing the inherently unknowable elements of unconscious 
processing which thematically evokes many of the emerging lines of inquiry that characterise 
the study of the new unconscious. Elizabeth Strout’s My Name is Lucy Barton demonstrated 
the ability of fiction to both reflect upon and actively participate in the discourse of 
neuroatypicality. In introducing memory studies to my analysis, I demonstrated how Strout’s 
novel is able to employ memory as a literary device while replicating the individual and 
cultural phenomena of mnemonic memory and embracing its inherent fallibility in the face of 
trauma. Further, in exploring works from a variety of literary epochs, I have demonstrated 
how fiction can be reinvigorated and revaluated through a symbiotic exchange with 
contemporary criticism.    
Each novel articulates a subversive mode of representing neuroatypical minds 
informed by epistemic care while never relinquishing their fundamentally literary approach. 
Woolf, Frame, and Strout each explore the tensions between a responsibility towards 
vulnerable subjects and the creative playground of the conscious and unconscious mind. All 
three texts centre neuroatypical individuals and the adversity they face as a reminder of the 
essentially human impact our abstract and critical musings can have. The matter of 
representing and critically engaging with neuroatypical experiences will continue to evolve 
far beyond the bounds of this thesis. Moreover, it is likely that the theory and terminology I 
have employed throughout this thesis will cycle out of use. This inevitability is something I 
celebrate, as it speaks to a growing united scientific and artistic investment in expanding our 
understanding of, and engagement with, the neuroatypical experience—an investment which 
sits at the core of my work here. While we may never fully comprehend the entire spectrum 
of mental functioning that exists, literature can situate us within the complex experience of 
the mind of both self and other, destabilising and diversifying preconceived notions of mental 
processes, and attesting to the vast potential of human cognition. 
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